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Abstract 
Corporate governance has been a hot bed for scholars from diverse disciplines. Managers 
whose interests are not congruent with that of shareholders‟ do not have the incentive to 
maximize shareholder value. Agency theory implicitly assumes corporations as arenas of the 
principal-agent conflict. On the other hand, organizational perspectives maintain that firms 
differ in their adopted corporate governance level depending on the environmental 
contingencies in which they operate. This study develops a contingency framework by 
synthesizing agency theory and organization theory. The aims of this study are to examine 
the effect of firm level contingencies on corporate governance and examine the moderating 
impact of firm level contingencies on the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm financial performance in the Ethiopian non-financial share companies. Data were 
collected from public and private sources for 42 companies covering the period 2009-2013. 
For the first time overall corporate governance index is constructed from board structure, 
ownership structure, and disclosure and transparency. By specifying fixed effect regression 
models the study accounts for the presence of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, a 
moderation fixed effect model is specified for the corporate governance-performance 
relationship. Results show that firms choose their corporate governance in response to 
contexts in which they operate. High-risk firms have good corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is enhanced if the largest owner is government or bank. Findings show not only 
the positive influence of corporate governance on financial performance but also the positive 
effect of corporate governance on financial performance is enhanced where there are high 
agency problems. Firm growth, firm level risk and identity of the largest shareholder 
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moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance. 
The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that firms endogenously choose 
their corporate governance and the effect of corporate governance on pperformance depends 
on firm level contingencies. For practice, the positive link between corporate governance and 
financial performance informs us that instituting and enforcing corporate governance should 
be taken seriously. Areas that require priority include the legal frameworks and their 
enforcement, additional corporate governance standards, strong financial market particularly 
a stock market. Future research can build on the limitations of the study. For instance, 
researchers can increase the sample size, compare industries or perform cross-country 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has been a hot bed for scholars from diverse disciplines (Hambrick, et 
al., 2008). In the 18
th
 century the famous economist prophesised the inevitable conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers of modern corporations (Smith, 1776).  Adam 
Smith (1776) in his book „the wealth of nations‟ warned that managers may lack the 
incentives to act in the interest of shareholders as managers control “rather of other people’s 
money than of their own”. Later  Berle and Means (1932) emphasized the adverse effect of 
dispersed ownership on performance and proposed ownership concentration to remedy the 
problem. Since then particularly over the past few decades, the issue of agency problem in 
publicly held corporations has attracted scholars from various academic fields (Hambrick, et 
al., 2008). In the 20
th
 century, Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalized the the agency 
problems that occur as shareholders of a corporation (principals) delegate a manager (agent) 
to perform tasks on their behalf.  Agency problems occur due to the lack of incentives on the 
side of the manager (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) that opens rooms for managerial 
misbehaviour and the expropriation of shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Managers whose interests are not congruent with that of 
shareholders‟ do not have the incentive to maximize shareholder value. In this context, 
managers exercise their discretion on company resources in the form of higher managerial 
compensation and spending on perquisites, investing on inefficient projects, and even 
staying on the job without qualification (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
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Corporate governance provides managers the incentive to strive for higher shareholders‟ 
wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). It deals with the mechanisms by which 
investors of a widely held corporation assure themselves of getting a return from their 
invested capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, hereafter OECD explains that corporate governance specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among parties to a corporation such as managers, 
directors and shareholders in a way that sound objectives are developed and progress and 
performances are monitored (OECD, 2004a). Corporate governance has legal and economic 
as well as micro and macro aspects. Capital markets (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a), 
ownership concentration (La Porta, et al., 1999; Holderness, 2003), the board of directors 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a), managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012) and strong legal and regulatory systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; La Porta, et al., 1997) are prominent corporate governance mechanisms. These are a 
“bundle of governance mechanisms” (Rediker and Seth, 1995) instituted to limit managerial 
discretion and make them behave in the interests of shareholders for profit maximization. 
Following accounting scandals in major companies (Enron, WorldCom and Tyco), several 
corporate governance regulations have been adopted to be applied by public companies 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). In the U.S. the Sarbanes-Oxley act, the NYSE, NASDAQ and 
AMEX emerged in response to corporate scandals.  
There is much evidence on the significance of corporate governance both at firm and 
national levels. The Centre for International Private Enterprise, hereafter CIPE explains how 
corporate governance affects corruption. By demanding appropriate disclosure and 
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transparency of company transactions, good corporate governance blocks the supply side of 
corruption that would drain company resources (CIPE, 2002).  Good corporate governance 
allows companies to access finance at lower costs (Klapper and Love, 2002). Corporate 
governance affects the financial viability of companies. Good corporate governance requires 
managers and boards to devise sound strategies that help attract external finance at 
favourable terms and enhance company performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994; CIPE, 2002). 
National level evidences show that countries with good corporate governance regimes are 
associated with high entrepreneurial growth and better economic development (Claessens, 
2003; OECD, 2004a), large financial markets (La Porta, et al., 1997) and low corruption rate 
(Wu, 2005).  
Agency theory is a predominantly used framework in corporate governance research 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Scholars using this framework prescribe different corporate 
governance mechanisms for companies. Their general premise is that corporate governance 
mechanisms are universal and one size fits all (Black, et al., 2010). Studies thus demonstrate 
that these governance mechanisms individually or collectively predict higher firm 
performance (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Li and Simerly, 1998). Organizational theory 
maintains that it is not possible to reduce the conflict of interests in modern corporations to 
the principal-agent relationship (Mintzberg, 1984), as all external shareholders may not have 
similar interests (Drucker, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). The theory suggests that the 
choice of organizational forms should depend on factors both internal and external to a firm 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Several researchers accept this 
context driven argument (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bhagat, et al., 
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2008; (Klapper and Love, 2002); Nelson, 1991).  Diversities of corporate governance 
mechanisms across countries (Klapper and Love, 2002; Black, et al., 2010; Lins, 2003) and 
even across firms within a country (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Black, et al., 2010)  explain 
the varieties of governance choices that companies make (Nelson, 1991). This context 
dependent assumption has implications for organization studies. Organizational scholars 
argue that performance is contingent on the fit between corporate governance and firm 
characteristics (Black, et al., 2010; Li and Simerly, 1998;Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). This 
line of thinking has recently become the new direction for corporate governance literature 
(Boyd, et al., 2012).  
This thesis is written to clarify these controversies surrounding the literature as well as many 
other issues. There is limited evidence on how African companies are governed and how this 
affects their performance. Most of the information we have about corporate governance 
comes from developed economies. Research is required to explain the implications of global 
evidence to African companies that have been aliens to modern corporate culture. 
Particularly, the Ethiopian context creates much interest. It has the lowest rated investor 
protection regime, no formal corporate governance institutions, the weakest corporate 
governance enforcement and no formally organized stock market.  
 The study builds on the advice of Eisenhardt (1989) and Burton (2000) who suggest 
complementing the perspectives of agency theory and organizational theory. It has two main 
arguments:  (1) organizational contingencies affect the level of use of corporate governance 
mechanisms and (2) the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on performance depends 
on contingency factors.  Specifically, we need to examine how uncertainty, firm growth, and 
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owner identity influence corporate governance choice and how the choices explain 
performance variances across firms. This line of inquiry adds to the knowledge we already 
have by augmenting traditional corporate governance researches with contingency 
perspectives from the field of organizational perspectives (Boyd, et al., 2012; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). Moreover extending corporate governance researches to developing 
countries such as Ethiopia which do not have capital market may set the boundaries of the 
commonly used agency theory with new insights. Therefore explaining the antecedents and 
consequences of corporate governance opens new avenue for research (Hambrick, et al., 
2008). The purpose of this thesis is to examine how firm level contingencies (firm growth, 
firm risk and owner identity) influence corporate governance choice and how firm level 
contingencies moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial 
performance. 
1.2  Problem Statement 
 Since the classical work of Berle and Means (1932), there have been many theoretical and 
empirical studies on agency problems and the remedy, corporate governance. The agency 
problem occurs due to the separation of „ownership and control‟ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
between shareholders of a corporation (principal) and the manager who is delegated by the 
shareholders (Agent) to perform tasks on their behalf. The principals require maximum 
return from their invested capital and the manager is responsible to behave in the interests of 
shareholders for maximum company performance. Nevertheless, the manager may be 
reluctant to achieve maximum company performance as the benefits belong to shareholders 
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while costs are born by the manager. Corporate governance deals with making the manager 
to behave in the interest of shareholders for higher return. 
Although the agency perspective is an often used framework in corporate governance studies 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), researchers from organizational perspectives have contributed 
new insights to the issue (Burton, 2000). Both perspectives recognize the presence of self-
interest, information asymmetry and risk aversion in modern corporations (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Both assume self-interested and opportunistic managers and emphasise that corporate 
governance is a remedy to align the interests of shareholders and managers. Given such 
similarities, one would expect that the perspectives unequivocally predict positive 
association between corporate governance and company performance. Higher return is what 
corporate governance ultimately assures of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
However, the agency and organizational perspectives have subtle differences on the nature 
of corporations, corporate governance and the governance-performance link. Agency theory 
implicitly assumes corporations as arenas of the principal-agent conflict. This implies that an 
examination of modern corporations should focus on the theory‟s dichotomous view. 
Organizational scholars recognize the complexity of influences in corporations which are 
difficult to reduce to dichotomy (Mintzberg, 1984; Drucker, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988). Agency theory researchers believe that modern corporations are victims of inherent 
conflict of interest, thus all should adopt equal level of corporate governance (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994; Aguilera, et al., 2007). Under this condition, corporate governance would 
have a positive effect on firm performance. On the other hand, organizational perspectives 
maintain that firms differ in their adopted corporate governance level depending on the 
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environmental contingencies in which they operate (Holderness, 2003). Consequently, 
company performance depends on the degree of fitness or congruence between contingency 
factors and the adopted corporate governance (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1973). 
While the corporate governance conceptions of agency and organizational perspective seem 
to be contradictory, they are in fact complementary. Corporate governance researchers have 
developed such contingency models to reflect the complementarities of the agency and 
organizational perspectives (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). The objective of this study is to 
integrate the two perspectives into a single framework.  Specifically, the study tries to 
demonstrate the complementarities of the agency and organizational perspectives by 
examining how firm level contingencies influence adopted level of corporate governance 
and how fitness or congruence between corporate governance and firm contingencies in tern 
influence firm performance.  
The agency perspective allows us to identify corporate governance mechanisms that 
constrain managerial discretion and make them act for higher company performance. 
Proponents of the agency perspective have suggested that the board of directors (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a), managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
ownership concentration (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and appropriate disclosure and 
transparency (Abrahamson and Park, 1994) are relevant corporate governance mechanisms. 
The organizational perspective complements the agency perspective by recognizing firm 
difference in level of corporate governance. Proponents of organisation perspectives argue 
that adoption of corporate governance mechanisms depends on environmental contingencies 
within which firms operate (Klapper and Love, 2002). The central idea of organizational 
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researchers is that firms operating in different contracting environments differ in their level 
of agency problems thus calling for contingent corporate governance (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Empirical studies have reported 
that contingency factors at industry level (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, et al., 
1999) and firm level (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994; Alves and 
Martins, 2010) influence the level of adoption of corporate governance. At the firm level the 
level of agency problems is affected by firm growth (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Himmelberg, et 
al., 1999), firm risk (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bathala and Rao, 1995), identity of the 
largest owner (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Holderness, 2003) and asset composition 
(Klapper and Love, 2002; Alves and Martins, 2010).    
The link between corporate governance and firm performance is another dimension that the 
agency and organizational perspectives appear to have different predictions. In the tradition 
of agency theory, firm performance is a direct function of corporate governance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, organizational scholars argue that performance is a function 
of the level of fit between chosen structural forms and environmental contingencies that 
influence those choices (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Boyd, et al., 2012). The implication is that 
the form and strength of relationship between an independent variable on a dependent 
variable is moderated by another variable (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; Schoonhoven, 
1981). Corporate governance researchers have obtained that the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance is moderated by firm growth (Black, et al., 2010), firm risk 
(Li and Simerly, 1998) and identity of large owners (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). In 
summary, this thesis proposes that organizational perspectives can complement agency 
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theory‟s traditional conceptions of corporate governance in such a way that additional 
insights can be obtained.  
Empirical Corporate governance studies can be categorized on how they put corporate 
governance in their analysis. Studies on antecedents of corporate governance identify firm 
and environmental contingencies that could affect firm level corporate governance 
mechanisms Relevant contingency factors considered as antecedents of corporate 
governance are firm growth (Bathala and Rao, 1995), Firm risk (Zajac and Westphal,1994; 
Bathala and Rao, 1995; Himmelberg, et al., 1999), firm size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Bathala and Rao, 1995), owner identity (Abrahamson and Park, 1994) and asset composition 
(Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Other studies explain the effect of 
some measure of corporate governance on firm performance (Klapper and Love, 2002; 
Gompers, et al., 2003; Bauer, et al., 2008; Black, et al., 2010). Still others emphasize on how 
the level of existence of contingency factors moderate the governance-performance 
relationship.   
However few studies have integrated antecedents of corporate governance and the 
moderating effect of antecedent factors in the corporate governance-performance 
relationship into a single framework. This approach is commonly known as full contingency 
model. The central idea of contingency models is corporate governance is enhanced where it 
is required most (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Bebczuk, 2005).  Finkelstein and D'Aveni 
(1994) conceptualize and test the conflicting hypothesis of CEO duality suggested by 
organizational theory and agency theory.  Bebczuk (2005) and Black, et al., (2010)  indicate 
that firm growth moderates the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
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performance. Li and Simerly (1998) hypothesized and empirically tested the moderating 
effect of environmental dynamism on the managerial ownership-performance relationship. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) study the moderating effect of owner identity on the 
governance-performance relationship.  
The empirical corporate governance literature has several limitations. Corporate governance 
encompasses a bundle of mechanisms that should be included in an analysis that otherwise 
would lead to missing variable bias (Gompers, et al., 2003; Black, et al., 2010).  Firm 
hetrogeniety is another problem few studies have addressed (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). 
Despite addressing the aforementioned limitations, testing moderation hypotheses are the 
major setback for researchers.  This study has the responsibility of taking care of the 
limitations of previous empirical studies.  
The corporate form of organization in Ethiopia is at its infancy stage  (Negash, 2008).  There 
is no formal secondary financial market. The share company law is the only corporate 
governance mechanism in the country and the Ministry of Trade (MoT) is the only entity 
that regulates and supervises share companies (Negash, 2008). Therefore studies have 
focused on evaluating the company law based on international corporate governance 
frameworks.  
 Most of the studies agree on one thing: the share company law is insufficient to address 
more pertinent corporate governance provisions. It doesn‟t address adequately governance 
issues related to the board of directors (Tura, 2012). Specifically the company law ignores 
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board dimensions such as the composition and independence of the board of directors, and 
separation of the jobs of the chair and the CEO. The share company law does not have 
enough provisions requiring companies to disclose material information especially relative 
to international standards (Gebeyaw, 2012).  
Similar evaluative studies have also unveiled the limitations of the company law. Negash 
(2008) used the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) framework to evaluate the 
company law and found out that the company law has severe problems related to inadequacy 
to address complex governance issues, lack of incorporating international codes and 
principles of corporate governance, high agency cost associated with political party 
domination in the corporate sector, high ownership concentration and pyramid ownership 
structure, inefficient legal and court system that creates inadequate investor protection, and 
lack of organized share market characterize the overall corporate governance system in the 
country.  Gebeyaw (2012) evaluates the Ethiopian share company law on the bases of the six 
governance principles of the OECD.  Compared with international governance standards, the 
legal and regulatory framework of the share company law is ineffective to promote efficient 
market.  
The only economic analysis study examines the corporate governance of Ethiopian banks 
and the implications on financial performance (Fanta, et al., 2013). However, the legal and 
institutional environment within which financial institutions operate is different from that of 
non-financial institutions. This study focuses on non-financial share companies of Ethiopia.  
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Although the adoption of relevant international governance mechanisms with the 
consideration of legal, economic and cultural circumstances of the country has paramount 
importance to the economic growth of the country (Gebeyaw, 2012; Tura, 2012), it coudn‟t 
be realized in the near future. Recognizing the limitations of the share company law to 
address contemporary market situations the government has been working on a new draft. 
Recently the government of Ethiopia commits itself to developing the private sector. 
Moreover, the country is aspiring to attract foreign investment.  
Despite insufficient company law and virtually no regulatory systems, Ethiopian share 
companies are still operating in the market. Moreover, newly established ones are joining the 
market. Therefore, it can be presumed at this point that Ethiopian share companies 
consistently adjust their internal corporate governance mechanisms in response to the 
environment especially to their internal environment within which they operate.  Difference 
in performance of Ethiopian share companies could be to a large extent the result of 
difference in capacity to adjust their corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, what 
determines the corporate governance of Ethiopian share companies, and to what extent does 
adjustment of corporate governance in response to environmental factors affect corporate 
performance?  Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the effect of firm level 
contingencies on corporate governance and examine the moderating impact of firm level 
contingencies on the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial 
performance in the Ethiopian non-financial share companies.    
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1.3  Aim and Objectives 
The aims of this study are to examine the effect of firm level contingencies on corporate 
governance and examine the moderating impact of firm level contingencies on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance in the Ethiopian 
non-financial share companies. The specific objectives of the study are to explain, 
 the effect of firm growth on corporate governance in the Ethiopian non-financial 
share companies. 
 the effect of firm risk on corporate governance in the Ethiopian non-financial share 
companies. 
 the effect of owner identity on corporate governance in the Ethiopian non-financial 
share companies.  
 the effect of corporate governance on firm financial performance in the Ethiopian 
non-financial share companies. 
 the moderating effect of firm growth in the relationship between corporate 
governance  and firm financial performance in the Ethiopian non-financial share 
companies.  
 the moderating effect of firm risk in the relationship between corporate governance  
and firm financial performance in the Ethiopian non-financial share companies. 
 the moderating effect of owner identity in the relationship between corporate 
governance  and firm financial performance in the Ethiopian non-financial share 
companies.  
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1.4  Hypotheses  
For each of the above specific objectives, testable hypotheses are developed in chapter four. 
It should be noted that the aim of this study is to explain what firm level contingencies affect 
corporate governance and how firm level contingencies moderate the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Thus, based on the level of analysis, we can 
have three groups of hypotheses. 
 Hypotheses for the impact of firm level contingencies on corporate governance 
Firm growth 
H1a: The higher the growth opportunities of firms the stronger will be their 
corporate governance. 
H1b: The higher the growth opportunities of firms the weaker will be their corporate 
governance. 
Firm risk 
H2a: The higher the risk of firms the stronger will be their corporate governance. 
H2b: The higher the risk of firms the weaker will be their corporate governance.  
Owner identity 
H3a: the impact of owner identity on corporate governance is positive for bank and 
government ownership relative to management ownership. 
H3b: the positive impact of owner identity on corporate governance is greater for 
bank ownership than government ownership relative to management ownership. 
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Hypothesis for the impact of corporate governance on firm performance 
H4: The effect of corporate governance on firm performance is positive. 
 
Hypotheses for the moderating effect of firm level contingencies on the corporate 
governance-firm performance relationship.  
 The moderating effect of Firm growth  
H5: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
moderated by firm growth. The greater the growth of firms the greater will be the 
positive influence of corporate governance on firm performance. 
The moderating effect of Firm risk  
H6: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
moderated by firm risk. The greater firm risk the greater will be the positive 
influence corporate governance on firm performance. 
The moderating effect of Owner identity  
 H7: the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
moderated by the identity of the largest owner. If the largest owner is bank the greater 
will be the positive influence of corporate governance on firm performance.  
1.5  Rationale 
The strong link between corporate governance and economic performance is the main reason 
that justifies for undertaking this thesis. Studies have indicated that good corporate 
governance is associated with entrepreneurial growth  (La Porta, et al., 1999), high flow of 
external finance (CIPE , 2002), lower diversion of firm resources and high firm performance 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gompers, et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2002; Bauer, et al., 
2008; Claessens, 2003). In fact, the effect of corporate governance is systemic. For example, 
a cross-country study shows that countries with poor legal rule and weaker law enforcement 
do have smaller and narrower capital markets (both equity and debt) (La Porta, et al., 1997; 
Claessens, 2003). The OECD (2004a) notes that; 
“If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital market, 
and if they are to attract long-term “patient” capital, corporate 
governance arrangements must be credible, well understood across 
borders and adhere to internationally accepted principles. Even if 
corporations do not rely primarily on foreign sources of capital, 
adherences to good corporate governance practices will help improve 
the confidence of domestic investors, reduce the cost of capital, 
underpin the good functioning of financial markets, and ultimately 
induce more stable sources of financing.” 
The forth-going discussion briefly highlights the significance of corporate governance to 
economic development at a national level. The question should be what role the findings of 
this thesis can play. Obviously, the role of this thesis is to inform policy makers and other 
stakeholders on the benefits of corporate governance on economic performance both at a 
company and country level. As Bebczuk (2005) comments, even in the absence of financial 
markets in a country, companies may be encouraged to strengthen their governance 
mechanisms if findings show a positive link between corporate governance and firm 
17 
 
financial performance. This initiative addresses only the private issue of economic 
institutions. The idea can be extended to the broader policy. Financial markets do not exist in 
Ethiopia and corporate governance institutions and standards are virtually absent. Therefore, 
the agency and information problems examined in the developed markets can have also 
implication in a market that is shy to much of the realities in developed markets. (Gebeyaw, 
2012) mentions several weaknesses of the Ethiopia share company law to address corporate 
issues in accordance with international best practices. Thus, findings of the study have 
important implications to the legal issues of corporate governance. Corporate governance is 
a public issue as well that minority shareholders need to be legally protected from the 
expropriation of insiders and large shareholders (Bebczuk, 2005). Obviously, this is the task 
of authorities. There has been a tremendous effort by scholars and researchers to studying 
corporate governance and its effect on corporate decisions and performance. In comparison 
with the benefits of good governance to financial stability, capital market development and 
investment promotion the attentions given to the field is not enough. It is disturbing to 
observe the lack of concern by researchers as well as lawmakers to the creation and 
enhancement of corporate governance culture in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a civil law affiliated 
country. Its legal system is one of the weakest to protecting shareholders (La Porta, et al., 
1997). Owing to its weak institutions both legal and financial, managers may expropriate the 
benefits of minority shareholders, as there are no external mechanisms that discipline 
managers (Cornelius, 2005). The weak legal framework allows managers to pursue their 
interest at the expense of shareholders (Gebeyaw, 2012). In the absence of capital markets, 
especially stock markets potential employers may not know the performance of managers 
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and hence managers may not have the incentive to exert their efforts to maximize the wealth 
of shareholders. In these contexts, corporate governance interventions assures the viability of 
businesses (Daily and Dalton, 1994).  In fact, studies show that corporate governance 
benefits those companies that operate in countries with weak governance institutions 
(Klapper and Love, 2002; Cornelius, 2005). Although there are fragmented studies on the 
legal issues of corporate governance in Ethiopia (Negash, 2008; Fekadu, 2010), economic 
analysis of the field is virtually absent. 
Recently there have been initiatives by the business community and other stakeholders to 
influence the government of Ethiopia to establish necessary corporate governance 
regulations and institutions. This movement has already started recruiting voluntary 
companies to implement a standard corporate governance code that has been under 
development and has not been completed to date. The timing of this thesis is so perfect that 
findings could help identify appropriate corporate governance mechanisms and the type of 
companies that could benefit from a given mix. Literature has reminded us that unless 
supported by valid empirical information the adoption of any corporate governance 
mechanism would result in either poor implementation due to resistance or poor 
performance due to incongruence between firm level contingencies and adopted corporate 
governance mechanism.    
The absence of formal financial market in the country is a unique context to address 
corporate governance. Significant number of studies has focused on developed nations or 
have addressed the issue of corporate governance in the context of secondary financial 
markets. Even though these studies have informed us a lot about the issue, there is no 
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guarantee that the findings would also apply to other contexts especially developing nations 
that do not have secondary financial markets. Therefore, information on the corporate 
governance of Ethiopian companies could add something to our knowledge about corporate 
governance. 
The nature of ownership structure in Ethiopia is another area worth investigation. In addition 
to the issue of concentrated vs. dispersed ownership structure, the identity of the largest 
shareholder has recently been the focus of much theoretical and empirical inquiry.  
1.6  Delineation of field and Scope of the Study 
Corporate governance is a multidisciplinary issue that can be explained by political theory, 
legal theory, sociology, management, psychology, economics, and accounting and finance. 
Over the past few decades, the issue of agency problem in publicly held corporations has 
attracted scholars from various academic fields (Hambrick et al., 2008). This study addresses 
the broader fields of economic and organizational theories. Nevertheless, the legal and 
regulatory institutional environment of Ethiopia is also addressed as economic analysis could 
be impossible or at least incomplete without a clear understanding of the macro-level factors 
underling corporate governance. The scope of the study can be defined in cross sectional and 
temporal dimensions. The population of the study is non-financial share companies of 
Ethiopia. That is financial companies such as banks and insurance companies are not 
included in the study. This is because we do not expect both financial and non-financial 
firms to operate in similar legal frameworks. Theoretically, these companies raise capital by 
selling stocks (ownership shares) to the public. For econometrics reasons, companies that 
have been operating since 2009 are considered.  
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1.7  Importance of the Study 
 The thesis contributes to the corporate governance literature in three ways. First, a unique 
hand collected corporate governance index is constructed for Ethiopian non-financial 
corporations and related to firm performance. Previous works have studied the institutions 
and legal framework that shape the corporate governance of Ethiopia at country level (WGI, 
2010) or simply evaluate only the legal aspect of corporate governance (Williamson, 1975). 
Findings from these studies indicate that Ethiopia has weak regulatory and legal system. 
There have been conflicting propositions about the relationship between institutional 
systems and firm level corporate governance. On one hand, firms embedded in weak 
institutional systems are not expected to adopt good corporate governance as courts and 
investors do not understand the added governance features when conflicts among members 
of the firm arise (Klapper and Love, 2002). On the contrary, other scholars claim that 
investors are willing to pay a premium price if firms in weak institutional systems augment 
the weak system with better corporate governance. The legal and regulatory systems in 
Ethiopia are too weak to protect shareholders from managerial abuse (Fekadu, 2010; Negash, 
2008). In this respect, this study contributes also to practice. In less developed markets, a 
clear understanding of corporate governance is a prerequisite to initiate major institutional 
change (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Additionally, Good corporate governance assures the 
growth of entrepreneurship (La Porta, et al., 1997; La Porta, et al., 1999), high flow of 
external finance, low diversion of firm resources and higher firm performance (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) and reduces corruption (Wu, 2005). Therefore, the thesis contributes to the 
literature by providing new evidence on the corporate governance of Ethiopia.  
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Second, the thesis contributes to the corporate governance literature by identifying relevant 
firm level contingencies that affect the level of adoption of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance researches traditionally assume that the separation of ownership and control 
demand mechanisms to constrain managerial discretion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). This approach considers all corporations as targets of such control 
mechanisms irrespective of differences in characteristics. Literature however reminds us that 
firms have the discretions to choose their mode of governance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001; Klapper and Love, 2002; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Li and 
Simerly, 1998). Literature also reminds us that large investors not only constrain managerial 
discretion but also may have the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders (Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2000). Germane to this objective is firms choose their corporate governance in 
response to the specificity of their characteristics. Apart from observed firm level 
contingencies, this thesis shows that unobserved firm heterogeneity affect both corporate 
governance and firm performance.  
Third, Contrary to agency theory‟s assumption that the link between corporate governance 
and firm performance is context free, this study provides evidence that factors in the 
contracting environment of firms‟ are important moderating contingencies for the 
relationship. Since firms choose governance mechanism endogenous to their characteristics, 
performance should depend on the level of fit between the chosen governance mechanism 
and firm level contingencies (Schoonhoven, 1981; Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). 
Recently the argument has gained prominence in the corporate governance literature. 
Proponents maintain that the benefit of using corporate governance mechanisms is higher in 
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situation where greater agency problem is more likely (Zajac and Westphal, 1994). This 
thesis contributes to the literature by drawing insights from organizational perspective that 
states firm level contingencies-corporate governance alignment positively influences firm 
performance (Burton, 2000; Boyd, et al., 2012; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Except Few 
studies (Black, et al., 2010; Li and Simerly, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), the 
literature provides scarce evidence on the link between corporate governance and firm 
performance.    
1.8  Limitations of the study 
Although this study is a result of relentless effort and enthusiasm, it may have some 
limitations. The major one relates to sample selection. In the corporate governance literature, 
selecting sample based on specified period and data availability is a common approach 
(Yermack, 1996). This study follows the literature and selects companies that have been 
operating for at least five years. It requires identifying companies that started operation 
before or in 2009 (2013 being the last year). Further, we excluded companies with 
insufficient data and end up with a usable sample of 42 companies. This has two 
consequences. First, companies that commence operation before or on 2009 may have quit 
before 2013. This reduced the number of observations that may have significant effect on 
results obtained on the remaining companies. The problem is severe if excluded companies 
have different corporate governance systems and financial performance. For instance, the 
excluded companies had bad governance systems that led them to underperform or even to 
bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton, 1994). Second, young companies that commence operation 
later than 2009 are also excluded from the sample. A similar selection bias would exist if 
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these companies had different corporate governance or performance. In this context, the 
results of the study would have been different if young companies were included. 
Nevertheless, we do not have such evidence. The best we can do is to investigate the effect 
of the two cases of selection biases is showing if governance and performance have some 
kind of distribution pattern. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the distribution of the 
variables does not indicate the presence of sample selection bias. Still, there is some chance 
for the presence of the problem. 
1.9  Study Environment 
In the last three decades there has been fewer topics placed in the international business and 
development agenda than corporate governance. Business failures, financial crisis and high 
profile scandals across the world have brought corporate governance to top priority of 
developing countries (CIPE , 2002). Despite much theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
links between corporate governance and economic development the issue has been alien to 
the African continent (Negash, 2008). The limited evidence in the continent has led scholars 
and practitioners to hold a generalist view observed from their corporate governance reform 
recommendations based on evidences obtained from developed markets (CIPE , 2002). 
Ayogu (2001) undertakes a survey of corporate governance for listed companies of 
Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The survey employs global corporate governance indicators such as 
board size composition executive compensation, succession planning, committee structure, 
and accounting standards. Nganga, et al. (2003) survey legal systems effectiveness across 
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Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. They 
conclude that shareholders of Africa enjoy similar rights as in other emerging markets do. 
1.9.1 Corporate governance in Ethiopia 
1.9.1.1 Legal and regulatory institutions 
Share company is new to Ethiopia (Negash, 2008). It was in 1960 that the current 
commercial code adopted from the French commercial code. The share company law is a 
part of this commercial code. However recognizing its inadequacy to address contemporary 
market situations the government has been working on a new draft and it has not been 
completed at the time of writing on this dissertation.  Therefore, this review section focuses 
on the legal framework of the 1960 commercial code of Ethiopia and the institutions related 
to it. The Ministry of Trade is the only entity that regulates and supervises share companies 
(Negash, 2008). Gebeyaw (2012) evaluates the Ethiopian share company law on the bases of 
the six governance principles of the OECD.  He concludes that the legal and regulatory 
framework of the share company law is ineffective to promote efficient market and could 
even alienate investors. Similarly, Tura (2012) examines the legal framework that governs 
companies. He reports the inadequacy of the legal framework to specify clearly the roles, 
composition and remuneration of boards of directors. Specifically, there is no legal provision 
for the need for independent directors. Moreover, the duties of executive directors is not 
clearly delineated from non-executive directors. Gebeyaw (2012) and Tura (2012) 
recommend for the adoption of relevant international governance mechanisms with the 
consideration of legal, economic and cultural circumstances of the country. 
25 
 
1.9.1.2 Corporate governance structure  
a. Shareholder rights 
 
Shareholder rights are one of the fundamental elements of good corporate governance 
(Claessens, 2003). Shareholders have the right to demand relevant information regarding the 
operation and governance of their company (arts 406, 417, 422 and 427).
1
 Shareholders have 
also the right to vote in shareholders‟ meeting (art 407).  Shareholders can exercise their 
voting rights on matters related to approval or removal of directors and auditors, approval or 
rejection of directors‟ and auditors‟ reports, authorization or prohibition of directors‟ 
involvement with competing companies, invoking  legal suits against directors, approving or 
rejection of resolutions  passed by the general meeting etc. (arts 353(1) 355, 356 372, and 
419(2)). There are however some exceptions. For example, a shareholder may not vote when 
his interest conflicts with the company‟s and preferred shareholders are allowed to vote only 
in extraordinary meetings (336(3)).  Other shareholder rights include the right to get their 
share in company profit (art 345 (1 and 2)), the preferential right to buy new shares in 
proportion to their shareholdings (art 470), the right to transfer their shares unless restricted 
by the article of association or extraordinary meetings (art 333), and the right to withdraw 
from the company (art 463). 
b. Ownership structure  
 
Shares may have different classes i.e. preferred and ordinary (art 335). In cases of 
misconduct, shareholders cannot sue insiders and majority holders (Gebeyaw, 2012). The 
                                                          
1
 Art(s) refer to article(s) in the company law section of the commercial code of Ethiopia. 
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powers of shareholder concentration are indicated in the share company law. Shareholders 
owning not less than 10% of the shares can call shareholders general meetings (art 391(2)) 
and can demand the ministry of trade reduce board remuneration (art 353(7)). Shareholders 
owning 20% of the shares can appoint one auditor (art 368(2)). 
c. Board structure  
 
The board of directors are elected to serve for three years. Unless prohibited by the 
company‟s laws, a board member is legible for re-election (art 350 and 354). The law 
requires the size of the board to be between 3 and 12 (art 347). Related to board  
composition, all board members should be shareholders of the company.  Even though the 
general manager is an employee, the article of association may require directors to be 
managers of the company (art 348 and 363(2).). Tura, (2012) comment that the share 
company law does not clearly specify the role and structure of the board. There is no clear 
legal provision stating the need for independent board of directors and the delineation of the 
duties of executive directors from the non-executive directors. In one hand, the fact that the 
general manager is an employee of the company and may not be board member requires all 
board members to be non-executives. On the other hand if the article of association may 
specify that one or more of the board members can be managers, implies that the board may 
include at least one executive member. CEO-duality, which refers to whether the positions of 
the general manager of a firm and the chair of the board are held by different persons, is not 
clearly indicated in the company law.  
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d. Disclosure and transparency 
 
Theoretically, law requires share companies to publish identity, address and shareholding of 
each owner in the official and commercial news paper (art 392(1)). In actual situations, no 
single share company discloses financial statements and other relevant information on its 
website and other public media. The shareholders as well as the financial performances of 
many of Ethiopian share companies are not known by the public (Negash, 2008). The share 
company law does not have enough provisions requiring companies to disclose material 
information especially relative to international standards (Gebeyaw, 2012). Gebeyaw (2012) 
note that the share company law is incapable of addressing the minimum standard of 
disclosure of relevant information. Balance sheet and income statements are only submitted 
to the ministry of trade and are not accessible for the general public. Studies show that 
disclosure of financial statements explain difference in performance of companies (Bauer, et 
al., 2008). Share company law allows companies to issue bearer shares (art 325) that 
provides anonymous owners the opportunity to be shareholders. This could result in low 
transparency and disclosure and may lead insiders to misuse company resources. The share 
company low does not have provisions for mandatory disclosure and transparency standards 
(Gebeyaw, 2012). The law does not clearly state whether financial statements need to be 
prepared in accordance with international standards (art 446 and 448). It has been reported 
that poor transparency and disclosure increases a country‟s financial volatility as external 
stakeholders do not have adequate information to analyze firms while insiders can have this 
limited information and engage in transactions that benefits only them (Claessens, 2003). 
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Table 1: Comparison of corporate governance in Ethiopia and developed nations 
Governance mechanisms Developed nations Ethiopia 
Internal mechanisms 
   
Ownership structure  Dispersed  Concentrated  
Shareholder type  Institutional investors   Management, government 
and political parties.  
Board of directors  Can include non-
shareholders. 
Are elected from 
shareholders. 
Disclosure and transparency Good    Weak or virtually absent  
External mechanisms 
   
Legal framework 
Good legal framework 
and  enforcement, 
enough protection of 
shareholders. 
Weak legal framework and 
enforcement, weak 
protection of shareholders.  
Other external mechanisms  Product, financial and 
managerial labour 
markets. 
 No such disciplining 
mechanisms.  
Corporate governance 
culture 
Strong  Very weak or virtually 
absent. 
 
1.9.1.3 Previous studies on Ethiopian corporate governance  
Negash (2008) undertakes a qualitative study of the corporate governance of Ethiopia using 
the APRM questionnaire.
2
 APRM was aimed at enhancing the quality of governance in 
Africa and corporate governance was one of the themes. The study reports frustrating 
corporate governance environment. Inadequacy to address complex governance issues, lack 
of incorporating international codes and principles of corporate governance, high agency 
cost associated with political party domination in the corporate sector, high ownership 
concentration and pyramid ownership structure, inefficient legal and court system that 
                                                          
2
 APRM refers to the African Peer Review Mechanism adopted by the African Union on the 9
th
 of 2003 (Negash, 
2008) 
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creates inadequate investor protection, and lack of organized share market characterize the 
overall corporate governance system in the country. The author recommends that in the 
absence of market mechanisms to discipline managers, internal corporate governance should 
fill the gap. Klapper and Love (2002) also argue that internal corporate governance is strong 
in countries with weak legal and regulatory systems. If this proposition works in Ethiopia, 
we should find a systematic voluntary adoption of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Gebeyaw (2012) evaluates the Ethiopian share company law on the bases of the six 
governance principles of the OECD.  Compared with international governance standards, the 
legal and regulatory framework of the share company law is ineffective to promote efficient 
market. Similarly, Tura (2012) examines the legal framework that governs companies and 
reports the inadequacy of the legal framework to specify clearly the roles, composition and 
remuneration of boards of directors. Specifically, there is no legal provision for the need for 
independent directors. Moreover, the duties of executive directors is not clearly delineated 
from non-executive directors. Both Gebeyaw (2012) and Tura (2012) recommend for the 
adoption of relevant international governance mechanisms taking the country‟s legal, 
economic and cultural circumstances. The above studies explore the legal aspects, which 
draws on the socially desirable implications of corporate governance (Hambrick, et al., 
2008). The only economic analysis study examines the corporate governance of Ethiopian 
banks and the implications on financial performance (Fanta, et al., 2013). However, the legal 
and institutional environment within which financial institutions operate is different from 
that of non-financial institutions. In fact, the study explains that weak legal environment, 
poor investor protection, law level corporate governance awareness and the absence of 
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financial markets have had adverse effect on corporate governance and performance of 
Ethiopian banks.   
1.10 Clarification of Concepts and Constructs 
 Agency theory (perspective): an economic theory that emphasises the separation of 
ownership (financing) and control (management) in modern share companies.  
Agency theorists believe that managers are self-serving, opportunistic and are more 
likely to expropriate shareholder money. The theory suggests mechanisms to monitor 
managers and align their interests with that of shareholders‟. Consequently, firms that 
institute good corporate governance are expected to have high performance. 
 Organizational theory (perspective): paradigms including organizational contingency, 
resource dependence, organizational economics.  
 Corporate governance: legal and economic institutions established at both micro and 
macro levels.  
 Internal corporate governance: mechanisms rationally established by a firm to 
regulate relationships among members.  
 External corporate governance: refer to legal and economic institutions established 
outside firms. This may include corporate governance principles, rules and 
regulations, courts, markets such as financial, labour and product markets, 
associations etc.  
 Measures of corporate governance: numerical values that indicate the quality of 
corporate governance. 
 Single measure of corporate governance: corporate governance measure that focus on 
a specific aspect:  single measures may consider an aspect of board of directors or 
ownership structure. 
 Board size: the number of directors a board has. 
 CEO duality: refers to whether the positions of the CEO and board chair are held by 
one person. 
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 Proportion of outside/inside directors: the proportion of non-executive/executive 
directors in a board relative to total number of directors. 
 Board ownership: the proportion of firm shares owned by directors.  
 Ownership concentration: the cumulative proportion of firm shares owned by a 
particular group of shareholder, e.g. ownership by the largest shareholder, the top 
five shareholders, top 10 shareholders or   by all executives of a firm. 
 Owner identity: refers to who a particular shareholder is. For instance, identity may 
refer to a board member, other company, bank, government etc. 
 Corporate governance index: a composite score constructed from multiple corporate 
governance indicators such as board characteristics, ownership structure and 
disclosure and transparency. Various combinations of aspects of governance 
indicators can be formed.   
 CGIETH: refers to Corporate Governance Index for Ethiopia. The index is 
constructed from board characteristics, ownership structure and disclosure and 
transparency. Board characteristics includes, board size, board composition, CEO 
duality, and board ownership. Ownership structure includes ownership concentration 
of top outside shareholders, dummy indicators of whether a minimum of 10% of 
shares is owned by the CEO, outside shareholder or other directors. Disclosure and 
transparency is measured by dummy indicators of whether a company discloses the 
identity, ownership etc of all shareholders and directors; financial statements to the 
public and allowances to directors in its financial statements.   
 Firm level contingencies: firm characteristics (firm growth, firm risk, size, leverage, 
asset composition etc.) that can affect both corporate governance and firm 
performance.  
 Antecedents: refers to firm level contingencies. 
 Moderation: a framework that assumes that the effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable is depends on another variable referred as a „moderator‟. 
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1.11 Plan of the Study 
The thesis is organised in to seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the general orientation of the 
thesis. In this chapter introduction to the thesis, precise problem statement along with the 
objectives of the thesis are reported. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework. The 
chapter provides an integration of the agency and organizational perspectives in to a single 
framework. The theoretical framework serves as a base from which testable hypotheses are 
developed later in chapter 4. Chapter 3 reviews relevant literature. The focus of the literature 
review is on the findings of empirical studies, measurement of variables and analysis 
methods. The review is organized into major themes. In chapter 4, testable hypotheses are 
developed based on the theoretical and empirical reviews of chapter 2 and chapter 3 
respectively. The methodology of the study is outlined in chapter 5. it addresses issues 
related to sampling, data collection instruments, variables and their measurement, empirical 
models, data analysis procedures and robustness checks. Chapter 6 is reserved for the 
analysis of major findings of the study. Various descriptive and inferential statistics outputs 
are reported in the chapter.  The findings of the study are analysed as appeared in tables and 
figures but their implications in terms of the literature is maintained for the next chapter. 
Finally, chapter 7 is for the discussion, conclusions and recommendations.  In the discussion 
section, findings reported in chapter 6 are elaborated in terms of both theoretical and 
empirical reviews. In the conclusions section of chapter 7, we summarize major findings of 
the study. Finally, recommendations are provided that may have important implications for 
both theory and practice. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses about two theories relevant to the analysis of corporate governance in 
this thesis. Agency theory has been an often used framework and holds a major part in this 
chapter and in the thesis as a whole. The framework also incorporates the organizational 
theory. Different perspectives make up the organizational theory and are mentioned 
explicitly when necessary. For each theory, we discuss separately on assumptions of a 
corporation, the central idea of the theory the corporate governance implications of the 
theory. We then synthesize the theories in to a single framework. Finally, the synthesized 
framework is depicted with a diagram.  
2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is an element of the contractual view of the firm  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
that views the firm as legal machinery established as a nexus for complex contracts among 
dispersed individuals (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The pioneers of agency theory have 
mentioned that shareholders of corporations delegate work to managers that subsequently 
results agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932). The theory focuses on the contractual 
relationship between parties in which the owners of a corporation (principals) delegate tasks 
to another party (the agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In their influential work,  Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define agency problem as a contractual relationship in which “one or 
more persons (principal) engage another person (agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. This is 
commonly known as the „separation of ownership and control‟ or finance and management  
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In some circumstances where the contract is not specific about 
34 
 
the principals hold the „residual control right‟ i.e. decision making rights in cases of 
unspecified in the contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Principals however are not 
qualified or informed enough to exercise their residual rights. Managers end up with having 
higher residual control rights or discretion.   
The central issue of agency theory is that due to the separation of control and ownership 
mangers are self-serving and may act contrary to the profit-maximizing interest of principals 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This is because shareholders desire greater profit while 
managers do not as profit belongs to the shareholders  (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012) . The 
agency problem manifests itself through various characteristics of inefficiency.  
Consequences of managerial discretion include resource diversion, transfer pricing, higher 
managerial compensation and perquisite, managerial entrenchment in which the manager 
stay on the job without contribution or qualification and value minimizing investments 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Corporate governance is about the limits to managerial discretion  
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Solving the agency problem aligns the interests of managers 
with that of shareholders, as a result profit increases.   
Agency theory has two complementary views regarding the principal-agent contract. The 
Positive agency theory focuses on identifying situations where there are high principals-
agent conflict in large corporations and devise appropriate governance mechanisms to reduce 
managerial discretion (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent stream of agency theory on the 
other hand describes which governance mechanism is efficient and under what different 
circumstances (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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Generally, the concern of agency theory is resolving two problems (Eisenhardt, 1989).  first, 
the agency problem that arises when  the goals of the principals and the agent diverge, and 
the agency problems that arise due to the fact that the principals cannot verify that the agent 
has appropriate behaviour. Second, the problem of risk sharing in which the principals and 
the agent may have different attitude towards risk and therefore may prefer different actions. 
To solve these problems agency theory focuses on identifying the most efficient contract to 
alien the interest of managers with that of the principals‟ (Eisenhardt, 1989). These are a 
“bundle of governance mechanisms” (Rediker and Seth, 1995) instituted to limit managerial 
discretion and make them strive for profit maximization. The efficient contract could be 
either behaviour oriented (ex ante mechanisms such as salary, various control mechanism) or 
outcome oriented (market governance). Behavioural contracts are monitoring mechanisms 
instituted to reduce the ex ante managerial misbehaviour. These monitoring mechanisms 
include the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 2012), large shareholders (Holderness, 2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and appropriate disclosure and transparency requirements 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Agency theorists have even emphasised efficient capital 
market, the product market and managerial labour market as ex post discipline mechanism 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). These mechanisms however work if markets are 
perfect, in the absence of which internal governance mechanisms are indispensable to 
constrain managerial discretion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
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2.3 Organizational theory   
The organizational theory considers corporations as a „coalition of vested interests‟ (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Cohen and Cyert, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This view has two 
important implications: First, various parties have a vested interest in the modern 
corporation, Second, the strategies crafted by corporations should be consistent with the 
power relationships of the parties involved (Zahra, 1996).  According to  Mintzberg (1984) 
modern corporations are controlled by a complex set of forces and cannot be reduced to a 
simple principal-agent relationship. Therefore, organizational studies should incorporate the 
multiple interests that may affect both firm strategy and firm performance (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; Cyert and March, 1963). The presence of individuals with different interests 
and identities implies conflict of interests and sub goal optimization (Cyert and March, 
1963). The organizational viewpoints that the duty of the executive is serving as an agent of 
the complex relationships in the corporation, constrained by the need to balance the multiple 
demands of the various interest groups. In the organizational theory, profit as the sole 
measures of executive effectiveness is equivocal. Organization performance may be 
measured several criteria (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
The organizational theory asserts the discretional choices of firms and the subsequent 
difference in behaviour and performance (Nelson, 1991). Most importantly, the theory 
strongly focuses on the influence of environmental factors on firm strategy and performance. 
Since the seminal work of Burns and Stalker (1961), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), there 
has been a long tradition in the organizational literature to explain structural choices of firms 
as results of contingency factors. The central idea of the theory is that contingency factors 
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influence structural choice of a firm and the level of fit or congruence between the 
contingency factor and the structure chosen in turn influences firm performance (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Burns and Stalker, 1961).
3
 Contingency factors can include environmental 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961), organizational (Child, 1972), and strategy (Chandler, 1962; Miles 
and Snow, 1978).   
In the corporate governance literature, the organizational view proposes adoption of 
governance mechanisms based on firm and environmental factors (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 
1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994) as firm governance is one constituent of firm structure.  
Nelson elaborates on this, 
 “structure involves how a firm is organised and governed, and how decisions 
actually are made and carried out”  (Nelson, 1991).  
According to organizational scholars, contingencies within the organization and its 
environment affect the costs and benefits of governance mechanisms (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). Contingencies under which use of a particular governance 
mechanism is costly tend to reduce the level of the chosen mechanism. On the other hand, 
contingencies that enhance the benefits of use of a governance mechanism tend to increase 
the use of the mechanism. 
2.4 Synthesizing agency theory and organizational theory  
Even though agency theory has been the dominant theoretical framework in the corporate 
governance literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), scholars have emphasised the significance 
                                                          
3
 Contingency theory is just one of  the relevant organizational  perspectives used in this thesis.   
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of complementing the theory with other theories. More specifically agency theory has 
important contributions to organizational study, if complemented with organizational 
perspectives provides deep insight (Eisenhardt, 1989). Although the corporate governance 
conceptualization of agency theory and organizational theory seems divergent and 
conflicting, they provide complementary insights in identifying contingency factors that 
affect choice and effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Agency theory informs us that there is information asymmetry, goal conflict between the 
principals and agents that leads self-interest to dominate in organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, the theory is not comprehensive enough to explicate the whole picture as it 
reduces the goal conflict to the manager-shareholders relationship (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). The agency model holds that managers and shareholders of corporations are in 
constant conflict and this leads managers to behave inappropriately to the detriment of 
shareholders‟ interest for higher firm profit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983a). However, organizational theorists depict the modern corporation as melting points of 
a multitude of interests in which the power relationship among the various coalition groups 
determine both corporate strategy and performance (Cyert and March, 1963; Cohen and 
Cyert, 1973).    
Agency theory maintains that managers are self-serving (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
internal governance mechanisms align the interest of manager and shareholder especially 
when markets are not efficient (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Internal governance mechanisms 
such as the board of directors and reporting systems reveal managerial behaviour and thus 
reduce moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, agency theory is 
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not clear about the situations that influence the level of moral hazard. The agency theory 
predictions of the corporate governance-firm performance relationships are context free 
(Burton, 2000). Two implications can be drawn: first, agency theory posits that mechanisms 
of reducing managerial discretion should always be instituted for all corporations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, in agency theory there is always positive relationship between 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Organizational scholars suggest that firms 
differ in behaviour and performance as they discretionally choose their governance structure 
(Nelson, 1991).  Thus, adoption of governance mechanisms should depend on factors both 
internal and external to a firm (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
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Several researchers from various disciplines have recognised this idea by complementing 
agency theory with organizational perspectives. They have showed that contingencies at firm 
level (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; 
Klapper and Love, 2002), industry level (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), and even country level 
(Klapper and Love, 2002) affect choice of governance mechanisms. At the firm level, 
growth potential (Klapper and Love, 2002; Black, et al., 2010), demand volatility (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 
2002), firm size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), capital structure (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), 
and investment rate (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and 
Love, 2002) are recognized as important contingency factors influencing the choice of 
governance mechanism. The effect of industry factors on the choice of governance 
mechanisms is well argued by (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Similarly, agency theory‟s 
                                                          
4
   This conceptualization calls for identifying antecedents of corporate governance. 
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performance prediction is not valid since the effect of a particular mechanism on firm 
performance depends on its fit with the firm‟s internal and external factors (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2004).
5
 Contrary to agency theory‟s assertion that strong monitoring of managers 
can lead to high firm performance, strategic management attributes firm performance to the 
level of fit/misfit between corporate governance with firm or/and environment factors 
(Galbraith, 1973).  
The following conceptual model is a synthesis of the agency theory with organizational 
theory. 
 
                                                          
5
 This conceptualization calls for examining the moderating effect of firm and environment factors on the 
corporate governance-firm performance relationship. 
Corporate governance 
mechanisms (X) 
Contingency 
factors (Z) 
Firm Performance 
(Y) 
 Level of fit (X*Z) 
Figure 1: A conceptual framework for the antecedents and performance effect of corporate governance. 
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2.5 Conclusion  
Several theoretical frameworks have tried to address the issue of corporate governance. 
Agency theory has been the most researched framework. Agency theory views modern 
corporations as arenas for the divergent interests of managers and shareholders. Managers 
are assumed to be opportunistic and self-serving. Hence, shareholders need to institute 
incentive systems and monitoring devices to constrain managerial discretion. Several 
mechanisms have been suggested. Board characteristics that increase its vigilant, managerial 
incentives, major ownership stake by non-board shareholder, appropriate disclosure systems 
have been pronounced as important corporate governance mechanisms. The upshot is that 
the presence of these mechanisms affects firm performance positively.  
Organizational scholars open the black box and define corporations as the “coalitions” of 
multiple interests. The job of the manager is designing and implementing corporate 
strategies constrained by the various interests of this coalition. Consistent with economic 
perspectives, organizational scholars believe in the presence of self-interest in modern 
corporations. However, they consider firm differences in behaviour and performance. 
Specifically, the idea that contingencies within the firm and its environment affect the level 
of governance mechanisms adopted has been emphasised. Such contingencies do not only 
affect choice of governance but also influences firm performance.   
It has been suggested that complementing agency theory with organizational theory 
contributes a lot to organizational research. Agency theory informs us that instituting 
appropriate governance mechanisms aligns the manager-shareholder interest and makes the 
former to work for higher firm performance. Organizational theory complements this idea by 
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identifying contingency factors that can explain differences in the level of governance 
mechanisms across firms.  
The next chapter reviews the empirical corporate governance literature organized on relevant 
themes. Detail account of previous researches is provided. The focus of the review is on (1) 
corporate governance mechanisms; (2) findings of previous studies linking antecedent 
factors, corporate governance and firm performance; (3) research methodologies such as 
variables used, variable measurement, and analysis methods. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the literature organized and presented based on major thematic areas. 
The major focus is the empirical literature. The themes of the review are definition of 
corporate governance, governance mechanisms of reducing managerial discretion, effect of 
antecedent factors on corporate governance, effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance and the moderating effect of firm level contingencies on the corporate 
governance-firm performance relationship, measuring firm level contingencies, corporate 
governance and firm performance variables and analysis techniques.  
3.2  Definition of corporate governance 
Scholars have defined corporate governance on several dimensions. Often corporate 
governance definition are framed on „what it constitutes‟, „whom it affects‟ and „its 
consequences‟. Corporate governance can be viewed from investors‟ perspectives. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “…deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.”  Metrick and Ishii (2002) use similar definition, “...the promise to repay a fair 
return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm efficiently given 
investment”.  Mayer (1997) also emphasises that corporate governance aligns the interests of 
shareholders and managers and assures that companies are operated for the benefit of 
investors. This definition reflects agency theory‟s conception of corporate governance.  
Regional and international institutions emphasise on the elements of corporate governance 
and on what it is supposed to accomplish. CIPE (2002) explains that “Corporate governance 
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is the body of “rules of the game” by which companies are managed internally and 
supervised by boards of directors, in order to protect the interests and financial stake of 
shareholders...”  Similarly, the OECD (2004a) states that “Corporate governance specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, 
such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the 
structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance." 
Corporate governance can also be perceived on the bases of its constituencies and the kind of 
change interventions. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that corporate governance 
structures encompass economic and legal institutions. The Cadbury committee (Cadbury, 
1992) defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. Zingales (1995) states a governance system as “the complex set of constraints 
that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi rent registered by the firm”. 
These institutions can be altered for the better by appropriate interventions at private and 
public levels (Bebczuk, 2005). At the private level, change in corporate governance requires 
the participation of those affected by it. However, major institutional improvement can be 
achieved at the public level. Corporate governance interventions at this level provide 
protection to minority shareholders  (Bebczuk, 2005).  
Alternatively, the consequences of corporate governance can serve to clarify the concept. 
Researchers have suggested that corporate governance is associated with entrepreneurial 
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growth (La Porta, et al., 1999), flow of external finance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and 
financial market development (La Porta, et al., 1997).  Metrick and Ishii (2002) and (Klapper 
and Love, 2002) argue that corporate governance benefits firms operating in weaker 
institution countries. On the other hand, Bebczuk (2005) suggests that weak institutional 
environment such as financial markets constrain the benefits firms can get from good 
corporate governance. The reason is that investors react to corporate governance information 
through their actions in financial markets. Bebczuk (2005) believes that even in the absence 
of financial markets, companies should be encouraged to improve their corporate governance 
if evidence can show the positive link between corporate governance and firm performance.  
From the above definitions, it is clear that corporate governance is a complex set of 
structures and processes that are put in place by companies to limit agency problems. The 
structures of corporate governance encompass economic and legal institutions whose change 
for the better require interventions at micro and macro levels. Obviously, the prominence of 
corporate governance is largely due to its effect on economic development.  
3.3  Corporate governance mechanisms of reducing managerial discretion  
In the spirit of agency theory, managers are self-serving and opportunistic (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Managers with significantly high level of discretion misuses firm resources 
that may lead to lower firm performance. Good corporate governance is thus required to 
align the interest of managers with that of the shareholders‟ in a way that managers strive for 
higher firm performance  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mayer, 1997).   
The agency problem occurs when shareholders desire greater profit while managers do not 
because the profit belongs to the shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Consequently, 
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managers consume perquisites (personal benefits such as expenditures on airplane), may not 
work hard, may not exploit all opportunities, or may involve in power play with company 
resources (Eisenhardt, 1989). Solving the agency problem aligns the interests of managers 
with that of shareholders, as a result profit increases. Scholars have suggested several 
corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain that 
successful corporate governance system requires some combination of legal protection of 
investors and ownership concentration. 
3.3.1 Managerial ownership 
Share ownership by managers enables their behaviour to align with the principals (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012).
6
 Higher managerial ownership may also 
allow managers to control the company and expropriate minority shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
7
 Inside ownership does not restrict managers from 
pursuing private benefits but makes managers share the costs of their behaviour and actions 
with shareholders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). According to Agrawal and Knoeber (2012) 
the advantage of management ownership is that shareholders do not have to monitor 
managers as managers are also owners of the company.  However firm performance is a 
noisy measure of management effectiveness as several factors may affect it apart from the 
behaviour of managers.  This has two adverse effects: first, manages may lose the incentive 
to behave appropriately since they know that profit is not determined only by their 
behaviour. Second, since they bear the risk alone they should be highly paid in return. The 
                                                          
6
 This is referred to ‘the alignment effect’. 
7
 This is refereed to ‘the entrenchment effect’. 
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situation calls for the use of other mechanisms that allow shareholders to monitor managerial 
behaviour so that rewards and penalty depends on their behaviour.   
3.3.2 Ownership structure and concentration 
Ownership concentration is a measure of shareholders‟ power to influence managerial 
behaviour (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) through significant ownership by an individual 
shareholder or minority ownership by several shareholders even in countries with weak legal 
system and inefficient courts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Large investors have both the 
incentive and capacity to monitor management as they have more interest to profit 
maximization and more control over firm right  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  The presence 
of block holders can increase the monitoring ability of the board of directors even if the CEO 
has an influence on the board (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Especially, the presence of 
outside block holders are believed to affect the form and level of managerial compensation  
(Holderness, 2003).  
Nevertheless, the efficacy of large owners to monitor managers depends on the level of legal 
protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Large ownership by one large owner can be an 
effective monitor of management as long as the majority owner observes firm operations and 
the voting mechanism is efficient. Large ownership by more than one owners  may be less 
effective than large ownership by a single shareholder  since it requires concerted action by 
all large minority shareholdings as managers may interfere in the process of collective 
actions which.
8
 The free-rider problem may also affect the effectiveness of minority 
shareholders in monitoring management (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). According to 
                                                          
8
 Large ownership by an owner and ownership by several small owners are commonly known as block holding 
and minority holding respectively. 
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Holderness (2003), block ownership may be motivated by two factors: the shared benefits of 
control and the private benefits of control. The first is related to the fact that block holders 
have the incentive and capacity to monitor management to the benefits of all shareholders. 
The second motive emphasise the fact that block holders  may be motivated by private 
benefit of control (Holderness, 2003) in which block owners expropriate minority holders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
The effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is not a settled issue. Berle and 
Means (1932) suggest a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) explain that restructuring ownership structure 
has positive performance consequences, as the process is a rational decision of owners of the 
company to fit the amount of their shareholdings with the strategy of the firm. Still 
ownership concentration may have a negative effect on performance as large investors may 
have interests that do not align with other shareholders or managers and may redistribute 
resources efficiently or inefficiently from others (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The problem is 
especially severe if other shareholders have firm specific investment or if voting right is 
more than cash flow right (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) argue that diffuse ownership may have some advantages that counterbalances 
the disadvantages associated with the agency problems. If diffuse ownership were dangerous 
to firm performance, we would not observe such ownership forms. Accordingly, owners 
decide on the level of their ownership stakes after assessing the costs and benefits and 
therefore ownership concentration should not relate to financial performance. 
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3.3.3 Board structure 
Agency theory considers the board of directors as the ultimate disciplining mechanism 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Shareholders provide their money to 
firms because by exercising their legal right they are sure that they can get their money back 
and the most important shareholder right is electing the board of directors (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  Directors serve as monitoring devices to align the interests of mangers with 
that of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). The board of directors serve as an 
information system that shareholders can use to monitor and control managerial opportunism 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a).    
Agency theory suggests that an effective board has large size (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012), 
is composed of more outside independent directors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), has members owning significant ownership stakes in the firm 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985), and has a chairperson who is not sitting also in the position of 
a CEO (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Large board size increases the source of information but may also limit the members to come 
to a collective decision-making  (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Agrawal and Knoeber (2012) 
explain that a firm adjusts its board size in response to the factors inside and outside of it that 
influence the relative costs and benefits of board size. 
 Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a) view outside directors as indispensable tools of 
internal control. Outside directors that do not have any relationship with the CEO or the firm 
are considered to be effective monitors of managerial behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012; Zahra, 1996). A high proportion of 
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outside directors broadens a board‟s expertise and assures its objectivity in monitoring the 
CEO (Zahra, 1996). Consistent with agency theory, international institutions have 
emphasised on outside directors as better monitoring devises (OECD, 2004a). Outside 
directors monitor managerial behaviour better than inside directors (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), due the risk of reputation loss and legal litigations (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley act and the New York stock market rules assume outside director as better 
monitors of management (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). The corporate governance principles 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development suggests more non-
executive board members as they are believed to make independent judgements (OECD, 
2004a). Outside directors are especially actively involved in monitoring organizational 
outcomes and threatening management to disclose negative outcomes (Abrahamson and 
Park, 1994).  Independent directors do not have the incentive to help a firm hide its 
accounting problems (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Unlike managers whose human skills are 
idiosyncratic and undiversified independent directors are not employees of the company and 
have nothing to loose if something wrong happens to the company.  Moreover, due to risk of 
reputation loss and legal litigation, they are less likely to help the firm hide inappropriate 
behaviours. A board with more outside members may be effective in coming to a collective 
decision-making but may lack relevant information that insiders have (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2012). 
According to agency theory, significant ownership by outside directors aligns their interest 
with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012; Morck, et al., 
1988; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). A Board owning few or no shares does not have the 
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incentive to monitor and discipline management  (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Outside 
directors with block holding have the incentive and capacity to monitor management for the 
benefit of all.  
 CEO duality describes the situation where the same person holds the positions of both the 
CEO and chairperson of the board in a corporation  (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Contrary to 
established theory about the favourability of separating the jobs of the CEO and board 
chairperson there is lack of consensus in the empirical literature (Daily, et al., 2003). 
However, advocates of agency focus on issues of monitoring and entrenchment and the 
advantages of separating the positions of the CEO and board chair (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 
1994). The CEO‟s influence on the board reduces its effectiveness in monitoring 
management (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). It also allows 
management entrenchment leading to misallocation of firm resources contrary to 
shareholders‟ interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A CEO who is also a chair of the board 
dominates both the agenda and content of board meetings  (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). 
CEO duality creates a conflict of interest in which the CEO is the head of the firm‟s strategic 
management and is an evaluator of this strategic management at the same time  (Finkelstein 
and D'Aveni, 1994).  
3.3.4 Disclosure and transparency 
Agency problem may arise due to information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Company provide disclosure in response to 
information asymmetry and agency problems between shareholders and managers (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Adequate disclosure is an essential element of good corporate governance 
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(Abrahamson and Park, 1994). The OECD (2004a) stresses the significance of timely and 
accurate disclosure of information for successful corporate governance. Adequate disclosure 
and transparency allows shareholders to exercise their ownership rights. It also allows 
regulators to identify and correct an ethical and illegal company practices. With sufficient 
disclosure and transparency, the market is able to reap the services of analysts and rating 
agencies that transfer unorganized data in to usable information for investors to make 
informed decisions. However, with poor transparency and disclosure regime, external 
stakeholders do not have the information to analyze companies. Then, insiders can take 
advantage of the situation and engage themselves in transactions that benefit only them that 
may lead to financial volatility as investors lose confidence (Claessens, 2003). 
Company disclosure especially tailored to investors is an important ingredient for an 
efficient capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Companies use different means to provide 
disclosure. Financial statements, management reports, press release, internet sites and other 
regulatory filings are well-known company disclosure vehicles. For instance, management 
may employ financial reporting and disclosure to inform outside investors on firm 
performance and governance (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
In capital markets setting, disclosure reduces resource allocation problems that occur due to 
information asymmetry. As noted by La Porta, et al. (1997) and Claessens (2003) good 
corpora governance is associated with capital market development. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
provide two reasons why disclosure is an indispensable tool for the smooth relationships 
between investors and company managers.  Disclosure reduces information gaps of potential 
investors who may not otherwise appreciate investment opportunities of entrepreneurs. 
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According to Myers and Majluf (1984), managers have the incentive to reduce the 
information asymmetry with adequate disclosure as this lowers the cost of capital.  With 
appropriate disclosure, entrepreneurs can easily access to external finance.  Once they 
provide their fund, investors demand managers to disclose relevant information on how 
company resources are being utilized.  
3.4 Antecedents of corporate governance  
Agency theorists consider managers having enough discretion  (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Since managers may act contrary to shareholder interests, instituting corporate governance 
reduces the conflict of interests between them. On the other hand, organizational scholars 
argue that firms‟ choose structural forms depending on internal and external factors (Burns 
and Stalker, 1961). 
Several scholars have called for studies that would include antecedent factors to explain 
variations in the adoption of certain corporate governance mechanisms between firms 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). These researchers believe that the potential for moral hazard and agency 
problems varies systematically depending on environmental contingencies. Contrary to 
agency theory‟s assumption, firms trade off the costs and benefits of a particular governance 
mechanism (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Methodologically, 
explaining cross sectional variation of corporate governance reduces potential endogeneity 
problem (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If this problem is not addressed estimates are biased. 
Therefore, research that can adequately explain corporate governance variation across firms 
is required.  
54 
 
The type of corporate governance and measurement mechanisms used does not matter for 
the flavour of endogenous governance to work (Klapper and Love, 2002; Himmelberg, et al., 
1999). Baysinger and Butler (1985) find that the optimal board composition is varies 
systematically depending on circumstances. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that the cost and 
benefit of ownership concentration varies depending on firm size, firm risk and industry 
type. Bathala and Rao (1995) study the determinants of the proportion of outside directors by 
incorporating leverage, CEO tenure, firm size, firm risk and growth that are assumed to 
affect the level of agency problem and others. Himmelberg et al. (1999) obtain that both 
observed and unobserved firm level characteristics affect managerial ownership.  
Relevant contingency factors considered as antecedents of corporate governance are firm 
growth (Bathala and Rao, 1995), Firm risk (Zajac and Westphal,1994; Bathala and Rao, 
1995; Himmelberg, et al., 1999), firm size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bathala and Rao, 
1995), and asset composition (Himmelberg, et al., 1999;  Klapper and Love, 2002).  
In the following paragraphs, the discussion focuses on firm level contingencies that are 
believed to affect the scope of managerial discretion and thus the level of corporate 
governance adopted. The main variables of interest are firm risk, firm growth and owner 
identity, but we also address other control variables.  
3.4.1 Firm growth  
Studies show that firm growth increases the level of agency problem and moral hazard 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). These studies 
predict a positive link between firm growth and corporate governance. Limited number of 
studies shows that high growth firms adopt good corporate governance (Himmelberg, et al., 
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1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Klapper and Love (2002) examine the link between firm 
level corporate governance and a list of factors that are believed to determine it. Using data 
in 14 emerging markets their result show that past growth rate is positively related to 
corporate governance index. In a panel of U.S. companies, Himmelberg et al. (1999) find 
that managers of firms with higher growth potential have larger ownership stake, i.e. a strong 
governance mechanism.  
On the other hand, studies report negative association and even null association between 
firm growth and corporate governance.  Bathala and Rao (1995) examine the determinants of 
corporate governance in a cross section of 261 firms.  Using OLS regression they find that 
sales growth is negatively related to the proportion of outside directors. Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) obtain that growth is unrelated to the probability of earnings restatement.  
3.4.2 Firm risk 
There is a growing belief that firms operating in volatile environments have greater agency 
problems that require adoption of stronger corporate governance mechanisms (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). Empirical studies show that the optimal choice of a given corporate 
governance mechanism depends on the degree of instability in the firms‟ environment. For 
example, optimal ownership structure (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001), proportion of outside directors (Bathala and Rao, 1995) and disclosure 
(Abrahamson and Park, 1994) are determined by the volatility of the firm‟s environment.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) examine the link between firm specific risk and ownership 
concentration in a cross section of 511 U.S. firms. They find that firm specific risk explains 
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the cross sectional variation in ownership concentration. Specifically, instability of profit 
rate explains the variation of ownership structure positively.  
Other studies have reported negative association between risk and corporate governance 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995). Bathala and Rao (1995) examine the determinants of the 
proportion of outside directors in a cross section of 261 firms. Using OLS regression, they 
find that firm risk measured by volatility of firm return negatively affects the proportion of 
outside directors. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examine the effect of firm specific risk on 
ownership concentration in a panel of 400 U.S. corporations. Their result shows that higher 
firm risk is associated with lower level of CEO stock ownership.    
3.4.3 Owner identity 
Agency theory assumes that all block holders have the motivation to monitor management 
equally (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;  La Porta, et al. 1999). Organizational scholars suggest 
that all shareholders do not similar risk profile and may have divergent interests (Mintzberg, 
1984; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). For instance, block holders may have different objectives 
and prefer different strategies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). In 
this context, the issue is not limited to the conflict of interests between shareholders and the 
manager but also between shareholders themselves that may affect firm decisions differently 
(Go'rriz and Fum'as, 1996). Specifically block holders may not have similar incentive to 
monitor management behaviour. For instance, Abrahamson and Park (1994) obtain that non-
executive shareholders do not have similar interest on disclosure of negative outcomes. 
There is scarcity of empirical evidence on the associations between owner identity and 
corporate governance. Ananchotikul (2007) shows that the effect of foreign direct 
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investment on firm level corporate governance depends on identity of owners. Especially, 
industrial ownership has negative effect on corporate governance while institutional 
ownership is associated positively with higher corporate governance.  
3.4.4 Other antecedent factors 
Firm size 
The expected effect of firm size on corporate governance is not conclusive.  Larger firms are 
believed to have greater agency problems (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 
2002). On the other hand, smaller firms may adopt stronger governance mechanisms as they 
may have better growth opportunities, badly in need of external finance at lower cost of 
capital (Klapper and Love, 2002).   
The empirical literature documents mixed results. After controlling for unobserved firm 
effects Himmelberg, et al. (1999) find that firm size has a positive effect on managerial 
ownership in a panel of U.S. firms.  Alves and Martins (2010) obtain a positive effect of firm 
size on the proportion of outside board of directors. 
Studies also indicate negative association between firm size and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) indicate that larger firms have less ownership 
concentration for a cross section of U.S. firms. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) report that firm 
size increases the probability that a firm restates its earnings.  Alves and Martins (2010) use 
different governance mechanisms in one study and find that firm size negatively affects 
board ownership and outside block ownership. 
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Still, studies find no-association between firm size and corporate governance. For instance 
firm size has no effect on an overall governance index (Klapper and Love, 2002) and the 
proportion of outside directors (Bathala and Rao, 1995). Therefore, the evidence is 
inconclusive. Surprisingly, in a single study firm size may have mixed results for different 
measures of governance mechanisms. Alves and Martins (2010) report positive result for the 
proportion of outside board of directors and negative result for board ownership and outside 
block ownership. 
Asset composition 
The composition of a firm‟s asset determines the level of managerial discretion. The extent 
that assets are observable can explain the tightness of monitoring required. Compared to 
intangible assets it is difficult to steal fixed assets (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and 
Love, 2002). It is generally believed that the proportion of intangible assets in a firm 
influences the level of agency problems (Alves and Martins, 2010; Zahra, 1996). Intangible 
assets are associated with high information asymmetry (Zahra, 1996), increased scope of 
managerial discretion and opportunism (Alves and Martins, 2010).   
Consistent with the above argument, studies find a negative link between fixed capital and 
corporate governance. Himmelberg, et al. (1999) obtain that firms with high proportion of 
fixed assets have a lower level of managerial ownership.  In a cross-country study Klapper 
and Love (2002) show that firms with higher proportions of fixed assets have lower 
corporate governance index.  
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Studies using soft capital as a proxy for the scope of managerial discretion support the 
results obtained for fixed assets. For instance, Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) show that 
non-production overhead as a measure of soft capitals is negatively associated with CEO 
duality. This result corroborates the literature as CEO duality reduces the effectiveness of the 
board as a monitoring devise (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Similarly, Himmelberg, et al. 
(1999) finds that advertising intensive firms have higher managerial ownership.  
 Market power 
Agency theorists assume that higher free cash flow is associated with higher agency 
problems (Jensen, 1986). The empirical literature considers various indicators to proxy for 
the level of free cash flow.  Himmelberg, et al. (1999) find that market power measured by 
the ratio of operating income to sales is positively relate to managerial ownership. Thomsen 
and Pedersen (2000) and Black, et al. (2010) controlled for industry type as indicator of 
market power and claim that it has a direct influence on performance and indirectly through 
ownership structure. 
 Leverage  
Leverage reflects the monitoring role of creditors that otherwise shareholders would 
exercise. Debt serves to focus management towards efficiency and limits free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986). Leverage may reduce the agency cost by preventing managers from investing 
in value-reducing projects or force them sale unproductive assets. Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) obtain a negative association between leverage and the five largest shareholdings. 
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3.4.5 Corporate governance and performance 
 Several researchers examine the link between corporate governance and firm performance 
(Klapper and Love, 2002; Gompers, et al., 2003; Bauer, et al., 2008; Black, et al., 2010). It is 
generally believed that good corporate governance enhances a firm‟s performance. 
Corporate governance includes multiple aspects of contracts imposed for aligning interests 
of shareholders and managers. Researchers may examine the link between one or more 
governance indicators individually and collectively and firm performance. Individual 
governance indicators if used to predict firm performance may result in missing variable bias 
unless other governance variables are controlled for. The issue is discussed in the 
methodology chapter in detail. Researchers often construct governance indices to measure 
the strength of shareholder rights. Governance indices are believed to be able to capture the 
multiple constraints that firms use for aligning the interests of shareholders and managers 
(Bauer, et al., 2008; Black, et al., 2010).  Despite measures of corporate governance utilized, 
examining its effect on firm performance has been considered as a valid approach by 
researchers. Therefore, the literature review does not focus on a particular governance 
mechanism.  Measures of firm performance have been problematic. Researchers use either 
market based or financial measures of performance indicators. This review focuses on 
studies that use financial measure of performance as a dependent variable. There are two 
reasons for this. First, this thesis uses only financial performance indicators: return on asset 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) that previous financial-based studies are more relevant to 
the current study than market-based studies are. Second, market measures and financial 
measures indicate different things and some times are not positively correlated. 
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Several studies focus on single measures of corporate governance to the examination of firm 
performance. The effect of ownership concentration on firm performance has been the focus 
of much of empirical research. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that there should be no 
systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance. They suggest that 
diffuse ownership can have an advantage that offsets the agency problems associated with 
diffusion.  For instance,  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no relationship between ownership 
concentration and return on asset (ROA) in a cross section of U.S. firms. Similarly, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) indicate that there is no relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance.  
Researchers consider the board of directors as an important governance mechanism. Studies 
examine board characteristics such as board size, the proportion of outside directors, board 
ownership and CEO duality and link with firm performance. Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
study the relationship between board composition and financial performance in a sample of 
266 firms for the period 1970 to 1980. Using a system of regression equations, they show 
that change in board composition at the beginning of the decade predicted change in 
financial performance.  Daily, et al. (2003) find that firms with high proportion of affiliated 
board members have higher probability of bankruptcy. The probability of bankruptcy is also 
found to be high for firms that have CEOs sitting as chairs of boards.   
However, studies indicate no relationship between measures of board characteristics and 
firm financial performance. Using a meta-analysis Daily et al. (2003) analyze the effects of 
board characteristics on financial performance and obtain that there is no systematic 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and financial performance. The same 
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meta-analysis failed to find significant relationship between CEO duality and financial 
performance.   Harris and Raviv (2008) model the optimal control of the board of directors 
and show that there is no relationship between board size and firm performance. In a cross-
country study Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) obtains that board size has no significant 
relationship with return on asset (ROA) in companies of several African countries. Black et 
al. (2010) find insignificant result for the relationship between disclosure sub-index and firm 
value. They argue that the result could have been different unless other governance 
mechanisms were not controlled. 
 Studies that use single measures of governance mechanisms have found inconsistent results 
(Bhagat, et al., 2008). The problem is linked to missing variable bias, as single measures do 
not capture the multiple aspects of governance (Bhagat, et al., 2008; Black, et al., 2010). 
Klapper and Love (2002) use firm level corporate governance rating of firms in 14 emerging 
markets. The index was constructed from a survey instrument that contains 57 binary 
(yes/no) questions on management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, and fairness. They show that the corporate governance index is positively 
related to ROA. Bebczuk (2005) Construct a transparency and disclosure index from and 
examine the link between corporate governance and firm performance in 65 non-financial 
Argentinean companies. Different OLS specifications show a robust positive association 
between the governance index and return on asset (ROA). A further marginal analysis 
indicates that for a firm with average governance index, a 10-point increase in the 
governance index increases ROA by 1.9% of its average value.   
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Gompers, et al. (2003) investigate the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in 
1500 large U.S. firms during 1990‟s. They constructed a “Governance Index” (G-index) to 
proxy for shareholder rights.  Single equation regressions indicate that firms with stronger 
shareholder rights have higher return on equity (ROE) and higher net profits. Bebchuk, et al. 
(2004) construct an entrenchment index that limit shareholder rights using the G-index. OLS 
results show that the entrenchment index both individually and in aggregate correlate 
negatively with return on asset (ROA).
9
 Bhagat and Bolton (2008) Study the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance. They argued that from an econometric 
point of view studying the relationship among corporate governance and other firm specific 
factors requires formulating a system of simultaneous equations that specifies the 
relationship. Governance as the main variable of interest was measured by seven different 
measures: the Gompers, et al. (2003) index (GIM or G-index), an “entrenchment index” 
created by Bebchuk, et al. (2004) (BCF) called the E-index, a 52 governance features index 
by Brown and Caylor (2004) and other variables such as Stock ownership of board members, 
CEO-chair separation and board independence.  The result indicate that better governance 
measured by GIM and BCF indices, stock ownership by board members, CEO-Chair 
separation are positively correlated with contemporaneous and subsequent operating 
performance (ROA). Furthermore an economic impact analysis indicated that improving the 
G-index by 1% improved performance during the study period and performance of the next 
year by more than 0.5%, and performance of the next two years by more than 0.25%. Bauer, 
et al. (2008) use overall corporate governance index and found that corporate governance 
                                                          
9
 Lower values of entrenchment is favorable and negative association of this variable with financial performance indicates 
performance enhancing effect of corporate governance.  
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significantly affects company performance. Japanese firms that have good governance rating 
outperform low rated firms by about 15.12% a year.   
3.4.6 The effect of corporate governance on performance: a contingency perspective  
As discussed above, studies based on agency theory assume that corporate governance has a 
positive effect on firm performance. On the other hand, organizational scholars suggest that 
the link between corporate governance and firm performance depends on context. This line 
of thinking often referred as „contingency‟ framework has two approaches. In the first 
approach, studies identify contingency factors as antecedents of corporate governance. The 
previous section reviews such studies that relate firm level contingency factors with different 
corporate governance mechanisms. In the second contingency approach, studies try to show 
that firm level contingencies moderate the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. This thesis employs both approaches, as a full contingency analysis 
requires identification of relevant antecedents of corporate governance that may also have 
moderating effects in the governance-firm performance relationship. Contingency models 
are used to resolve conflicting hypothesis of different theoretical frameworks (Finkelstein 
and D'Aveni, 1994).  
Black, et al., (2010) advice researchers to suspect their findings obtained from full sample 
analyses. Several researchers have reported that the effect of a corporate governance 
mechanism on performance is not the same across firms which have different characteristics  
(Black, et al., 2010; Bebczuk, 2005; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Daily, et al., 2003), 
operate in different industries (Li and Simerly, 1998; Black, et al., 2010) or country of origin 
(Klapper and Love, 2002). Studies that address specific governance mechanisms support this 
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contingency thinking. For instance, researchers comment that the effect of the composition 
of the board of directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) and CEO duality (Finkelstein and 
D'Aveni, 1994) is contingent on factors within the firm and in the environment in which the 
firm operates. Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) conceptualize and test the conflicting 
hypothesis of CEO duality suggested by organizational theory and agency theory. They 
modelled and tested a contingency framework in a sample of firms belonging to three 
industries. The result from several logistic regressions show that effective board favours 
CEO duality when performance is low and informal CEO power is low.  However, CEO 
duality is rare when the CEO has informal power and when firm performance is high.  
Studies have used various moderator variables.  However, this review focuses on researches 
that use firm growth, firm risk and owner identity as moderators of the governance-firm 
performance relationship. Moreover, even if moderation studies can use either interaction 
moderation analysis or sub group analysis to test hypotheses, the review is limited focuses 
only on the interaction moderation. Although a detail explanation is given in the 
methodology chapter, interaction moderation is a regression analysis that includes a variable 
that is a multiplicative product of a corporate governance variables and a moderator variable. 
Limiting the scope of the review to too few moderators as well as to interaction moderation 
is believed to increase relevance to the current study and help generalise across studies. 
Central to contingency models is that the value of corporate governance is enhanced where it 
is required most (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Bebczuk, 2005).  
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3.4.6.1 The moderating effect of firm growth on the corporate governance-performance 
relationship 
Studies indicate that firm growth moderates the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance (Bebczuk, 2005; Black, et al., 2010). These studies would prove 
moderation if the coefficient of the interaction terms is significantly different from zero. For 
a particular case of firm growth, studies suggest that the positive effect of corporate 
governance is stronger for high growth firms. Black, et al. (2010) study the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance in a cross section of 66 Brazilian non-financial 
firms. By interacting an overall governance index with a dummy variable for high growth 
firms, they find that the positive effect of corporate governance on firm performance is 
greater for high growth firms.  Moreover,  Black et al. (2010) indicate that for high growth 
firms, there is greater positive effect of disclosure and transparency sub-index on firm 
performance. Bebczuk, (2005) obtain that firm growth moderates the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. The interaction effect of a disclosure and 
transparency affects firm performance negatively.   
3.4.6.2 The moderating effect of firm risk on the corporate governance-performance 
relationship 
 Li and Simerly (1998)  suggest that greater firm risk affects both managers and outside 
owners. Managers facing greater firm risk are expected to devise appropriate strategies in the 
realm of vague situations, tend to have limited alternative courses of actions and less 
concrete criteria. Strategies developed in these contexts are complex. Shareholders can 
monitor managerial behaviour and performance if they are able to comprehend the 
environment within which the firm is functioning.  Environmental firm risk renders such 
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monitoring capacity more challenging (Li and Simerly, 1998). Thus, the efficiency of 
monitoring managerial actions depends on the level of environmental dynamism.  
Li and Simerly (1998) hypothesized and empirically tested the moderating effect of 
environmental dynamism on the managerial ownership-performance relationship for 90 
firms in two industries that have significantly different dynamism. OLS regression results 
indicate that the interaction of environmental dynamism dummy variable and CEO 
ownership leads to positive performance. More directly, for firms with higher environmental 
dynamism, there is a stronger positive relationship between CEO ownership and firm 
performance.  
3.4.6.3 The moderating effect of owner identity on the corporate governance-
performance relationship 
 According to Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) the null hypothesise between ownership 
structure and firm performance (Demsetz, 1983) could be solved if owner identity is 
considered. They comment that knowledge on how owner identity affects firm performance 
has important implications for matching corporate strategies with corporate governance. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) study the link between ownership concentration and firm 
performance in a panel of 435 largest European companies for the period 1990-95.  Using 
autoregressive estimation technique, the interaction term of ownership concentration and 
owner identity indicators show that the effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance is negative for bank, family and government ownership relative to 
institutionally owned firms. 
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3.4.7 Measuring corporate governance 
Single dimension vs. Composite measures of corporate governance 
3.4.7.1 Single dimension corporate governance 
 
Single dimension measures focus on a particular governance mechanism. Research on single 
dimension of governance mechanisms focus on ownership concentration and the board of 
directors. Ownership concentration is a measure of shareholders‟ power to influence 
managerial behaviour (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) advise 
researchers to separate shareholdings among the different owners who are assumed to have 
different interests. ownership by the CEO including the CEO‟s stock options (Li and 
Simerly, 1998), management shareholding (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, et al., 
1999), shareholding by largest shareholders (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), concentration 
of all outside shareholders (Zahra, 1996; Mura, 2007; Alves and Martins, 2010), and  
dummy indicator for the presence of a major non-board block holder owning a percentage of  
firm‟s shares (Zajac and Westphal, 1994), have been widely used measures of ownership 
concentration. 
 The board of directors has gained much coverage in the empirical governance literature. The 
board of directors is often characterized by its size, composition and share ownership.  The 
measurement of board composition is not a settled issue in corporate governance studies 
(Daily, et al., 2003). (Daily, et al., 2003; Zahra, 1996)  define board composition as the 
proportion of non-affiliated outside directors. Affiliation is defined personal or professional 
relationships with the corporation or the CEO. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) use the term 
independent directors and defined as outside board members who are not ex-employees of 
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the firm, are not family members of the CEO, and do not have  business relationship with the 
company such as consultants, lawyers, bankers, accountants, customers , suppliers and other 
service providers. Many researchers have used the proportion of non-executive directors as a 
measure of board composition (Mura, 2007). 
There is a growing belief that ownership by directors is an important indicator of the 
incentive of the board to monitor the CEO. Board ownership can be measured by the 
proportion of shares held by all directors in the board, by non-executive directors or by 
executive directors  (Mura, 2007). 
3.4.7.2 Corporate governance index 
 
Researchers argue that using single dimensions of governance mechanisms leads to missing 
variable bias (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012; Black, et al., 2010). Considering this, several 
studies have constructed corporate governance index from multiple indicators. Studies use 
two approaches to emphasise the multi dimensionality of corporate governance. Some 
analyze several governance measures individually in a single study. Mura (2007) reflects the 
multidimensionality of corporate governance by including different measures of board 
ownership and a board structure in a single study. A composite index may not be always 
necessary but analysis that does not control for other governance mechanisms is still 
vulnerable to the same missing variable bias (Black, et al., 2010).  
In the second approach, researchers construct an overall corporate governance index from 
multiple governance mechanisms informed by both the theoretical and empirical literature. 
There are multiple dimensions of corporate governance. Single dimension governance 
70 
 
proxies can only captures a glimpse of the overall governance practices  (Ananchotikul, 
2007; Black, et al., 2010). Moreover, their efficiency to represent the overall corporate 
governance depends on the assumption that they are correlated with other governance 
practices.  
For several decades, corporate governance has been the focus of much theoretical and 
empirical research in developed economies. However, many studies have addressed the issue 
in developing economies (Klapper and Love, 2002; Bebczuk, 2005; Ananchotikul, 2007; 
Javed and Iqbal, 2007; Black, et al., 2010). Klapper and Love (2002) use firm level corporate 
governance data in 14 emerging markets. Originally, the data were collected from 495 
companies in 25 countries by an independent private firm. Corporate governance index was 
constructed from a survey instrument that contains 57 binary (yes/no) questions on 
management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, and 
fairness. Analysts answer to the questions based on firm publications, interviews with senior 
managers, executives and board members. Average of the results is the governance measure 
for each firm.  
Ananchotikul (2007) constructed corporate governance index for 365 listed non-financial 
companies of Thailand. The index includes 76 questions and is further classified in to five 
sub indices: board structure, conflict of interest, board responsibility, shareholders right, and 
disclosure and transparency.  With unequal weight for each sub index the overall index for 
each company ranges between 0 and 100, hundred being the best governance. Only publicly 
available information was used to avoid misreport and self-selection. Bebczuk (2005) 
construct a transparency and disclosure index for 65 non-financial listed companies of 
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Argentina for the period 2003-2004 using various public sources. The index is based on 32 
„yes‟ or „no‟ questions on whether a firm discloses corporate governance information 
publicly and has three sub indices: board, disclosure and shareholders.   
Javed and Iqbal (2007) Constructed corporate governance index for 50 Pakistani listed non-
financial companies for the periods 2003 and 2005. Various corporate governance 
ordinances were used including the Pakistani legal framework and the securities exchange 
commission of Pakistan. Twenty-two provisions were included grouped in to three sub 
indices: board, ownership and shareholdings and transparency, disclosure and audit.   
Black, et al. (2010) construct firm level corporate governance for 66 Brazilian non-financial 
firms by mailing a 41 binary question survey containing the following elements:  board 
structure, ownership structure, board procedure, disclosure, related party transaction and 
minority shareholder right. They did not rely on corporate governance required by the 
Brazilian law. They claimed that response rate would have been low or results would not 
have varied as all firms were expected to comply the law. For each sub index, they sum the 
elements and divide it by the maximum value achieved by any firm. This makes each sub 
index to be within 0 and 1 (in theory). The overall corporate governance index is the average 
of the sum of the sub indices. In practices corporate governance index lies within 0.32 and 
0.81.  
In developed markets governance indices are constructed in the U.S (Gompers, et al., 2003), 
Japan (Bauer, et al., 2008) . Gompers, et al. (2003) investigate the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance of 1500 large U.S. firms during 1990‟s. Based on data 
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compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), they constructed a 
“Governance Index” (G-index) to proxy for shareholder rights. The index has 24 provisions 
and is constructed in terms of corporate laws decreasing shareholder rights.
10
  Bebchuk, et al. 
(2004) questioned the relevance of all of the 24 provisions used in the Gompers, et al. (2003) 
study. They argued that some provisions might have little relevance in determining firm 
value, profitability and sales growth. Based on the same data set compiled by IRRC they 
constructed an entrenchment index (E-index) comprising of six provisions (four that limit 
shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeover difficult) for all firms 
between 1990 and 2003.
11
 Each firm was rated on the absence or presence of each provision, 
from 0 to 6. Bauer, et al. (2008) study the link between corporate governance and company 
performance of Japanese firms by using an overall governance rating constructed from six 
governance sub-indices:  board accountability,  financial disclosure and internal controls,  
shareholder rights,  remuneration, market for control, and corporate behaviour. 
3.4.8 Limitations in Empirical Corporate Governance Literature 
  
 The literature has several limitations. These limitations can fall under, measurement, model 
specification and, data analysis and hypothesis testing.  
Measurement of corporate governance has been a controversial issue in the literature. 
Corporate governance encompasses a “bundle” of mechanisms adopted to constrain 
                                                          
10
 The index is compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, U.S.A. (IRRC) and has 24 equally weighted 
corporate provisions such as poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boars, cumulative voting etc. that limit 
shareholders’ rights and increase management power. 
11
 The E-index was constructed from the IRRC data set too. Four of the E-Index set constitute limit on shareholder voting,  
i.e. Staggered boards, limits to shareholders amendments of the by-laws, supermajority requirements for mergers, and 
supermajority requirements for charter amendments. The remaining two are measures taken in preparation for a hostile 
offer. i.e. poison pills and golden parachute arrangements.   
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managerial discretion (Rediker and Seth, 1995). The board of directors, ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership and appropriate disclosure and transparency are 
believed to be important elements of effective corporate governance. Hence, an examination 
of corporate governance should incorporate these mechanisms into a composite measure. 
Studies that ignore to develop a holistic measure of corporate governance are deemed to 
missing variable bias (Gompers, et al., 2003; Black, et al., 2010). Under this condition 
estimates are incorrect and lead to wrong interpretations.    
Model specification is another limitation of the literature. The adequacy of a specified 
corporate governance model can be judged on whether relevant firm level contingencies are 
identified and incorporated, whether unobserved firm heterogeneity are accounted for, and 
whether moderating firm factors are considered in the governance-firm performance 
relationship. Contrary to agency theory‟s assumption that „one size fits all‟ (Black, et al., 
2010), organizational scholars believe that choice of structural forms is affected by both firm 
level and environmental contingencies both within and outside a company (Burton, 2000). 
The issue is firms choose their corporate governance endogenously to contingency factors. 
Few researchers have explained corporate governance endogenous to firm level 
contingencies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). Although including relevant observed firm level 
contingencies is an important approach to reduce the problem of endogeneity, it does not 
avoid the problem completely. The effect of unobserved firm heterogeneity on temporal 
behavior of firms is well addressed both in econometrics (Green, 2002; 2010) and empirical 
studies (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Cavaco, et al., 2013). In the corporate governance 
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literature, this would mean unobserved fixed firm effects affect the level of governance 
mechanisms adopted and financial performance. Unobserved fixed firm effects if ignored 
can lead to biased coefficient estimates and to wrong interpretations of findings. For 
example, exclusion of unobserved firm effects in a model linking corporate governance and 
firm performance would lead to a wrong association between them. Studies based on agency 
theory implicitly assume that the corporate governance-firm performance link is context free 
(Li and Simerly, 1998). However, organizational researchers have suggested that the effect 
of an organizational form on performance depends on whether it is in fit with environmental 
contingencies (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1973). The idea is that contingencies 
moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Although 
this line of thinking is getting more prominence, few studies dare to conceptualize and test 
such contingency hypotheses (Li and Simerly, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Black, et 
al., 2010).  
Finally, Data analysis and hypothesis testing are major gaps in the corporate governance 
literature. Even if all limitations discussed so far were addressed, the effort would be in futile 
if researchers employ incorrect data analysis and hypothesis testing approaches. Especially, 
testing moderation hypotheses are the major setback for researchers and require great care.  
Although a moderation hypothesis can be evaluated by testing the significance of the 
interaction term  (Allison, 1977; Friedrich, 1982), it cannot address the full implication of 
the hypothesis (Schoonhoven, 1981). In addition to testing the significance of a 
multiplicative term, a moderation hypothesis requires sketching the overall effect of 
corporate governance against a moderating variable (Schoonhoven, 1981). No single study 
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makes use of the multi-staged hypothesis testing approach. No single study addresses all the 
limitations discussed above.  
Bridging the gap 
This study bridges the gap in previous corporate governance studies. A holistic corporate 
governance index is constructed that are believed to be relevant for effective corporate 
governance.  This study also addresses the problem of model specification by incorporating 
relevant firm level contingencies, accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity through 
fixed effect estimation, and estimating a moderation regression that considers important 
moderating variables in the governance-firm performance relationship. Finally this study 
recognizes the limitation of previous studies in testing hypotheses by pushing the 
methodology one further step. In addition to statistical tests, graphical sketches are used to 
test moderation hypotheses (Schoonhoven, 1981). 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter reviews the corporate governance literature informed by both agency and 
organizational perspectives. Corporate governance is a complex set of structures and 
processes that are put in place by companies to limit agency problems.  The agency problem 
occurs when shareholders desire greater profit while managers do not because the profit 
belongs to the shareholders. The consensus is managers with significantly high level of 
discretion misuses firm resources that may lead to lower firm performance. Several 
corporate governance mechanisms have been proposed. Share ownership by managers 
enables their behaviour to align with the principals. Large investors have both the incentive 
and capacity to monitor management. Agency theory suggests that the board of directors 
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serve as a monitoring device and its effectiveness depends on its characteristics such as its 
size, structure and shareholdings. Moreover, company disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry and agency problems between shareholders and managers.   
Contrary to agency theory‟s assumption, organizational scholars believe that the potential for 
moral hazard and agency problems varies systematically depending on environmental 
contingencies. Limited number of studies shows that contingency factors such as firm 
growth, firm risk and owner identity influence the corporate governance choice of firms. 
There is a general belief that good corporate governance enhances a firm‟s performance. 
Agency based researches report insignificant association between corporate governance and 
firm performance. Organizational scholars comment that ignoring contingency factors is the 
cause of inconsistencies in results of agency based studies. This line of idea has led several 
researchers to understand how contingency factors moderate the effect of governance 
mechanisms on firm performance.  
This chapter also discusses the multidimensionality of corporate governance and the need to 
construct composite scores to reduce missing variable bias. Overall, measurement of 
corporate governance, model specification and data analysis and hypothesis testing are major 
limitations in the empirical corporate governance literature.   
The next chapter presents statement of the problem. Based on the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter two, agency theory and organizational theory are integrated and testable 
hypotheses are developed.  
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CHAPTER 4: PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to developing hypotheses. As discussed in earlier parts, this study 
is based on agency and organizational theories that are synthesized into a single research 
framework. Three groups of hypotheses are developed. Scholars comment that 
complementing agency theory with other perspectives in organizational studies provides 
deep insight (Eisenhardt, 1989; Daily, et al., 2003). Agency theory has important 
contributions to organizational theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hambrick, et al., 2008). Consistent 
with agency theory and organizational theory, the first group of hypotheses links corporate 
governance with firm level contingencies. In the theoretical framework, we have mentioned 
that firms choose their corporate governance depending on contingency factors.  Three main 
contingency variables are antecedents of corporate governance. Firm growth, firm risk and 
identity of the largest owner have gained more attention in the empirical corporate 
governance literature.
12
 The second group depicts the link between corporate governance and 
performance that traditional agency researchers often address. Researches that rely heavily 
on agency theory assume firm performance as a direct consequence of corporate governance. 
In the third group of hypotheses, we complement the traditional agency research tradition 
with organizational perspective. Consistent with organizational scholars, we account for the 
moderating effect of firm level contingencies in the corporate governance-firm performance. 
Organizational researchers suggest that the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance depends on contingency factors that exist within and outside firms.  
                                                          
12
  (Zajac and Westphal, 1994) comment that limited availability of prior research makes identifying a 
comprehensive list of contingencies let alone ranking them based on importance. 
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4.2 Hypotheses  
4.2.1 Hypothesises for the effect of antecedent factors on corporate governance  
 Agency theory holds that as managers are self-serving and behave in value minimizing way, 
instituting appropriate governance mechanisms is unquestionable for maximum firm 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Organizational 
scholars also share the idea that less motivated shareholders or their representatives leads 
managers to serve their own interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, organizational theorists 
emphasise that governance mechanisms need to consider the demands of the environment 
imposed on firms (Burton, 2000; Cohen and Cyert, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
nature of the environment both internal and external to a firm affects the costs and benefits 
of governance mechanisms adopted by the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Hence, the levels of use of governance 
mechanisms depend on firm and environmental contingencies.  
Several scholars have called for studies that would include antecedent factors to explain 
variations in the adoption of certain corporate governance mechanisms within firm and 
between firms (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001;  Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The central idea 
is governance mechanisms are endogenously chosen by firms. Observed (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Klapper and Love, 2002; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Holderness, 2003; Black, et al., 
2010; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) and unobserved firm level characteristics 
(Himmelberg, et al., 1999), and observed and unobserved industry characteristics  (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, et al., 1999) determine the adoption of governance 
mechanism across firms. In fact, cross-country studies show that unobserved country effects 
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explain variations in the strength of corporate governance mechanism (Klapper and Love, 
2002). 
 Holderness (2003) comment that the incentive and capacity of block holders either to 
monitor management or to expropriate minority shareholders depends on firm level 
contingencies. Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest researchers to include observed firm 
characteristic that relate to potential moral hazard and affect optimal managerial ownership. 
They show that managerial ownership is predicted by factors of the contracting environment 
in which the firm operates. More over they find that the cross sectional variation in 
managerial ownership is largely affected by unobserved heterogeneity. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) suggest the inclusion of firm and environment factors to explain 
ownership structure. Klapper and Love (2002) argue that corporate governance mechanisms 
are endogenously determined can equally work for all governance mechanism. Firms have 
the discretion to flexibly choose their corporate governance mechanism depending upon 
contexts (Burton, 2000; Black, et al., 2010; Desender, et al., 2013).  Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) show that optimal board composition varies systematically depending on 
circumstances. Similarly, Zajac and Westphal (1994) explain that greater agency problems 
require greater monitoring through higher proportion of outside directors, large percentage of 
outside director ownership, a separate CEO/board chairperson position, block ownership by 
a non-board shareholder. They suggest that policy prescriptions for a standard form of the 
board of directors would be inappropriate, as firms may be different and changing 
constantly.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that the level of private and shared benefits of 
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control differs across industries. Regulated industries are more likely to have diffusely 
owned firms as regulators substitute the monitoring role of shareholders.  
Relevant contingency factors considered as antecedents of corporate governance are firm 
growth (Bathala and Rao, 1995), Firm risk (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Bathala and Rao, 
1995; Himmelberg, et al., 1999), firm size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bathala and Rao, 
1995), and asset composition (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002).  Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) use firm size, control potential and systematic regulation as antecedents of 
ownership concentration. Klapper and Love (2002) include country-level measure of 
shareholder rights and their enforcement, firm growth, and the proportion of intangible 
assets. Himmelberg et al. (1999) use firm size, capital intensity, R & D intensity, advertising 
intensity, cash flow, volatility and investment rate as determinants of managerial ownership. 
Bathala and Rao (1995) study the determinants of the proportion of outsider directors by 
incorporating leverage, CEO tenure, firm size, firm risk, growth as the factors determining 
the level of agency problem. The type of governance mechanisms used as a dependent 
variable does not matter as endogeneity equally applies to all governance forms (Klapper 
and Love, 2002). The hypotheses for the firm level determinants of corporate governance 
mainly focus on firm growth, firm risk, and owner identity. Nevertheless, we also address 
other firm level contingencies roughly.  
4.2.1.1 The effect of firm growth on corporate governance 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature document inconsistent relationship between firm 
growth and corporate governance. Moreover, for a given prediction scholars provide 
different reasons. Firms respond to their growth potential by instituting appropriate 
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governance system. For instance, firms with high growth opportunities are expected to have 
high proportion of outside directors in the board (Bathala and Rao, 1995). Moreover, firms 
may get highly concentrated or have higher proportion of outside directors to signal external 
financiers that the risk of expropriation by management is less likely (Klapper and Love, 
2002). At the same time, growing firms may need appropriate financial management and 
instituting good corporate governance limits inefficient investments (Bebczuk, 2005). More 
over a growing firm badly needs external finance and the cost of capital is generally lower 
for a firm with effective control mechanisms compared to a firm with weak control 
mechanisms (Bebczuk, 2005). Ownership that is more concentrated is also predicted, as 
shareholders do not want to handover their control to creditors if the firm raises external 
finance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Empirical Studies show that firm growth increases the 
level of agency problem and moral hazard (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Himmelberg, et al., 
1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Klapper and Love (2002) study the effect of firm growth on 
corporate governance of firms in 14 countries. Using a governance index to represents the 
multiple dimensions of governance they obtain that past growth rates are positively related to 
corporate governance. Himmelberg et al. (1999) find that firm growth positively affects the 
level of managerial ownership. The following hypothesis is developed on the bases of the 
above argument for positive association between firm growth and corporate governance. 
H1a: The higher the growth opportunities of firms the stronger will be their 
corporate governance. 
On the other hand, firm growth may affect corporate governance negatively.  Since growing 
firms operate in volatile environment, managers often use a great deal of subjective decision-
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making during the strategic making process (Bathala and Rao, 1995). As executives have 
better information in these situations, managers of high-growth firms may prefer more 
insiders in their board. This will extend to other governance mechanisms as well (Klapper 
and Love, 2002). For example, the desire to have freedom of making subject decision, a 
manager of a growing firm may prefer dispersed ownership, limited disclose of relevant 
information to both insiders and outsiders, etc. Bathala and Rao (1995) examine the 
determinants of the proportion of outside directors in a cross section of 261 firms. Using 
OLS regression they find that sales growth is negatively related to the proportion of outside 
directors. The following hypothesis is based on the above evidence; 
 H1b: The higher the growth opportunities of firms the weaker will be their 
corporate governance. 
4.2.1.2 The effect of firm risk on corporate governance 
There is a growing belief that firms operating in volatile environments have greater agency 
problems that require adoption of stronger corporate governance mechanisms (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). Agency theory emphasises the importance of firm risk in explaining 
efficient contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). Daily et al. (2003) suggest that the volatility of 
operations firms face recently gives researchers a room to study the governance mechanism 
such firms adopt. Results from such studies add to the knowledge we have about corporate 
governance. Volatility in a firm‟s environment is unfavourable as it limits a firm‟s ability to 
understand its environment  (Cohen and Cyert, 1973). Decisions tend to be more subjective 
and conflicts are more likely higher (Cohen and Cyert, 1973). Environment volatility 
increases the severity of agency problems and thus demands tighter monitoring of 
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management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001).  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) argue that the wealth gain 
obtained by shareholders through strong monitoring of managerial performance depends on 
conditions of the firm‟s environment. For a firm that operates in a dynamic environment, the 
manager is expected to make timely decisions (Galbraith, 1973). However, it is difficult to 
identify whether firm performance is directly attributed to managerial behaviour. The 
situation makes monitoring managerial behaviour in volatile environments difficult. Thus, 
the greater the volatility of the environment the greater the wealth gain by shareholders from 
tighter controls (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Moreover, since 
monitoring has the advantage of linking rewards with the behaviour of managers more 
concentrated ownership (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012) and greater managerial ownership 
aligns the interests of managers and shareholders in more volatile environment (Zahra, 
1996).  
Studies show that firm risk has positive effect on optimal structure of ownership structure 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), proportion of outside 
directors (Bathala and Rao, 1995), and company disclosure (Abrahamson and Park, 1994). 
Based on the discussion the following hypothesis is developed. 
H2a: The higher the risk of firms the stronger will be their corporate 
governance. 
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On the other hand volatile environment increases performance variability (Zahra, 1996). 
Since managers are risk averters (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), they prefer more 
compensation (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012).  Managers prefer rewards based on the quality 
of their decisions in making strategic choices rather than the actual outcomes of the decision 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995).  Outside directors reward managers based on outcomes and such 
outcomes are volatile. On the other hand, inside board members reward mangers based on 
the processes managers follow to make decisions. Therefore, managers of firms operating in 
volatile environment are more likely to prefer high proportion of inside board members. In 
addition, managers tend to resist disclosing organizational outcomes as volatility may affect 
firm performance adversely (Abrahamson and Park, 1994) or may resist incentives directly 
linked with performance (Zajac and Westphal, 1994).  
The information processing perspective of organizational theory emphasises the link 
between the environment and information processing demand of a firm. Risky environments 
require executives to process large amount of information (Galbraith, 1973), that tend to 
require innovativeness and use of a large amount of subjectivity (Cohen and Cyert, 1973; 
Bathala and Rao, 1995). In this, situation insiders possess important information (Zahra, 
1996; Harris and Raviv, 2008) and hence the agency costs associated with insiders is lower 
relative to the costs of information loss when the board is dominated by outsiders  (Harris 
and Raviv, 2008; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Moreover, the degree of interference on the 
manager‟s decisions decreases with more inside directors and smaller board size (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 2012). Studies have reported negative association between risk and corporate 
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governance (Bathala and Rao, 1995). This calls for an inverse relationship between firm risk 
and corporate governance. 
H2b: The higher the risk of firms the weaker will be their corporate 
governance.  
4.2.1.3 The effect of owner identity on corporate governance 
The consensus among scholars in agency theory is that owners are expected to aspire for the 
maximization of their wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Research based on agency 
perspective treat shareholders as a homogenous group of individuals with identical risk 
exposure and goal preference. This assumption works well when markets are perfect i.e. 
when all the risk is diversifiable (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). When markets are 
imperfect, due to the differential risks and returns they assume, owners may disagree on 
company strategy. As organizational scholars such as Mintzberg (1984) and Drucker (1988) 
suggest the forces that influence modern corporations are too complex to explain in a simple 
principal-agent dichotomy that agency theory maintains. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) further 
noted that, even in the absence of uncertainty, information asymmetry and imperfect 
markets, shareholder interests do not coincide. Second, owners such as institutional 
investors, banks, non-financial companies and governments are intermediate agents of the 
ultimate owners that may not have similar objectives (La Porta, et al., 1999).   Hence, like 
managers owners may maximize their utility at the expense of the overall value of the 
company. Although, large owners engage themselves with corporate governance more 
actively (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), they may also inefficiently redistribute wealth from 
other investors to themselves (La Porta, et al., 1999). In this case the question is not about 
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the conflict of interest between share holder and managers but it is about how large investors 
dominate the decision making process of the company in such a way that performance is 
affected either positively or negatively (Go'rriz and Fum'as, 1996).  
The evidence tells us little about who monitors controlling owners (La Porta et al., 1999) and 
owner identity is the key to discover the risk and return preferences of the various categories 
of owners and resulting corporate governance choices and firm performance. In this 
direction, pushing the analysis beyond the traditional principal-agent relationship is vital. 
Further research aimed at providing clear understanding of the goal preferences and risk 
profiles of key shareholders is required (Gedjavlovich, 1989). Specifically further research 
that can discriminate between management, family, government, company and bank 
ownership categories is required.  
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) identify most notable owner category that invest in and 
control publicly held corporations: families, banks, institutional investors, government and 
other non-financial companies. Distinguishing which of these owner categories dominate 
firms provides information on the degree of expropriation minority holders are exposed to. It 
expands the analysis beyond the traditional manager-shareholder conflict and to the conflict 
of interest between majority and minority shareholders.  
a. Management ownership 
 
 Agency theory assumes significant ownership by managers aligns their interests with that of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Nevertheless, managerial ownership may lead 
them to entrench themselves and act contrary to shareholder interests. Generally, companies 
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with entrenched managers have higher agency problems. Management ownership is a 
predominant structure in Ethiopia. In at least 50% of sampled companies, managers are the 
largest shareholders. This may not be common in other countries particularly in developed 
markets. Since there are no formal corporate governance institutions in the country, 
managers with significant ownership may misuse firm resources. It is also possible that 
significant ownership reduces the agency problems as managers could bear large part of the 
costs (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Therefore, this special ownership structure provides a 
fertile ground to study the role of management ownership to governance mechanisms.  
b. Family ownership 
 
Even though whether family ownership eliminates or creates agency cost is an empirical 
question, the relationship between family ownership and agency cost has conflicting 
theoretical predictions (Abdullah, 2006a). Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) explain that due to 
their firm specific investment, family owners have long-term commitment.  Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003) argue that family controlled firms have the highest agency costs than firms 
controlled by other categories of owners.  This is because family owners may entrench 
themselves and gain personal benefits by controlling much of the decision power of the 
company.  
Other researchers claim that their findings show an indirect association between family 
ownership and the prevalence of agency cost. For example, Abdullah (2006a) find that the 
ratio of family members in the board of directors is positively related to the quality of 
financial reports. They pose that family owners have the expertise on the firm‟s condition 
88 
 
and to monitor the activities of the firm. Similarly, Go'rriz and Fum'as (1996) comment that 
family ownership reduces the agency and contractual costs. Since family members 
themselves are agents, the necessity of disciplining and monitoring agents is eliminated. 
That does not however prove that the dominance of family ownership across the world is due 
to lower agency cost of family control (La Porta, et al., 1999). In the study of the largest 
companies of 27 wealthy countries of the world, La Porta, et al. (1999) find that family 
owners do not monitor management as top management is a part of the family owners.   
c. Bank ownership 
 
Significant ownership by banks lets them influence the company through board 
representation and lending (La Porta, et al., 1999). Banks have professional managers who 
are not entrenched themselves to expropriate other shareholders (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 
2003). Jensen (1989) poses that joint ownership of debt and equity by large informed 
investors such as banks results in strong managerial monitoring and creates incentive for 
managers to pursue activities that maximize shareholders value.  
d. Government ownership 
 
Government‟s influence is more obvious than others‟ are (Gedjavlovich, 1989). Government 
may influence the democratization of corporations. Through various initiatives, it gives 
direction on how corporations are run (Mintzberg, 1984). For example, if the government 
holds shares it may require „public interest‟ representations in the board of directors. Thus 
with substantial ownership government may serve as an alternative governance mechanism 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) comment that 
89 
 
companies under the process of privatization may not have large investors. In this context, 
managers of these firms would end up with high control and discretion. This is particularly 
interesting for Ethiopia. Little after the current government took power, many state owned 
companies have been privatized. The privatization agency requires companies to undergo 
series of clearing procedures before allowing full control by private owners. In the mean 
time, the government maintains its position as a shareowner. On the other hand, government 
may not be sensitive to corporate governance matters in the case where there is high 
asymmetric information on the side of the society. The lack of information about its role in 
governance systems, a government may not have high reputation and re-election impact to 
motivate it enroll in monitoring the activities of management in a profit maximizing way  
(La Porta, et al., 1999).  
e. Company ownership 
 
Company block holders exhibit unique behaviors that are not common to individual block 
holders. Company ownership usually forms business groups each of which are found at 
different stages of the value chain (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Reports show that the 
effect of company ownership on corporate governance is not as clear as ownership by other 
categories of owners. For example, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) explain that the advantage 
of transfer of knowledge when companies own other companies along a given industry value 
chain may be outweighed by risk of lack of mutual monitoring. In this case, the agency cost 
of company dominance is expected to be high.  
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From the above discussion, the role of family and company ownership to corporate 
governance is not clear. There are some reasons that indicate the incentive of government to 
monitor management. We may also suspect this as government may not know its role in 
governance systems. Bank ownership is an undisputed predictor of corporate governance. 
Since managers (executives and directors) are the largest owners in half of the sampled 
companies, they serve as a reference group in the analysis. Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are developed.   
H3a: the impact of owner identity on corporate governance is positive for 
bank and government ownership relative to management ownership. 
Hypothesis 3a would be weak as the theoretical prediction for government ownership is not 
consistent as it is for bank ownership. Hypothesis 3b is supposed to resolve this by 
emphasising more on the role of bank ownership than government ownership. 
H3b: the positive impact of owner identity on corporate governance is greater 
for bank ownership than government ownership relative to management 
ownership. 
4.2.1.4 Other antecedents of corporate governance 
 
Firm size 
The expected effect of firm size on corporate governance is not settled. Larger firms are 
believed to have greater agency problems (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 
2002). Himmelberg et al. (1999) comment that large firms have greater agency problems and 
91 
 
thus require tighter monitoring. This may be due to management complexity (Bebczuk, 
2005) that renders monitoring in large firms difficult (Klapper and Love, 2002). Therefore, 
large firms should adopt stronger corporate governance mechanism.   
On the other hand, smaller firms may adopt stronger governance mechanisms as they may 
have better growth opportunities,
13
 badly in need of external finance at lower cost of capital 
(Klapper and Love, 2002; Bebczuk, 2005). Bebczuk (2005)  suggest that large firm size may 
be correlated negatively with growth opportunities, positively with diversification, greater 
economies of scale and scope, more professionalized management and higher access to 
finance. According to  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for a 
given degree of control an owner requires a small share of the firm as firm size gets larger. 
Similarly, Himmelberg, et al. (1999) argues that large firms benefit from monitoring by top-
level management and external institutions. In this set up, both Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
and Himmelberg et al. (1999) would predict that larger firms may have lower agency 
problems and may require lower corporate governance. Increase in firm size raises the cost 
of sustaining central control (Cohen and Cyert, 1973). 
Asset composition 
The scope of managerial discretion in a firm may depend on the degree that its assets are 
observable. Compared to intangible assets it is difficult to steal fixed assets (Himmelberg, et 
al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002).
14
  Intangible assets are soft capitals that are difficult to 
                                                          
13
 This is contrary to the evidence of null relationship between firm size and expected firm growth (Simon, 
1964).  
14
 Tangible assets are fixed assets such as property, plant and equipment while intangible assets refer to “soft” 
capital which include R&D capital and short term assets such as inventories (Klapper and Love, 2002). 
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monitor and may lead to high managerial discretion (Klapper and Love, 2002). Thus, the 
agency problem and managerial discretion is higher in intangible asset intensive firms than 
fixed asset intensive firms are.  As a result, due to greater scope of managerial discretion 
intangible intensive firms should have good corporate governance to align the interests of 
shareholders with managers.  
Consistent with the above argument studies find a negative link between fixed capital and 
corporate governance  (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). Alternatively, empirical studies show that 
soft capitals require tighter monitoring of managerial behaviour and actions.  For instance, 
soft capital calls for the separation of the positions of CEO and the chair of the board  
(Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994) or higher managerial ownership (Himmelberg, et al., 1999), 
both of which indicate good corporate governance. 
Market power 
Agency theorists assume that higher free cash flow is associated with higher agency 
problems (Jensen, 1986). The empirical literature considers various indicators to proxy for 
the level of free cash flow. These studies assume that market power is an indicator of the 
level of free cash flow that in turn influences agency problems and managerial discretion. 
For instance, market power measured by the ratio of operating income to sales  
(Himmelberg, et al., 1999) and industry type  (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Black, et al., 
2010) is found to affect the level of governance mechanisms positively.  
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Leverage 
The effect of leverage on corporate governance is inconclusive as well. On one hand, highly 
leveraged firms should have good corporate governance to reduce the incentive for 
overinvestment and excessive risk taking (Bebczuk, 2005). On the other hand, debt may 
reflect the monitoring role of creditors that otherwise shareholders would exercise. This can 
be viewed as a substitution effect of governance mechanisms (Zajac and Westphal, 1994). 
Debt decreases the agency problem as it increases ownership stake of managers and lowers 
the amount of free cash flow available for overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). 
For a particular shareholder or a small group of shareholders, the ability to control the firm 
increases with the level of Leverage as leverage can reduce the impact of wealth constraint 
on control potential (La Porta, et al., 1999). Debt serves to focus management towards 
efficiency and limits free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Leverage may reduce the agency cost by 
preventing managers from investing in value-reducing projects or force them sale 
unproductive assets (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).  
4.2.2 Hypothesises for the Effects of Corporate Governance on Performance 
 
The major premise of agency theory is the „separation of ownership and control‟ which gives 
managers significant discretion  (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mangers may act contrary to 
the interest of shareholders for profit maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is 
commonly referred to as agency problem. Scholars have discussed specific evidences of 
managerial discretion. These include resource diversion, transfer pricing, higher managerial 
compensation and perquisite, managerial entrenchment in which the manager stay on the job 
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without contribution   and investing in value minimizing investments (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Corporate governance is about the limits to managerial discretion  (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Corporate governance reduces the agency problems by aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders as a result managerial actions are directed toward higher profits 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theorists maintain that perfect markets can discipline 
management to act in the interest of shareholders for higher profits (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). However, perfect markets are less likely in which internal governance 
mechanisms are indispensable to constrain managerial discretion (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). These governance mechanisms include managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012); the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012); large share holders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Holderness, 2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), and  appropriate disclosure 
and transparency requirements (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). 
 
The consensus among scholars is that corporate governance enhances firm performance. 
Firms with effective corporate governance can invest in profitable projects and enhance the 
efficiency of operations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Many studies obtain that corporate 
governance has positive impact on firm performance (Klapper and Love, 2002). 
   
H4: The effect of corporate governance on firm performance is positive. 
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Other firm level contingencies may affect firm performance. Firm growth may have negative 
effect on firm performance, as growth requires raising fund at higher cost of capital. Firm 
risk will have negative impact on firm performance. Faced with volatile environment, 
managers use their high discretion to use firm resources in value reducing manner.  
Moreover, volatility reduces firms‟ ability to understand their environment and develop 
appropriate strategy (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Firms that use higher level of debt in their 
capital structure are expected to perform poorly. High level of debt is associated with 
increased interest expense that lowers the net income available for shareholders. Moreover, 
highly leveraged firms have higher probability of bankruptcy that increases the costs of 
capital for additional financing needs.  Firm size may affect firm performance negatively. 
Bigger firms tend to use more debt relative to equity. Thus, bigger firms may act to satisfy 
debt holders rather than shareholders. As a result, they grow at higher cost of capital.  
Capital intensity is expected to have positive impact on firm performance. Capital-intensive 
firms enjoy economies of scale from their investments that may lead to lower costs 
associated with investments.   
4.2.3 Hypotheses for the moderating effect of firm level contingencies on the 
corporate governance-performance relationship. 
 Agency theory contends that governance mechanisms aligns the interests of managers with 
that of shareholders‟ that subsequently leads to high firm performance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, empirical researches on corporate governance doubt on the 
universality of the effect of corporate governance on performance; and whether the result is 
robust across times, different organizational contexts and within a country for many periods 
(Aguilera, et al., 2007). Results indicate that the direct link is not consistent in different 
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institutional and organizational contexts.  In a theoretical and empirical review,  Burton 
(2000) finds that there is no consistent relationship between independent board and firm 
performance. He mentions that methodological flaws specifically, measurement of the 
independent and dependent variables are the sources of errors in empirical researches. In the 
study of  Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership concentration has no significant relationship 
with firm performance as measured by accounting profit rate. Himmelberg, et al. (1999) 
estimates the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance using panel data.  After 
accounting for both observed and unobserved firm characteristics, the result shows no 
relationship between ownership and performance. Boyd et al. (2012) content reviewed 1173 
empirical strategic management articles with contingency perspectives published in strategic 
management journal. They reported that empirical researches that focus on the effect of 
corporate governance (for example CEO duality or the proportion of outside directors) on 
performance could not find a simple and direct relationship.  
From the above account of empirical researches relating one or more of corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance (market based or accounting based), those 
hypothetical links that are supposed to operate universally have been tested but in general 
consistent results are lacking. Another strand of literature focuses on the importance of 
fitting corporate governance to firm contexts. In an elaborated manner Bhagat et al. (2008)  
state that, if firms deliberately choose their corporate governance structure, we should expect 
systematic difference across firms; if firms optimize on the different governance choices, we 
should not expect differential performances i.e. firms with high governance ranking should 
not outperform those firms with low ranking. Burton (2000) reviewed theoretical and 
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empirical works and found that there have been inconsistent outcomes in empirical 
researches on the performance effects of corporate governance mechanism. He argues that 
such inconsistencies arise from the neglect of contingency propositions. The contingency 
proposition maintains that performance is enhanced if structural forms (corporate 
governance) fit with the firm‟s characteristics.  
 Organizational theory especially the contingency perspective suggests that contingency 
factors influence structural choices, and firm performance is a function of the level of fit 
between the chosen structure and the contingency factors (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The corporate governance implication of organizational theory 
is that firms that fit their governance mechanisms with the contingency factors outperform 
others without such fit (Black, et al., 2010). The costs and benefits of using governance 
mechanisms to alleviate agency problems depend on organizational and environmental 
contingencies. That is the benefit of using governance mechanisms is higher in situation 
where greater agency problem is more likely (Zajac and Westphal, 1994). Both agency 
theory and empirical studies do not have complete treatise of the implications of contextual 
factors on the corporate governance-performance relationship.  
Black, et al. (2010) advice researchers to suspect their findings obtained from full sample 
analyses. In addition, Burton (2000) explains that inconsistent results in traditional agency 
based research are due to wrong methodology. Several researchers have reported that the 
effect of a corporate governance mechanism on performance is not the same across firms 
which have different characteristics (Black, et al., 2010; Bebczuk, 2005; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; Daily, et al., 2003), which operate in different industries  (Li and Simerly, 
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1998) or country of origin (Klapper and Love, 2002). Baysinger and Butler (1985) argue that 
the performance effect of the composition of the board of directors is contingent on factors 
within the firm and in the environment in which the firm operates.  Finkelstein and D'Aveni 
(1994) show that effective board favours CEO duality when performance is low and 
informal CEO power is low.  However, CEO duality is rare when the CEO has informal 
power and when firm performance is high. The focus here is also the firm level contingency 
factors: firm growth, firm risk and owner identity.  
4.2.4 Hypothesis for the moderating effect of firm growth on the corporate 
governance performance relationship 
Agency and organizational perspectives emphasise on the positive link between corporate 
governance and firm performance. However, Studies indicate that firm growth moderates the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Bebczuk, 2005; Black, et 
al., 2010). Although corporate governance has a positive effect on firm performance, the 
effect is enhanced form high growth firms. High growth firms require good corporate 
governance so that they can raise external finance at lower costs (Klapper and Love, 2002) 
and constrain management from inefficient investments (Bebczuk, 2005). This is consistent 
with contingency frameworks that assume that corporate governance mechanisms chosen in 
a way that fit with firm growth have greater performance impact than mechanisms that do 
not have the required fit. Firm growth determines the level of agency problem. The 
following hypothesis captures the complex relationships among firm growth, corporate 
governance and firm performance.  
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H5: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
moderated by firm growth. The greater the growth of firms the greater will be 
the positive influence of corporate governance on firm performance. 
4.2.5 Hypothesis for the moderating effect of firm risk on the corporate governance-
firm performance relationship  
Li and Simerly (1998) comment that research outcomes fail to find significant relationship 
between governance mechanism specifically between managerial ownership and 
performance because they failed to consider the moderating impact of environmental 
dynamism in the governance-performance relationship. Environment volatility increases the 
severity of agency problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2000) as decisions tend to be more subjective that makes firms unable to 
understand the environment (Cohen and Cyert, 1973).  In this context, monitoring 
management is very difficult (Galbraith, 1973). Li and Simerly (1998) provide a similar 
arguement.  Managers facing greater firm risk are expected to devise appropriate strategies 
in the realm of vague situations, limited alternative courses of actions and less concrete 
criteria. It is highly probable that the strategy developed in these contexts is complex. 
Owners can monitor managerial behaviour and performance if they are able to comprehend 
the environment within which the firm is functioning.  Environmental volatility renders such 
monitoring capacity more challenging. Thus, the efficiency of monitoring managerial actions 
depends on the level of environmental dynamism. Since the benefit of monitoring 
management is greater under higher agency problems, the wealth gain obtained by 
shareholders through strong monitoring of managerial performance is greater in high risk 
firms (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Overall, the literature 
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emphasises the enhancing effect of firm risk in the corporate governance-firm performance 
relationship. The following hypothesis is developed to reflect the moderating effect of firm 
risk; 
 H6: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
moderated by firm risk. The greater firm risk the greater will be the positive 
influence corporate governance on firm performance. 
4.2.6 The moderating effect of owner identity on the corporate governance-
performance relationship 
 According to Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) null predictions for the effect of governance 
structures on firm performance could be solved if owner identity is considered. This has 
important implications for matching corporate strategies with corporate governance  
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Shareholders may have other objectives than maximum firm 
value is a recent research agenda. Owners engage in the affairs of the firm in a profit 
maximizing manner if markets are perfect.  However, in the context of imperfect markets 
owners may not easily reach at a consensus about firm strategy due to divergence in their 
assumptions about risk and timing of future cash flows  (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
 The ownership structure of a firm is a contractual structure (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since contracts are written and enforced at a cost, the 
organizational form adopted reflects such costs and is more or less efficient (Hansmann, 
1988; Go'rriz and Fum'as, 1996). In assigning ownership to any of the owner categories, 
evaluating the costs and benefits of ownership is needed so that its dominant objectives are 
identified (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Ideally, a particular owner category may assume 
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ownership. This involves transaction costs: ownership costs and the costs of market 
contracting. An owner category that controls a firm incurs ownership cost but is relieved of 
the cost of market contracting (Hansmann, 1988). The opportunity cost of reassigning 
ownership to another owner category involves the sum of ownership cost additional costs of 
market contracting. The cost of ownership includes monitoring and risk-bearing cost and the 
cost of collective decision making if the category consists of large heterogeneous owners. 
On the other hand, the cost of market contracting includes information cost, ex post 
transaction cost due to asset specificity (Williamson, 1975, 85 and 88) and market power 
distortion cost. Firms run by owner managers avoid the transaction costs by hiring 
professional managers while they incur the transaction costs of associated with debt 
financing. On the other hand, investor-owned companies avoid the transaction costs of debt 
financing due to availability of equity financing while they incur the transaction costs of 
hiring professional managers. As argued elsewhere, the effect of a particular owner group on 
firm performance depends on the costs and benefits of that group.   
Family Ownership 
Family ownership reduces the agency and contractual costs as family members are agents 
that eliminate the necessity of disciplining and monitoring agents (Go'rriz and Fum'as, 
1996). However, agency cost reduction mechanisms are side by side with costs of inefficient 
risk allocation and lack of specialization in family controlled firms. For instance, family 
owners may fear loss of control, be reluctant to attract external equity finance, favor growth 
and survival than profitability (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). According to Go'rriz and 
Fum'as (1996), compared with others family owned firms have high concentration of 
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decision making in the hands of few family member. This results in restricted diversification, 
higher cost of capital and lower investment rate. Even though due to their risk aversion 
tendency family firms have higher efficiency than non family firms (Go'rriz and Fum'as, 
1996), the effect of higher entrenchment and suboptimal investment decisions may reduce 
firm value and profitability (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). Studies report positive effects of 
family ownership on firm performance. For example, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) argue 
that family owners adopt better governance and monitoring practice. This may be because 
the family owners are wealth and may commit themselves to the long-term survival of the 
company (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).  Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) show that family 
ownership has significant positive effect on firm performance.  
Bank Ownership 
In bank-centered economies as opposed to market-centered ones, banks serve as universal 
finance providers to industrial companies (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Bank owned firms 
may have easy access to finance, information and other services (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000).  
Government Ownership 
According to Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), government owned firms are advantageous in 
terms of credit, liquidity or cost of capital, in which governments are relatively wealthier 
than other categories of owners. On the other hand, government may have value reducing 
effect. For instance, high interference by government allows it to have more control rights 
with no substantial cash flow rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, governments 
may have political goals  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), favor social welfare and employment 
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creation (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). As a result, government owned firms are more 
likely to be poor performers  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).    
Company Ownership 
Company block holders exhibit unique behaviors that are not common to individual block 
holders. Company ownership usually forms business groups each of which are found at 
different stages of the value chain (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). The most important 
advantage of company ownership relates to the transfer of knowledge. However, company 
ownership has costs too. It has been reported that company ownership reduces flexibility and 
lacks mutual controlling between business partners. According to Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000), company owned firms are expected to perform poorly as they may favor business 
transactions and growth. There is limited empirical evidence on the role of different owner 
groups in influencing effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000) study the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in a panel of 435 largest 
European companies. They show that the effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance is negative for bank, family and government owned firms relative to 
institutional owners.  
The above discussion explains that except bank ownership all are associated with costs. 
Together with our discussion on corporate governance effect of owner identity, the above 
argument leads to the following hypothetical relationship. 
H7: the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
moderated by the identity of the largest owner. If the largest owner is bank the 
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greater will be the positive influence of corporate governance on firm 
performance.  
 Based on the above theoretical argument the following research framework is proposed. The 
model is common in studies that employ contingency perspectives (Hambrick and Cannella, 
2004). 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued theoretically and developed testable hypotheses by synthesizing the   
agency and organizational literatures. The perspectives have salient differences on the nature 
of corporations, corporate governance and the governance-performance link. While agency 
theorists view corporations as the nexus for the principal-agent relationships, organizational 
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theorists doubt this and argue that relationship in modern corporations are too complex to 
explain with a dichotomous framework. Agency theorists have suggested the benefits of 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholder. In this perspective a variety of corporate 
governance, mechanisms are proposed. The board of directors structured in a way that 
enhances its vigilance, significant ownership by non-board owners, managerial incentives 
such as share ownership and appropriate disclosure are believed to align manager-
shareholder interest. Consequently, managers whose interests are congruent with that of 
shareholders act to maximize firm performance. On the other hand, organizational scholars 
heavily criticize agency theory and the research tradition along the framework as firm 
differences are ignored. The main idea of the organizational perspective is organizational 
contingencies explain differences in the level of use of corporate governance mechanisms 
across organizations.  Contrary to the agency perspective, firm performance is not a direct 
function of governance mechanisms rather it is a function of the fit between the adopted 
governance and relevant organizational contingencies. Thus, in this chapter two main 
arguments are outlined: (1) organizational contingencies may explain differences in the level 
of firms‟ use of corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, firm growth, firm risk, and 
identity of the largest owner are relevant organizational contingencies that may affect firms‟ 
choice of corporate governance mechanisms; and (2) the effect of corporate governance on 
performance depends on organizational contingencies.
15
 More clearly, the fit between 
corporate governance and organizational contingencies influences the effect of the former on 
firm performance.  
                                                          
15
 These organizational contingencies are selected for this thesis as they have gained much emphasis in the 
literature. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the strategies of the study. It outlines how sample is selected, identifies 
the sources of data, discusses and justifies how variables are measured, assembles variables 
into models, develops approaches of data analysis and assumption testing.  
5.2 Research type 
This study follows a positivist approach that assumes knowledge about firm specific 
variables of interest objectively exists and influence corporate governance; that in turn fits 
with the firm specific variables to influence firm performance. Firm growth, firm risk, and 
owner identity are firm specific factors. These factors differ from firm to firm, as a result the 
adopted corporate governance mechanisms differ from firm to firm as well. Depending on 
the level and direction of fit between the firm specific factors and the corresponding 
corporate governance mechanisms adopted, the result ultimately influences firm 
performance accordingly.   
5.3 Target Population and sample   
This study focuses on examining corporate governance of Ethiopian share companies. The 
potential for conflict of interest between the principals (owners of the corporation) and the 
agent (the manager) is high in firms which are organized by selling shares to the public and 
therefore this form of organization is an ideal setting to address corporate governance 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
To be in the sample a firm must be in operation before or at the year 2009. This allows  
collecting a five-year data. Collecting corporate governance and financial data based on the 
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criteria of available minimum consecutive years avoids the survivorship bias (Yermack, 
1996). At the beginning of every fiscal year (September to October), share companies (all 
companies for that matter) are required to report to the ministry of trade and renew their 
license.
16
 The sample includes all share companies that report to the ministry for the period 
2009 – 20013. After dropping companies for which there is no adequate data, we have a 
usable sample of 42 companies.
17
 The usable number of observations is 210 (42 
companies*5 year data). The companies represent five broad industry classes. 4 companies 
are selected from finance, insurance, real estate and trade, 4 companies from manufacturing, 
7 companies from public administration and others, 6 companies from transport, 
warehousing and communication, and 21 companies from wholesale and retail trade (see 
Appendix 1).  
Sample selection baize may not be a problem and the sample fairly represents the 
population.
18 
A simple investigation of the various descriptive statistics indicates that the 
sample fairly represents the population in terms of relevant firm characteristics. For example, 
the sample includes both poor performers and bad performers, and badly governed and well-
governed firms.    
                                                          
16
 The ministry of trade has the legal power to register newly formed companies, require annual disclosure of 
company status and collect relevant documents on owners and officials (art 323 and 447). 
17
 Sampling based on availability of sufficient data is a commonly approach in corporate governance studies 
(Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994; Himmelberg, et al., 1999).  
18
 Selection bias is a situation where study units or excluded units tend to be similar in certain aspects. Archive 
based studies are susceptible to selection bias (Himmelberg, et al., 1999) and care should be given to minimize 
the problem or take remedial actions.   
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5.4 Data sources and data collection instrument 
The most challenging task of completing this thesis was data collection. Actually several 
corporate governance researchers have provided rigorous reports about the tedious data 
collection procedures they had to follow. Since the corporate governance variable should be 
constructed from varied indicators, an effective means is to prepare a survey instrument 
based on the literature. However, a preliminary assessment of the legal, regulatory, and 
operating environment affecting Ethiopian share companies renders some of the survey 
items irrelevant.  Observing a governance mechanism is not relevant at least if its values do 
not vary across companies.  These factors led to a refined survey instrument. The instrument 
consists of three measures of governance mechanisms: ownership structure, board structure 
and disclosure and transparency.  
The Ministry of Trade requires share companies to deposit among other things, documents 
related to the names, addresses and shareholdings of their owners and the board of directors. 
This requirement applies to newly incorporated companies as well as to existing companies 
if relevant changes occur on shareholdings, the board of directors or the CEO. Several types 
of documents are deposited such as article of association, board minutes, annual 
shareholders meeting reports, financial statements, etc.  
Since shareholdings data are not organized in a meaningful way I have hand collected data 
related to various governance elements. The ownership structure consists of measures of 
ownership concentration and block holding. The measures of shareholdings in this 
dissertation are based on „cash flow right‟ as the share company law has provisions that 
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restrict the application of one-share one-vote rule.
19
 Ownership data reports are assumed to 
be accurate as firms would be legally penalized if they are found out to be misreporting 
(Holderness, 2003). The share company law of the commercial code of Ethiopia holds 
founders of a company liable if ownership information is incorrect or misleading (art 308-
310). Board structure measures the independence of the board. Board size, board 
composition, outside board ownership and board leadership indicate the level of board 
independence.  Disclosure and transparency measures the amount of information firms 
provide to the public.   
Firm level contingencies and financial variables are obtained from financial statements 
companies submit to the Ministry of Trade. Even though the requirement that a firm should 
have at least five years data allows collecting complete data on all corporate governance 
variables, some of the firms did not submit their financial statements to the Ministry of 
Trade for all periods during which they operated.
20
 When a firm has missing data on 
financial variables other sources have been consulted.  
5.5  Variables and variable measurement 
For all variables in this study a time series data for the cross section of firms are collected.  
Since the same cross-section of firms is observed for five years, we have a balanced panel 
data.  The advantage of a panel data over a cross section is the latitude that the researcher 
enjoys to model differences in the behaviour of individuals  (Greene, 2010).  
                                                          
19
 For example, a shareholder may not vote if his/her interest conflict with that of the company’s. Moreover, a 
board member is restricted from voting if the agenda relates to his/her roles. 
20
 Contrary to the shareholder law, the Ministry of Trade offers companies to submit either financial 
statements or bank statements.  
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5.5.1 Corporate Governance Index for Ethiopia (CGIETH) 
 
While studying the effect of specific governance mechanism on firm performance, 
controlling for other mechanisms avoids omitted variable bias  (Black, et al., 2010; Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 2012; Desender, et al., 2013). It requires that relevant governance mechanisms 
be identified and an overall index be constructed (Gompers, et al., 2003; Bebchuk, et al., 
2004; Black, et al., 2010). The CGIETH is constructed from the sub-indices of board 
structure, ownership structure and disclosure and transparency.  
5.5.1.1 Board Structure   
 
The corporate governance literature identifies relevant board characteristics that are believed 
to affect its independence and thus effectiveness. Agency theory suggests that an effective 
board has large size (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012), is composed of more outside, 
independent directors (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Zahra, 1996), 
has members owning significant ownership stakes in the firm  (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), 
and has a chairperson who is not sitting also in the position of a CEO  (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). For instance, Daily and Dalton (1994) obtain that bankrupt firms had both fewer 
independent directors and board chairs held by CEOs.    
Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) measure Board independence by standardizing and summing 
the proportion of outside directors and the proportion of firm shares owned by outside board 
members.  The board structure sub-index is a normalized sum of indicators of board size, 
proportion of outside board of directors, proportion of ownership by outside board of 
directors and CEO duality. Board size is a dummy variable if the board has more than six 
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members. Although optimal board size is not a settled issue, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) have 
suggested a board size of between seven and nine members. Large boards are believed to be 
effective monitors of management (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Proportion of outside 
directors is measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total board size (Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007; Desender, et al., 2013). The proportion of ownership by outside directors is 
measured by the ratio of the number of shares owned by non-executive directors to total 
number of shares outstanding (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). CEO duality is a board 
leadership indicator measured by a dummy variable if the CEO is not also the chair of the 
board (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).  
Board Structure Sub-Index = Board Size Dummy + Proportion of Outside Directors + 
Proportion of Shares Owned by Outside Directors + CEO Duality Dummy   
 
5.5.1.2 Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership structure index consists of two major components: ownership concentration and 
block holding. Ownership concentration is measured by the fraction of shares owned by the 
top five outside shareholders. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) comment that a measure of 
ownership structure should separate between management and outsiders‟ ownership.  
However, by using the fraction of shares owned by the largest five shareholders, (Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001) claimed that the presence of management among the largest five 
shareholders is unlikely, and thus the measure could accurately reflect the power of 
shareholders to control management. For a sample of 42 companies in this study the fraction 
of shareholdings by management and five largest owners is 50% and 59% respectively. The 
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evidence in this study shows that the correlation between management shareholding and 
largest five shareholding is 0.92. It would be misleading to assume that shareholding by the 
largest five could reflect the ability of shareholders to control management. What is more 
surprising is that fraction of shares by the five largest shareholders excluding management 
shareholding is about 19% and the correlation between the fraction of shares by the five 
largest shareholders as a whole and the fraction of shares by the five largest non-
management shareholders is -0.026.  Obviously, the fraction of shares by the five largest 
non-management shareholders can reflect the ability of shareholders to control management.   
The importance of block holders has been emphasized in the corporate governance literature. 
A block holder is a shareholder owning significant shares of a company measured by a 
certain threshold. La Porta et al. (1999)  use a 10% threshold and explain that it 1) provides 
significant threshold of votes 2) is a disclosure standard for many countries.  The share 
company law of Ethiopia provides shareholders owning a minimum of 10% of the shares to 
demand the Ministry of Trade reduce board remuneration (art 353(7)) and have the right to 
call shareholder general meetings (art 391 (2)). Block holding is measured by three dummy 
indicators for CEO, board of directors and outside shareholder.  That is if the CEO owns  at 
least 10% of the shares of a firm a dummy indicator of „1‟ is assigned or else a „0‟ is 
assigned. This is consistent with the prediction of agency theory that a CEO owning 
significant percentage of a firm‟s share more likely aligns her/his interest with that of 
shareholders‟. The same criterion applies to the board of directors in which a dummy is 
assigned if any director holds at least 10% of the shares.  Similarly, if a non-management 
outside shareholder owns at least 10% of the shares a dummy of „1‟ is assigned, otherwise a 
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„0‟ is assigned. Holderness (2003) suggest that outside block shareholders are better 
monitors of managerial behaviors and action as a result any analysis on block shareholders 
should separately deal with these outside block shareholders and insider block holders. 
Ownership structure is a normalized sum of ownership by largest five outside shareholders, 
CEO block holding, board block holding and outside block holding. 
Ownership Structure Sub-Index = Ownership by Largest Five outside Shareholders + 
CEO Block Holding + Board Block Holding + Outside Block Holding  
 
5.5.1.3 Disclosure sub-index 
 
Disclosure is an important measure of the quality of corporate governance of a firm 
(Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Beattie, et al., 2004; Bauer, et al., 2008). The OECD (2004a) 
explains that appropriate disclosure and transparency is a crucial ingredient of good 
corporate governance. The financial and operation reports, ownership structure and voting 
rights, board of directors, senior management along with their remuneration and 
independence are few of the information to be disclosed by companies. More surprisingly, 
Bauer, et al. (2008) find out that from the overall governance index, disclosure of financial 
statements and remuneration related matters explains much of the performance difference of 
Japanese companies. The disclosure and transparency sub index is a normalized sum of 
disclosure indicators for financial statements, board allowance and identity, address, 
ownership etc of shareholders and board of directors.  
Disclosure sub-index= financial statement disclosure + board allowances disclosure + 
owner and board member disclosure 
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The CGIETH is constructed from the three sub-indices discussed above. However, before 
combining the sub-indices to an overall governance index, the sub-indices are standardized 
relative to a maximum score (Black, et al., 2010). For example, the board structure sub-index 
is standardized by taking the ratio of board scores to the maximum score achieved by any 
company. The process allows the governance scores to be between zero and one. The overall 
CGIETH is the average of the standardized sub-indices. 
CGIETH = Mean (Board Structure Sub-Index + Ownership Structure Sub-Index + 
Disclosure Sub-Index)  
5.5.2 Firm performance 
 
The choice of performance variables is often problematic as performance is 
multidimensional (Li and Simerly, 1998). In the corporate governance literature, whether 
market measures or accounting measures of performance can effectively show the effects of 
governance mechanisms is not a settled issue (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). However, since 
this thesis deals with the alignment of interests of owners and managers, return measures are 
more appropriate  (Li and Simerly, 1998). According to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
researchers wrongly ignore accounting measures of firm performance in favor of market 
measures. For example, their regression result remains robust after substituting a market 
value measure by ROA. Moreover,  Li and Simerly (1998) suggest that performance is a 
multidimensional construct, thus valid analysis may not be possible with single measure. 
They use several measures of performance such as ROA, ROE, ROI and OROA. Studies in 
strategic management and financial management often use the first three (Li and Simerly, 
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1998). Particularly, corporate governance studies widely use ROA (Bebczuk, 2005) and 
ROE (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Bebchuk, et al., 2004). Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) state that return on equity reflects shareholder welfare and is most widely 
used accounting performance measure. In this thesis both return on asset (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) are used. Besides, calculating firm value as some studies do (Gompers et.al, 
2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) is impossible, as it requires market value of stocks 
information based on investors‟ anticipation of the firm‟s return. In the absence of stock 
market in Ethiopia, using financial measures of performance is the available option. 
5.5.3 Independent variables 
5.5.3.1 Firm Growth  
Growth opportunities determine the potential for managerial discretion (Himmelberg, et al., 
1999). Studies often use sales growth to account for firm growth potential and the scope of 
agency problems (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Sales growth can be constructed easily 
from financial statements and relates past performance with future prospects. Firm growth is 
measured by the year-to-year growth in firm sales. Sales growth between two periods is the 
ratio of the difference in sales of the periods to the previous period‟s sales.   
5.5.3.2  Firm Risk 
Corporate governance studies employ several measures of firm risk. Common to all studies 
is the assumption that instability in a firm‟s environment influences the level of managerial 
discretion thus the required corporate governance (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). Instability of firm return is often used as a proxy for risk. Both market data 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) and financial data (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994) can be used.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use variability of the firm‟s profit 
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as the measure of instability in the firm‟s environment to explain corporate governance in 
general and ownership concentration in particular. They include three measures: firm 
specific risk as the standard error of estimates from fitting the “market model”, standard 
deviation of monthly stock market return, and standard deviation of monthly accounting 
profit rate. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) employ both firm specific risk and market risk in 
the governance equation. Similarly,  Himmelberg et al. (1999) use the standard deviation of 
the idiosyncratic component of daily stock prices. Other studies consider financial return 
variability measured by standard deviation of ROA (Zajac and Westphal, 1994) and 
coefficient of variation of earnings before interest and taxes (Bathala and Rao, 1995). In this 
thesis, firm risk is measured by the standard deviation of five years return on asset (ROA) 
covering the period 2009 to 2013. 
5.5.3.3 Owner identity  
 
Owner identity refers to who the largest owner is.  Following Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
owner identity is a dummy variable for five owner categories: Management, bank, company, 
government, Family/individual.  Management refers to board members, the CEO and other 
executives (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If the largest shareholder is commercial bank 
(government or private owned), it is referred to as bank. A private firm that holds the largest 
fraction of shares of the target firm is referred to as company. Government may refer to the 
federal government, regional government, political party or related entities. The largest 
shareholder can be an individual/family who is not a board member or does not involve in 
the management of the company. Hence, for each owner category a value of one is assigned.  
The corporate governance literature identifies two ownership rights: cash flow right and 
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voting right (La Porta  et al., 1999; Javed and Iqbal, 2007).  The cash flow right is dependent 
on the proportion of shares a shareholder holds. Voting right may be greater than cash flow 
right due to pyramidal ownership and cross holding. Actually, the discrepancy between the 
level of share ownership and voting right appear if one-share-one vote is violated. To avoid 
confusion the notion of cash flow right is adopted here. The largest owner calculated by the 
proportion of share ownership of the top owner is set as a criterion to assign ownership. 
Therefore, the variables for owner identity are as follows: FAM, if the largest owner is 
family or an individual or a foundation, BANK, if the largest owner is a bank, GOV, if the 
largest owner is a government (federal, state government or a political party), and COMP, if 
the largest owner is a non-financial company or corporation. 
5.5.3.4 Firm Size 
 Logarithm of firm sales (Himmelberg, et al., 1999) and book value of asset or its logarithm 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Bebczuk, 2005; Mura, 2007; 
Black, et al., 2010) are commonly used measures of firm size in corporate governance 
researches. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that using book value of assets does not affect 
results obtained from using market value of common equity. In this study, firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of book value of total asset.  
5.5.3.5  Leverage 
 
Debt reflects the monitoring capacity of creditors. At the same time, debt limits free cash 
flow available after a firm invests in profitable projects (Jensen, 1986). Corporate 
governance researchers consider debt as an important factor that influences both governance 
and firm performance. Studies use either the ratio of total debt to total book value of asset 
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(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Bebczuk, 2005; Mura, 2007; Black, et al., 2010) or the ratio 
of long-term debt to total equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). This study uses the former 
approach and measures leverage by the ratio of total debt to total book value of asset.  
5.5.3.6 Market power 
 
Market power is believed to affect the level of agency problems. The process works either 
through its impact on free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Himmelberg, et al., 1999) or through 
product market completion (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Measuring market power is 
problematic in the governance literature. Studies often use crude measures to control the 
indirect effect of market power on both governance and firm performance. For instance, 
several researchers use industry type to control for the effect of market power (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000).  Himmelberg et al. (1999) use the ratio of operating income to sales as a 
market power prox. Clearly market power can be measured both at firm level and industry 
level. A variable that reflects both levels is more likely capable of capturing the influence of 
market power on governance and performance. Therefore, for a particular firm market power 
is measured by the ratio of firm sales to total industry sales to which the firm belongs.  
5.5.3.7  Asset composition 
 
Governance researchers argue that the extent that a firm‟s asset are observed predict the 
scope for managerial discretion and the required level of governance mechanisms  
(Himmelberg, et al., 1999). Compared with intangible or „soft‟ assets, fixed assets can easily 
be observed and are difficult to steal.  
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There are fairly stable measures of asset composition. Many studies have incorporated both 
the tangible and intangible aspects of firm asset composition.  Capital intensity measured by 
the ratio of fixed assets (plant, property and equipment) to sales (Mura, 2007) is a commonly 
used proxy for the effect of tangible assets on managerial discretion. Alternatively, studies 
employ advertising expenditure to sales ratio (Himmelberg, et al., 1999) and R&D 
expenditure to sales ratio (Alves and Martins, 2010) to indicate the difficulty of observing 
soft capital and its association with the scope of managerial discretion. 
This study uses measures for both tangible and intangible assets.   The ratio of fixed asset to 
firm sales and the ratio of advertising expenditure to firm sales are used to emphasise the 
importance of tangible and intangible assets in a firm‟s asset structure respectively. 
5.5.4 Validity and reliability of measures of corporate governance index and sub-
indices 
 
It has been explained that the focus of the thesis is corporate governance. A composite index 
of corporate governance is constructed for a sample of firms based on the sub-indices of 
ownership structure and concentration, board structure and disclosure and transparency. The 
chosen sub-indices are informed by the corporate governance literature and are relevant to 
the Ethiopian context.
21
 Before the overall corporate governance index is constructed, 
greater care has been taken to assure the validity of individual components used to generate 
each of the sub-indices. In fact, valid measures for the components of each sub-index were 
identified through detailed search of both the theoretical and empirical literature. The battery 
                                                          
21
 See the ‘data type and data collection instruments’ section for the procedures followed in the selection of 
relevant corporate governance variables. 
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of validity also includes in the process of combining the components of the sub-indices and 
combining in turn these sub-indices for the overall corporate governance index. Factor 
analysis is performed to further check the validity of the elements of the index.  Factor 
analysis results shows that monetary measure of ownership by CEO, outside shareholder and 
other directors is not a valid measure of ownership structure. Thus monetary measures of 
ownership are replaced by dummy indicators for each owner group. The reliability of the 
components and the sub-indices are checked using alpha.   
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 Table 2: summary of variables and their definition. 
    
 
  Variables                                               Definition   
  Corporate governance (CGIETH) 
 
Corporate governance index for Ethiopia constructed  for 
firm i at time t. 
  Return on asset (ROA) 
 
Net income to total book value of  (NI/book value of 
Assets) assets for firm i at time t. 
  Return on equity (ROE) 
 
Net income to book value of shareholder's equity 
(NI/Equity) for firm i at time t. 
  Firm risk (RISK) 
 
Standard deviation of return on asset st.dev(ROA).   
  Firm growth (GROW) 
 
 Year-to-year sales growth to proxy firm growth 
opportunity (Sales t-1 – sales t)/sales t-1. 
     Owner Identity  
Top largest owner identity for firm i at year t : (takes 1 or 
0): family (FAM), management (MAN), bank (BANK), 
government (GOV) or company (COMP). 
  Firm size (SIZE) 
 
Logarithm of book value of total asset log(Book Value of 
Asset). 
 
Capital structure (LEV) 
 
The ratio of total debt to the book value of assets (total 
debt/book value of asset). 
 
Capital intensity (CAP) 
 
The ratio of fixed asset to sales (fixed asset/sales). 
 
Advertising intensity (ADV) 
 
 The ratio of advertising expenditure to sales (adv. 
Exp/sales). 
 
Market power (POW) 
 
Ratio of firm sales to total industry sales.  
 
Investment (INV) 
 
Dummy if a firm reports annual investment on fixed 
assets.  
 
ui 
 
Dummy for firm i. 
  
Indj  
Tt 
  
Takes 1 if the firm is found in industry j, or 0. 
Year dummy for the period 2009-2013. 
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5.6 Research models 
 
The strength of corporate governance and its effect on performance can partially be 
explained if we account for unobserved firm heterogeneity (Holderness, 2003).  Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) model managerial ownership as a function of observed firm level contingencies 
and unobserved firm heterogeneity, and the effects of these variables on firm performance. 
They argue that unobserved firm heterogeneity is a “firm fixed effect” and incorporating this 
unobserved heterogeneity enables to explain the cross sectional variations in the adoption of 
corporate governance mechanisms. If unobserved firm heterogeneity are not controlled for in 
a regression of governance mechanisms on firm performance any relation observed between 
governance mechanisms and firm performance is spurious. One of the benefits of using 
panel data is its ability to allow arbitrary correlation of the unobservable effects with the 
explanatory variables, and a fixed effect analysis is best to do that (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Corporate governance researchers recommend the inclusion of unobserved individual effects 
to account for unexplained variation on the dependent variable (Klapper and Love, 2002; 
Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) mention three sources of unobserved firm heterogeneity: 
monitoring capability, market power and intangible assets. Unobserved firm heterogeneity 
may relate to monitoring capability. A firm with high monitoring capability will choose 
lower level of managerial ownership (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). Another example of 
unobserved firm heterogeneity is intangible assets (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). Since 
intangible assets are harder to monitor and managers have higher discretion (Himmelberg, et 
al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Thus, a firm with high proportion of intangible assets 
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will choose higher level of managerial ownership to align the interest of the manager and 
shareholders. 
Unobserved firm heterogeneity may arise due to difference in market power. Since a 
manager firm is insulated from the disciplining of the product market, the firm will choose to 
allocate high managerial ownership. Managerial ownership is only one of the governance 
mechanisms and therefore the idea can easily be transferred to other mechanisms (Klapper 
and Love, 2002). For example, a firm with higher monitoring capability, lower market power 
and lower proportion of intangible assets will choose less concentrated ownership, lower 
level of disclosure etc.   
Following Himmelberg et al. (1999) the following section presents specifications of 
corporate governance and firm performance. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑡 be observed firm level contingencies 
and 𝑢𝑖 be unobserved firm heterogeneity. The variables in 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are the factors in the 
contracting environment of the firm and affect the choice of governance mechanisms. 𝑢𝑖 
accounts for the unobserved firm heterogeneity due to conditions we discussed previously 
and are assumed to be time-invariant. Faced with variables in its contracting environment 
(𝑥𝑖𝑡) and unobserved heterogeneity 𝑢𝑖,  a firm chooses the level of its corporate governance 
mechanisms.                     
                 
[1] 
𝐶𝐺𝐼𝐸𝑇𝐻𝒊𝒕 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼1𝑢𝑖  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 is an overall corporate governance index for firm i at time t. The 
assumption behind using an overall measure is that firms employ a combination of various 
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governance mechanisms such as ownership concentration, board of directors, disclosure etc. 
to align the interests of managers and shareholders. 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a matrix of observed firm level 
contingencies that affect the level of the agency problem. specifically firm growth, firm risk, 
owner identity, capital intensity, advertising intensity, firm size, leverage and market power 
are included as key variables the contracting environment of the firm and 𝑒𝑖𝑡   is the error 
term.   
5.6.1 Empirical specification for the antecedents-corporate governance relationship 
 
The relationship between antecedent factors and corporate governance is modelled based on 
equation 1. In this model, corporate governance is the dependent variable. Corporate 
governance index is constructed for each firm based on three corporate governance 
dimensions. The main independent variables are firm risk, firm growth and owner identity. 
More over the model control for capital intensity, advertising intensity, leverage, firm size 
and market power.  
[ 2] 
CGIETHit = β0 + β1GROWit + β2RISKit + β3FAMit + β4COMP + β5GOV + β6BANK +
δzit
t + ui + Tt + εit     
Where CGIETH   is the corporate governance index for a particular firm, RISK is firm risk, 
GROW  is firm growth, FAM, COMP, GOV and BANK  are dummy variables for the largest 
owner identity for which management (MAN) is a reference group and is dropped from the 
model. zi
t includes a set of control variables (firm size, leverage, capital intensity, 
advertising intensity, market power, investment ), ui is firm fixed effect for firm i and Tt is 
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the fixed time effect for the period 2009-2013 and εit is the disturbance term. Performance 
related measures are not included in the governance equation, since separate equations are 
used to relate corporate governance and performance.   
 Given the optimal contract, it is possible to specify the performance model. Firm 
performance is a function of the chosen level of corporate governance, observed firm level 
contingencies and unobserved firm heterogeneity.   
[3] 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝐶𝐺𝐼𝐸𝑇𝐻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑍1𝑥𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝑢𝑖 + Tt + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Where πit is firm performance, xit is the same firm level contingencies that may affect both 
governance and performance, ui is unobserved firm fixed effect, Tt is fixed time effect and 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 is independent error term.  
5.6.2 Empirical specification for the corporate governance-performance relationship 
The empirical specification for firm performance takes use of equation 3.  
 
[4] 
ROA/ROEit   =  λ0 + λ1 CGIETHit +  λ2GROWit + λ3 RISKit + λ4 FAM + λ5 COMP +
λ6 GOV + λ7 BANK  + δzit
t  + 𝑢𝑖 + Tt + 𝑣it                                                                           
Equation 4 relates corporate governance with firm performance. Firm performance is 
measured by two measures. ROA  and  ROE  are accounting performance measures. CGIETH  
is the same governance index. The model also includes control variables in equation 2, firm 
and time fixed effects and the error term 𝑣it. 
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5.6.3 Empirical specification for moderating variables in the corporate governance-
performance relationship 
 
This study hypothesized that firm level contingencies moderate the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Moderation can be expressed by cross-
multiplying governance mechanisms with contingency factors (Zahra, 1996). Firm growth, 
firm risk and owner identity are believed to moderate the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Below is a variant of equation 4 specified by multiplying 
the corporate governance variable with each of the moderating variables.    
[ 5] 
ROA/ROEit   =  α0 + α1 CGIETH it + α5GROWit + α3 RISKit + α4 FAM + α5 COMP + α6 GOV +
α7 BANK + α1 (CGIETH ∗ GROW)it + α2 (CGIETH ∗ RISK)it + α3(CGIETH ∗ FAM)it +
α4(CGIETH ∗ COMP)it + α1 (CGIETH ∗ GOV)it +α1 (CGIETH ∗ BANK)it + δzit
t  + 𝑢𝑖 + Tt + 𝑣it                                                                           
       
Equation 5 is a moderation equation as it includes interaction between corporate governance 
with each moderating variables. In addition to interaction terms, main effects of the variables 
involved in cross multiplications are added.  Since there is no theoretical justification for the 
inclusion of all interactions in a single equation, separate analysis made for each (Gujarati, 
2004). Equation 5 also has the same control variables and fixed firm and fixed time effects.  
Estimation of equation 2, equation 4 and equation 5 is the right approach because by 
controlling the fixed effects we can avoid omitted variable bias (Gujarati, 2004).   
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5.7 Data analysis techniques 
The data analysis follows three main stages. 
Stage one: describing the sample  
The first stage of data analysis is the traditional descriptive and correlation analysis for all 
the variables used in the study. Descriptive statistics are provided to summarize the measures 
used to construct corporate governance sub indices and the overall corporate governance 
index (CGIETH). This stage also provides descriptive and correlations statistics for all 
variables involved in various estimations. 
Stage two: testing the influence of antecedent firm level contingencies on corporate 
governance 
The antecedent firm level contingencies are the independent variables that are believed to 
affect corporate governance. The corporate governance index (CGIETH) is the dependent 
variable and firm growth, firm risk and owner identity indicators are the main independent 
variables (equation 2). To justify for the validity of the proposed models in previous 
sections, different specifications of regression models. Specifically, pooled OLS with the 
assumption of absent individual effect, industry effect, and firm fixed effect equation 
specifications are analysed. As we use different specifications each at a time, changes in 
parameters and model fit are closely inspected and possible explanations are given. The 
significance of each variable is tested at 10%, 5% and 1%. To allow comparison between 
variables, coefficients are standardized (beta). Great care is   taken to satisfy basic regression 
assumptions (Normality, Heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity).    
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Stage three: testing the influence of corporate governance on firm performance 
At this stage, the link between corporate governance and firm performance is investigated. 
The two accounting measures of performance i.e., ROA and ROE are the dependent 
variables.   However, the same sets of independent variables are included in both 
performance models. The specifications are similar with that used in stage one. For each 
performance model OLS, industry effect and firm fixed effect specifications are considered. 
As in the previous stage, coefficients are standardized, the same significance levels are used 
and whether various estimations assumptions are fulfilled are checked.  
Stage four: testing the moderating effect of firm level contingencies on the corporate 
governance-performance relationship 
This data analysis stage is intended to test the moderating effects of firm growth, firm risk 
and owner identity on the corporate governance-performance relationship, separate analysis 
for each moderator variable. Strategic management studies use interaction moderation and 
subgroup moderation to test their contingency hypotheses (Venkatraman, 1989). In the 
subgroup moderation analysis, the researcher divides the sample units in to groups based on 
the contextual variable and t-tests (for two groups) or chi-square tests (for more than two 
groups) is used to identify the strength of relationships between the predictor and the 
outcome variables (Boyd, et al., 2012). Then the specified hypothesis of fit is supported if 
there is statistically significant difference in the correlation coefficients of the predictor 
variable and the outcome variable in the groups (Venkatraman, 1989). Sub group moderation 
requires large sample size (Boyd, et al., 2012). On the other hand, moderation analysis 
focuses on the form of relationship between the independent and dependent variables 
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(Venkatraman, 1989). In the relationship of X on Y, interaction moderation seeks to answer 
whether „a change in X has similar effect on Y in group 1 as in group 2‟.  
The theoretical arguments developed in this thesis focus on the „form‟ of relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance.  For example, the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance is greater for highly growing firms. An alternative way of 
saying is „the greater the value of firm growth the greater will be the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance‟ (Schoonhoven, 1981). Thus, Interaction moderation is 
used in this thesis.  It is a valid approach to test contingency hypotheses (Friedrich, 1982).
22
 
For each moderator variable, an interaction term is generated by cross-multiplying the 
corporate governance variable and the moderator variable. Testing whether a variable has 
moderating effects require running and comparing two regression specifications. First, we 
run a regression model incorporating the main effects of corporate governance, the 
moderator variables and other control variables. Second, regression model including the 
interaction effect of the corporate governance variable and each moderator variable is 
estimated (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). The procedure is referred as hierarchical regression and 
is commonly used in studies that use interaction moderations  (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 
1994; Li and Simerly, 1998; Zahra, 1996). 
There are several ways of testing the significance of moderating effects. The first approach is 
based on the magnitudes of the beta coefficients of the main effect and interaction effect. 
The moderating hypothesis is supported if the interaction term has greater beta than the main 
                                                          
22
 Since subgroup moderation analysis requires dividing units of analysis in to two or more groups each of 
which containing 200 units; it should not be used if the number of units of analysis under study does not 
support such criterion (Boyd et al., 2012). 
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effect (Li and Simerly, 1998). However, if variables are transformed to reduce 
multicollineartiy, testing moderation hypotheses based on beta coefficients is incorrect 
(Allison, 1977). An alternative approach involves directly testing the significance of the 
interaction term at certain significance level, say 1% or 5%  (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). 
The test statistics (p-value) obtained is similar if we also test the change in R
2
 (∆R2) obtained 
when interaction terms are added (Kim, et al., 2001). In both cases, the moderating 
hypothesis is supported if the test statistics is significant.  A further analysis of this approach 
requires sketching the marginal effect of the focal variable (e.g. corporate governance) on 
the dependent variable for significant interaction term (Schoonhoven, 1981; Kim, et al., 
2001).
23
   
 The methods informed by Friedrich (1982) and Schoonhoven (1981) are more appropriate 
for this thesis. Friedrich (1982) suggests that coefficients of variables involved in interactive 
specifications are conditional rather than stand-alone.  Assume an estimation result of a 
reduced model; Performance= B1 + B2*CGIETH + B3*Moderator + B4*(CGIETH*M). 
CGIETH is the corporate governance variable and M is a moderating variable. The 
coefficients (B1, B2 and B3) are outputs of an estimation. Coefficient B2 is the effect of 
CGIETH on performance if M is zero. Alternatively, B3 is the effect of the moderating 
variable (M) on performance if corporate governance (CGIETH) is zero. The coefficient of 
the interaction term of CGIETH and M (B4) is the change in the slope of performance on 
CGIETH due to a unit change in M. If B4 is positive, it would mean that a one unit increase 
                                                          
23
 (Schoonhoven, 1981) sketches the marginal effects of different measures of organization structure on the 
dependent variable for significant interaction terms. For example if the interaction terms X1X2 in a model of y= 
B1 + B2X1 + B3X2 + B4X1X2 + e is significant, the marginal effect of the focal variable (X1) on Y is given by Y= B2 + 
B4X2. 
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in M increases the slope of performance on CGIETH by B4 (Friedrich, 1982). Since, our 
conceptualization is on the overall effect of CGIETH on performance, we need to integrate 
the conditional coefficients of CGIETH and CGIETH*M and test it for significance. The 
derivative of the performance equation with respect to CGIETH gives us the overall effect of 
CGIETH: ∆ (Performance)/∆ (CGIETH) = B2 + B4M. By using a formal „t‟ test on the 
integrated coefficients, we can get the overall effect of CGIETH for particular values of M 
along with the associated significance level. The procedure applies to each moderating 
variable and consists of two sub-stages. 
a. Test whether the un-standardized coefficient of the interaction terms is 
significant (Venkatraman, 1989). 
b. Test the overall effect of CGIETH on performance along the observed values 
of the moderator variable (Mean, Mean + SD and Mean – SD) (Friedrich, 
1982).  
c. Graph overall effect of CGIETH on performance along the observed values of 
the moderator variable. 
5.8 Testing For Violations of Assumptions 
5.8.1 Normality  
Normality is one of the basic requirements of linear regression analysis. For valid results for, 
independent variables of a model must have normal distribution. Normality can be tested 
either before or after estimation. In both cases, various plots are available that can depict 
normality more clearly than statistical tests. Researchers recommend quintile-normal plots 
for practitioners  (Miller, 1997). Quantile-normal plots emphasise on the tails of the 
distribution and are one of the pre-estimation plot techniques. Normality is tested by 
evaluating the distribution of a variable against a diagonal axis that represents an ideal 
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normal distribution. Although it is difficult to obtain perfect normality, most of the analysis 
variables have normal distribution (see Appendix 4) 
5.8.2 Multicollinearity 
  
Multicollinearity exists when there is high correlation among variables of a specific model 
(Green, 2002). Although multicollinearity may occur in any regression analysis, it is a 
common problem in interaction moderation analyses (Venkatraman, 1989). Transforming 
the variables by subtracting the respective mean values and creating the interaction term with 
the transformed variables avoids the problem  (Li and Simerly, 1998; Venkatraman, 1989; Li 
and Simerly, 1998). In this study, measures of corporate governance, firm growth, firm risk 
and owner identity are transformed by subtracting their respective mean values and 
interaction terms are formed using the transformed variables. 
Regardless of model specification, a correlation coefficient that is higher than 0.75 is 
considered as an indicator of multicollinearity. In this study, no correlation coefficient has 
value that is as high as 0.75. A formal test of multicollinearity for each model is performed 
using VIF (Variance Inflation Factor). VIF measures the dimension compatibility of 
individual variables with respect to the other variables in a model.  The inverse of 
multicollinearity (tolerance) is an alternative measure of Multicollinearity. Higher values of 
tolerance shows lower multicollinearity and vice versa. The risk of multicollinearity is 
higher if mean VIF is significantly different from 1 and the largest VIF for individual 
variables is greater than 30 (Chatterjee and Hadi, 1986). All model specifications satisfy the 
criteria, thus multicollinearity is not a problem (see Appendix 5). 
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5.8.3 Heteroskedasticity 
 
The potential problem of heteroskedasticity in the regressions models is tested using 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests (Green, 2002). The null hypothesis of the test is that 
there is homoskedasticity or constant variance in error terms. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity problem. In addition to including 
time dummies in all models to solve the problem  (Zajac and Westphal, 1994), a formal test 
was undertaken. All tests indicate that heteroskedasticity is not a major problem. That is the 
null hypothesis for homoskedasticity is not rejected as indicated by large p-values (see 
Appendix 5).  
5.8.4   Endogenous corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance studies are often criticised for their failure to account for the risk of 
endogeneity problem (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Harris and Raviv, 2008). The presence 
of endogeneity could lead to biased estimates thus distorts the effect of corporate governance 
on firm performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Endogeneity may be caused due to the 
presence of unobserved fixed firm heterogeneity that can affect both corporate governance 
and firm performance (Himmelberg, et al., 1999), the failure to include all relevant variables 
commonly referred as omitted variable bias (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and reverse causality 
as firm performance may affect corporate governance  (Mura, 2007).  
Consistent with the corporate governance literature relevant firm level contingencies are 
included in all performance models (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). According to Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001), information on how a governance mechanism responds to both firm 
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level contingencies and factors in the firm‟s environment is one way of addressing 
endogeneity. Moreover, to avoid the presence of endogeneity caused by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity all performance models include firm fixed unobserved effects  (Himmelberg, 
et al., 1999; Gompers, et al., 2003; Cavaco, et al., 2013).  
While appropriate remedial actions such as mentioned above can reduce the risk of 
endogeneity, the problem may not be completely solved due to reverse causality. Bebczuk 
(2005) suggests that performance may have positive effect on corporate governance 1) only 
profitable firms afford the costs of adopting good corporate governance. 2) there may be  a 
system at an equilibrium state in which there is a group of firms with high performance/good 
corporate governance, whose owners are enjoying the benefits resulted from the strong 
corporate governance and are willing to maintain it; and the second group includes low 
performance/bad corporate governance firms in which insiders expropriate minorities and try 
hard to maintain it. In such situations, other methods are often used. Researchers used 
different methods to account for endogeneity. Instrumental variables regression  
(Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Bebczuk, 2005), simultaneous equation model (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Bebczuk, 2005), or lagged values of performance variables are commonly 
used (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994; Cavaco, et al., 2013).  
Cavaco, et al. (2013) use a variant of the following model to check endogeneity of board 
characteristics to previous financial performance (ROA and ROE).  
[ 6] 
𝐶𝐺𝐼�湡𝑇𝐻𝒊𝒕 =  Ω 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+𝜋 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
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Performance refers to ROA and ROE alternatively, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 refers to other firm level 
contingencies such as firm growth and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 the error term.  The focus here is Ω. If Ω is 
significant different from zero, the effect of CGIETH on financial performance is biased. For 
Both financial performance variables, the result clearly indicates that previous performance 
does not affect present corporate governance. Thus, it is safe to consider results in this study 
as valid (see Appendix 6: 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the strategies of the study. Sample selection requires great care as 
validity of results heavily depends on it. This chapter proposes sample selection based on a 
criterion that a company must be in operation for a specified period. This is consistent with 
the corporate governance literature. One of the major setbacks for governance studies is 
obtaining data. The problem is severe in countries where corporate governance is alien. This 
is especially true in Ethiopia. Multiple data sources had to be consulted to obtain data for this 
study. Similarly, standard data collection instruments appeared to be invalid for this study.  
As a result, a customized but comprehensive data gathering tools is developed. This chapter 
also explains how variables of the study are measured. Generally, studies use either single 
measure or composite measure of corporate governance. We argued that single measures are 
not capable of the multiple aspects of governance and composite measures assure the 
validity of results. Although there are several regression models available for researchers the 
literature reports concerns that researchers should address. This study uses firm fixed effects 
regression models and moderation regressions. Fixed effect models are used to account for 
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unobserved firm heterogeneity that could bias results. Various techniques are used to test 
violation of regression assumptions. Results indicate that assumptions of normality, 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity are not serious problems to affect the validity of 
results in this study. The next chapter presents data analyses and reports results. The chapter 
is organized by data analysis stages that are sub divided further based on relationship 
hypothesised in chapter four. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, results of the study are presented based on the four stages of data analysis 
outlined in the previous chapter. At stage one various descriptive analysis are performed. 
The effect of firm level contingencies on corporate governance is analysed in stage two. 
Three different specifications are used to check the robustness of corporate governance 
regressions. At stage three corporate governance is associated with firm financial 
performance. ROA and ROE are the dependent variables as consistency of the effect of 
corporate governance can be evaluated for alternative measures of performance. In the fourth 
stage, the moderating effects of firm level contingency factors are analysed. In addition to 
regressions analysis, marginal analyses are performed using various graphs. Results from all 
stages of data analyses are not related to the literature as it is the main task of chapter seven.  
6.2 Descriptive and correlation statistics 
Table 3 shows the corporate governance variables from which the various governance 
indices are constructed. The top five non-management shareholders own on average 19% of 
company shares (t5_out). The group owns a maximum of 91% of company shares and a 
minimum ownership of 0%. The standard deviation of 0.21 clearly indicates a wider 
dispersion. Regarding the block holding variables, CEO‟s and non-CEO board members 
separately are block holders in 38% of the observations. The figure is only 28% for non-
management shareholders. It demonstrates the dangers of the dominance of insiders in the 
ownership structure of  Ethiopian companies. The mean board size is approximately 6, with 
the minimum and maximum board size of 3 and 9 respectively. The company law of 
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Ethiopia requires board size to be between 3 and 12. The standard deviation of 1.6 is quite 
low implying that companies do not differ significantly in their board size. 
Table 3: summary statistics of corporate governance variables (2009-2013). 
 mean Std.Dev min max 
Ownership Structure     
t5_out 0.19 0.21 0 0.91 
Block_CEO 0.38 0.49 0 1  
Block_BoD 0.38 0.49 0 1  
Block_out 0.26 0.44 0 1  
Board Structure      
BoD_sz 5.98 1.60 3 9  
nexcBoD_sz 0.87 0.17 0.4 1  
CEO_duality 0.84 0.37 0 1  
nexBoD_own 0.40 0.38 0 1  
Disclosure and 
Transparency 
    
Disc_own 0.99 0.07 0 1  
Disc_allow 0.50 0.50 0 1  
Disc_finance 0.66 0.47 0 1  
No. of observations 210    
 
T5_out is the proportion of common equity owned by the top five non-management shareholders. Block_CEO 
is a dummy variable (1 if CEO owns 10% or more stakes or 0 otherwise).  Block_BoD is a dummy variable (1 
if at least a board member owns 10% or more stakes or 0 otherwise). Block_out is also a dummy variable (1 if 
any non-management shareholder owns 10% or more stakes or 0 otherwise). BoD_sz is size of the board. 
nexcBoD_sz is the proportion of non-executives in the board.  CEO_duality is a dummy variable taking 1 if the 
positions of the CEO and the chair of the board held by two persons or 0 otherwise. nexBoD_own is the 
proportion of common equity owned by all non-executive board members. Disc_own,  Disc_allow and 
Disc_finance are dummy variables that assume 1 if there is public disclosure  of the identity and ownership of 
shareholders, board members, etc., board allowances and financial and operating performance statements 
respectively. 
 
 
The proportion of non-executive board members is very large (87%) which may show strong 
monitoring capacity of the board of directors. This figure is as high as 100% of the board. 
However, it should be clear that the boards of some companies are dominated by 60% of 
executive directors. The disclosure variables show large discrepancy. The mean value of 
Disc_own (99%) suggests that almost all companies disclose the identity, address and share 
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ownership of their shareholders and board members. The result is not surprising expected as 
the company law requires all share companies to do so. Companies should submit such 
documents at the time of the formation of the share company and when any change occurs 
either in the ownership structure or the board of directors. This fact is also demonstrated by 
the very low standard deviation. On the other hand, on average 50% the companies disclose 
board allowances in their financial statements. The company law of Ethiopia states nothing 
regarding the amount and determination of board allowance. This is one of the weaknesses 
of the law relative to international corporate governance practices. The variability of 
disclosure of board allowances is large as significant number of companies do not disclose 
board allowances. Finally, the mean value of disclosure of financial statements implies that 
66% of the companies disclose their financial statements to the public. Public disclosure in 
this context is that companies submit their financial statements to the Ministry of Trade at 
the end of the year (July 7). According to the ministry, financial statements are publicly 
available and thus anyone interested could inspect them. Unlike international practices, 
Ethiopian companies have the discretion to disclose their financial statements to the public. 
This is the practice rather than the law in. The company law unequivocally obliges all share 
companies to submit their financial statements to the Ministry of Trade. In unwritten 
operating routine however, the ministry provides a company the option to submit its 
financial statements or a bank statement on its cash position. Whichever option a company 
exercises, the ministry would renew its license. 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics and simple correlations of the governance variables. The 
overall governance index (CGIETH) is a composite value of the three sub indices: ownership 
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sub index, board sub index and disclosure and transparency sub index. The mean value of 
the board and disclosure sub indices are above the theoretical threshold of 50%. The sub 
indices might have influenced the overall index. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for CGIETH and its sub indices (2009-2013). 
 mean 
Standard 
deviation CGIET Owner Board Disclosure 
CGIETH 0.56 0.1547 1    
Owner 0.31 0.2631 0.500
***
 1   
Board  0.64 0.2054 0.554
***
 -0.0822 1  
Disclosure  0.72 0.3005 0.729
***
 -0.0477 0.245
***
 1 
No. observations 210                      
Significance level of correlations coefficients: 
 *
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
  
The overall index has strong positive correlation with the three sub indices at a 0.1% 
significance level (p<0.001). The result is not surprising as CGIETH is an arithmetic average 
of the sub indices. Disclosure and transparency sub index is also positively related with the 
board sub index (p<0.001).  
Company level CGIETH of the sampled companies for each year in the period 2009-2013 is 
provided in the appendix (see Appendix 3). During the period, companies progressed and 
regressed in their governance.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Ethiopian Corporate Governance Index (CGIETH: 2009-2013). 
N= 42 companies, Mean= 0.56, standard deviation= 0.155, minimum=0.24, maximum= 0.84
 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the overall corporate governance index. The index is 
symmetric, almost normally distributed. This is good news for the regression analyses, as the 
variable is the focus of this thesis. CGIETH has a minimum of 0.24 and a maximum of 0.84. 
Theoretically, the index lies between 0 and 1(0 is weakest corporate governance while 1 is 
strongest corporate governance). The practical range of the variable is between 0.32 and 0.8 
(Black, et al., 2010).  
Table 5: descriptive statistics for identity of largest owners, year (2009-2013). 
Owner Group  observations percent Cum. percent 
Bank 5 2.38 2.38 
Company 32 15.24 17.62 
Family/individual 47 22.38 40.00 
Government 20 9.52 49.52 
Management 106 50.48 100.00 
Total 210 100.00  
Source: ministry of trade documentation. 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of the identity of the largest owner. The management 
group is the largest owner in more than 50% of the observations (42 firms and 5-year 
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period). The group includes the CEO and executive and non-executive board members. It is 
comparable with block ownership (10% or more of common equity) by the CEO and non-
CEO board members discussed in table 3. Bank ownership seems to be less common in 
Ethiopia. family/individual owners control more than 22% of the companies in the study 
period. Ownership by other companies account for more than 15%. Company ownership is 
allowed in Ethiopia. A company can have as much shares as possible but cross holding is not 
allowed if one of them holds 10% or more of the capital of the other company. Government 
ownership is also allowed in which a joint company can be formed with private investors. In 
most cases, the government owns shares of a company under the process of privatization. 
Compared with bank ownership, the government of Ethiopia is the dominant owner in more 
than 9% of the companies.  
Table 6: descriptive statistics and simple correlation of variables of the study (2009-2013) 
 mean St.dev CGIETH ROA ROE GROW RISK SIZE CAP ADV LEV POW INV 
CGIETH 0.56 0.15  1           
ROA 0.03 0.07  0.37*** 1          
ROE 0.04  0.15 0.34*** 0.83*** 1         
GROW 4.36  50.1 0.13* -0.06 -0.04  1        
RISK 0.06 0.05  -0.12* -0.07  -0.06 -0.02  1       
SIZE 17 1.44 0.33*** 0.3*** 0.27*** 0.016 -0.29*** 1      
CAP 2.5 9.15 -0.09 -0.09  -0.02 -0.02  -0.09 0.09 1     
ADV 0.01 0.01 0.25*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.04  -0.15** 0.31** 0.04  1    
LEV 0.38 0.21  0.13* -0.04 -0.03 0.16** -0.13* 0.16** -0.08  0.16** 1   
POW 0.12 0.24 0.13* 0.12* 0.16** 0.20*** 0.03  0.52** -0.08 0.21*** 0.28*** 1  
INV 0.26 0.44 0.30*** 0.0410 0.01  -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.16** 0.06 -0.01 1 
 
 No. of observations= 210 
 Significance level for correlation coefficients: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics and simple correlations of all variables of the study 
except owner identity. All variables except capital intensity significantly correlate with the 
corporate governance index. The highly skewed distribution of capital intensity could have 
caused the result and needs transformation. ROA and ROE are the performance variables. 
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The variables strongly correlate. Correlations coefficients are generally fair and 
multicollinearity may not be a problem.   
6.3 The effect of firm contingencies on corporate governance 
 
Table 7 examines the relationship between firm level contingencies (antecedent factors) and 
the level of corporate governance. The table reports standardized coefficients (BETA) for 
different specifications of the corporate governance model. Standardized coefficients allow 
comparison among similar variables in a particular specification. For instance, the magnitude 
of the relative effect of owner identity variables is worth investigating and the beta 
coefficients have such information. The result from the pooled OLS is reported in Equation 1 
(the second column).The main assumption of Pooled OLS is that individual differences can 
be explained by observed variables and thus unobserved individual effects are excluded. 
Unobserved fixed effects are included in equations 2-4. Equation 2 of the third column 
includes industry fixed effects for each industry class while equation 3 and 4 include firm 
fixed effects for each company. Year dummies are incorporated in all of the specifications. 
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Table 7: regression analysis for the effect of antecedent factors on corporate governance. 
Dependent variable: Corporate Governance index (CGIETH 2009-2013) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS 
Industry 
Effect Firm Effect Firm effect 
GROW 0.1143
*
 0.1036
*
 0.0083 0.0072 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     
RISK -0.0782 -0.0859 0.2110
***
 0.2116
***
 
 (0.1845) (0.1988) (0.1759) (0.1759) 
     
FAM -0.1779
***
 -0.1820
***
 0.0459  
 (0.0234) (0.0256) (0.0462)  
     
COMP 0.0868 -0.0190 0.2025  
 (0.0289) (0.0449) (0.0635)  
     
GOV 0.2744
***
 0.2855
***
 0.6519
***
  
 (0.0334) (0.0348) (0.0471)  
     
BANK 0.1386
**
 0.1431
**
 0.3219
***
  
 (0.0600) (0.0614) (0.0449)  
     
NPRV    0.6860
***
 
    (0.0448) 
     
CAP -0.0783 -0.0895 -0.2238
***
 -0.2227
***
 
 (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
     
ADV 0.1926
***
 0.1749
**
 0.3079
***
 0.3054
***
 
 (1.1372) (1.1682) (0.7710) (0.7703) 
     
LEV 0.0238 0.0297 -0.0084 -0.0010 
 (0.0462) (0.0499) (0.0382) (0.0380) 
     
SIZE 0.1642
**
 0.1597
*
 0.1175
*
 0.1142
*
 
 (0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
     
POW -0.0584 -0.0622 0.1691
**
 0.1665
**
 
 (0.0484) (0.0526) (0.0453) (0.0446) 
     
INV 0.2799
***
 0.2768
***
 0.1699
***
 0.1630
***
 
 (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0134) (0.0132) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS 
Industry 
Effect Firm Effect Firm effect 
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Industry effect No Yes No No 
     
Firm effect No No Yes Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 210 210 210 210 
R
2
 0.401 0.415 0.857 0.855 
adj. R
2
 0.352 0.353 0.81 0.81 
F 8.084*** 6.696*** 17.20*** 17.82*** 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
CGIETH is an overall corporate governance index constructed by taking the average score of board, ownership 
and disclosure sub indices. Growth is year-to-year sales growth over a five-year period.  RISK is standard 
deviation of return on asset (ROA). CAP is the logarithm of the ratio of fixed asset to sales.  Advert is the ratio 
of advertizing expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total asset.  Size is firm size measured by 
the logarithm of total asset. POW is market power measured by the ratio a firm's sales relative to total sales of 
its industry. INV is a dummy indicator whether a firm invests in fixed assets as reported in its financial 
statement.  FAM, COMP, GOV and BANK are dummy indicators for the identity of the largest shareholder. 
NPRV is also a dummy indicator if the largest shareholder is government or bank. 
 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the pooled OLS indicates that firm growth affects corporate 
governance positively and significantly. While we hypothesise a positive link between firm 
risk and corporate governance, the coefficient is negative and insignificant. Similarly, capital 
intensity, leverage and market power have insignificant coefficients. The ownership identity 
variables appear to affect corporate governance. While family ownership has negative effect, 
government and bank ownership are positively and significantly associated with corporate 
governance.   
 The industry effect specification does not differ significantly from the previous pooled OLS 
specification except slight differences in the magnitudes of some coefficients. The adjusted 
R
2 
in equations 1 and 2 are almost equal. Including industry effect reduces the significance 
of the coefficients of advertising intensity and firm size. The sign and significance of other 
Continued 
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coefficients are similar with those reported in the pooled OLS regression. This suggests that 
unobserved fixed industry effects correlate with observed firm characteristics and bias 
estimated coefficients in a pooled analysis. If we did not control for fixed industry effects, 
the coefficients of advertising intensity and firm size would have been large in the pooled 
OLS. Advertising intensity (ADV) predicts firm level corporate governance positively and 
significantly (p<0.05). The inclusion of fixed industry effects decreases the magnitude of the 
coefficient compared with the pooled OLS.  Firm size predicts corporate governance 
positively and significantly (p<0.1). 
The last two columns of table 7 (equation 3 and 4) consider unobserved firm heterogeneity 
by incorporating a dummy variable for each sampled firm. The adjusted R
2
 in equation 3 and 
4 are more than twice as large as the adjusted R
2‟s in equation 1 and 2. The inclusion of 
fixed firm effects increases the adjusted R
2 
from 0.352 to .81. It implies that unobserved firm 
heterogeneity carry attributes that explain half of the cross sectional variation of corporate 
governance.  The unobserved effect is a firm fixed effect that may correlate with observed 
firm contingencies (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). The inclusion of fixed firm effects change 
coefficient estimates of firm growth, firm risk, capital intensity, advertising intensity, market 
power and the owner identity dummies of family and bank ownerships.  
In fact, a formal test of the presence of unobserved firm heterogeneity was performed with 
an F-test. The null hypothesis is that the parameters of the individual dummies are zero. The 
F-test compares the pooled OLS without dummies with the one-way individual fixed effect 
model. For the regression that includes corporate governance as a dependent variable (model 
1), the F statistic of 4.81 rejects the null hypothesis at 1% significance level (p< 0.01). 
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Similarly, an F statistic of 6.96 rejects the null hypothesis of zero parameters of time fixed 
effects at 1% significance level (p<0.01). A test for a two-way effect model compares a 
pooled OLS without dummies with a two-way individual and time effect model. The null 
hypothesis is that the parameters of the individual effects and time effects are all zero. An F 
statistic of 5.12 rejects the zero individual and time fixed effect hypothesis in favour of a 
two-way fixed effect model at 1% significance level (P< 0.01). Thus, all fixed effect tests 
support the inclusion of both individual fixed effect and time fixed effect in the corporate 
governance regression analysis.  
Equation 3 and 4 are similar except the representation of owner identity. In equation 3, 
individual owner identity variables are included and the reference is management ownership. 
Equation 4 combines owner identity into broad classes. Company, government and bank 
ownership represent the „non-private‟ owner identity. The „private‟ group includes 
ownership by family/individual and management. The regression equation incorporates the 
non-private group and the private group is the reference group. Except for owner identity 
variables, result analysis for all variables refers equation 3 and 4 as firm effect equation(s).  
Turning to the result in table 7, firm growth turn out to be insignificant in the firm effect 
equations (the last two columns).  The result suggests that firm growth is correlated with 
unobserved firm characteristics and thus the coefficient is biased upward in the pooled OLS 
and industry effect equations. Firm risk is positively and significantly associated with 
corporate governance (p<0.01). Again, if we did not control for fixed firm effects, the 
coefficient of firm risk would have been biased downward in both the pooled OLS and 
industry effect equations. Similarly, the inclusion of fixed firm effects changes the 
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significance level of capital intensity. Capital intensity is found to be associated negatively 
and significantly with corporate governance (p<0.01).  The exclusion of fixed firm effects 
would bias the coefficient estimate downward (in absolute terms) in the pooled and industry 
effects regressions. Advertising intensity influences corporate governance positively and 
significantly (p<0.01). The inclusion of fixed firm effects increases the magnitude of the 
coefficient significantly compared with the pooled and industry effects analyses. Firm size 
influences corporate governance positively at a 10% significant level. Market power is also 
associated with corporate governance positively and significantly (p<0.05). The sign and 
significance level of the coefficient estimates change in the firm effects regression. The 
evidence shows that unobserved firm characteristics are correlated with market power 
downward biasing the coefficient. 
The investment dummy is consistently and positively predicts the level of corporate 
governance at a 1% significance level. The investment dummy (INV) is used to refine more 
the scope of discretionary spending. It allows investigation of whether companies reporting 
their investments differ in corporate governance compared with non-reporting companies. 
Owner identity is found to be significantly associated with corporate governance.  
Government and bank ownership are found to be positively associated with corporate 
governance compared with management ownership at a 1% significance level (p<0.01). 
Relative to management ownership, the effect of government ownership on corporate 
governance is more than twice of the effect of bank ownership (relative beta coefficients). 
Relative to management ownership, if the largest owner is government corporate governance 
increases by 0.15 or 27% of average corporate governance.  Using similar logic, relative to 
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management ownership if the largest owner is bank corporate governance increases by 0.14 
or 25% of average corporate governance.  
The negative link between family ownership and corporate governance relative to 
management ownership levels off by the inclusion of fixed firm effects. Relative to 
management ownership, family and company ownership have no significant effect on 
corporate governance. The last column of table 7 presents analysis for the non-private owner 
group (company, government and bank). The effect of owner identity on corporate 
governance is significantly positive if the largest owner is non-private shareholder relative to 
private shareholders.   
 In summary, the results presented in table 7 suggest that observed firm contingencies in the 
contracting environment influence the level of firm corporate governance. It is also evident 
that unobserved fixed industry level and firm level characteristics are correlated with 
observed firm contingencies rendering estimates from pooled regression analysis biased. The 
results have also suggested that even accounting for industry effects, parts of the contracting 
environment remain unobserved. The implication is clear; analysis linking the contracting 
environment with corporate governance should account for unobserved fixed firm effects 
that otherwise could lead to biased coefficient estimates.  
6.4 The effect of corporate governance on financial performance 
In the previous analysis, we have found out that the contracting environment within which 
firms operate predicts the cross sectional variation of corporate governance. The analysis has 
also shown that unobserved characteristics are correlated with observed firm contingencies 
rendering coefficient estimates biased. Specifically the inclusion of unobserved firm effects 
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increases the adjusted R
2   
from 0.352 to .81. Thus, corporate governance is not an exogenous 
phenomenon. The investigation of the link between corporate governance and financial 
performance should include not only firm contingencies but also unobserved firm 
characteristics.  
The examination of the link between corporate governance and financial performance is 
based on two accounting based variables:  return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). For each financial performance variable, three equations are specified. Similar with 
the previous analysis, pooled OLS, industry effects, firm effects regression analysis are used 
for comparison. The results are presented in table 8. The inclusion of fixed firm effects 
increases the adjusted R
2
 from 0.224 to 0.41 in the ROA equation and from 0.17 to 0.41 in 
the ROE equation. This suggests that unobserved firm effects explain much of the cross 
sectional variation of financial performance.  
Return on asset (ROA): corporate governance has positive and significant influence on 
ROA in all specifications at a 1% level (p<0.01). The increase in the adjusted R
2
 in the firm 
effect equation is a clear indication of the interplay of unobserved firm characteristics 
influencing firm performance.  For a firm with average corporate governance 
(CGIETH=0.56), a 1% increase in CGIETH is associated with a 0.014 increase in its ROA, 
that is, 4% of average ROA (0.03). A worst-to-best CGIETH (0.234 to 0.84) is associated 
with a jump in ROA by 0.16 (from -0.06 to 0.10).  
Firm growth is negatively and significantly associated with ROA in the pooled and industry 
effects specifications.  Similarly, firm risk has a statistically negative influence on ROA in 
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the firm effect equation. ROA is also influenced negatively and significantly by capital 
intensity and leverage in all specifications. On the other hand, ROA is positively and 
statistically associated with firm size in all specifications. All owner identity variables as 
well as advertising intensity, market power, and investment do not significantly influence 
ROA in all specifications.  
      
Return on equity (ROE): corporate governance has a significant positive influence on ROE 
in all specifications (p<0.01). Evaluating the effect of corporate governance at different 
values on ROE provides additional information as a robustness check. As we did for ROA, 
the firm effect specification is the focus of the analysis. Using the same logic, for a firm with 
average corporate governance, a 1% increase in corporate governance is associated with an 
increase in ROE by 0.03, which 79% of average ROE (0.04). A worst-to-best CGIETH 
(0.234 to 0.84) is associated with a jump in ROE by 0.32 (from -0.13 to 0.19).  
ROE is influenced negatively by firm growth in the OLS specification. ROE is associated 
with some of the owner identities. Relative to management, ROE is influenced positively if 
the largest owner is family and negatively if the largest owner is bank. Capital intensity has a 
statistically significant negative effect on ROE in the OLS and industry effect specifications. 
Similarly, leverage has a negative influence on ROE in the firm specification. The positive 
effect of firm size on ROE is consistent across all specifications. Firm risk, advertising 
intensity, market power and investment have no significant effect on ROE. 
In summary the results reported in table 8 suggests that unobserved firm heterogeneity 
explain much of the cross sectional variation in financial performance. Together with the 
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results in table 8, the evidence suggests that unobserved firm fixed effects influence both 
corporate governance and financial performance. Corporate governance is found to be a 
strong predictor of financial performance. What is more fascinating in the results of table 8 is 
that a change in corporate governance is associated with greater change in the magnitude of 
financial performance. Apart from the explanatory power of corporate governance firm level 
contingencies are important predictors of firm financial performance. The overall idea is that 
in an examination of the link between corporate governance and financial performance, a 
more robust analysis requires the inclusion of not only observed firm level contingencies but 
also unobserved firm heterogeneity.   
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            Table 8: Regression analysis for the effect of corporate governance on firm financial performance. 
Dep. Variable: ROA Dep. Variable: ROE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled OLS Industry 
Effect 
Firm Effect Pooled OLS Industry 
Effect 
Firm Effect 
CGIET 0.3259
***
 0.3383
***
 0.5309
***
 0.3079
***
 0.3465
***
 0.5600
***
 
 (0.0375) (0.0382) (0.0671) (0.0781) (0.0777) (0.1352) 
       
GROW -0.1298
**
 -0.1271
*
 -0.0930 -0.1223
*
 -0.1056 -0.0633 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       
RISK -0.0485 -0.0574 -0.3694
***
 -0.0107 0.0110 -0.1772 
 (0.0966) (0.1049) (0.1528) (0.2010) (0.2134) (0.3077) 
       
FAM 0.0640 0.0618 -0.0638 0.1232
*
 0.1448
*
 0.1297 
 (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0387) (0.0259) (0.0279) (0.0779) 
       
COMP 0.0014 0.0197 0.3982 -0.0367 0.1490 0.3350 
 (0.0151) (0.0236) (0.0534) (0.0315) (0.0479) (0.1076) 
       
GOV 0.0514 0.0340 -0.2877 0.1134 0.0895 -0.2426 
 (0.0182) (0.0192) (0.0456) (0.0380) (0.0390) (0.0918) 
       
BANK -0.0116 -0.0233 -0.1349 -0.0062 -0.0163 -0.1546
*
 
 (0.0317) (0.0327) (0.0434) (0.0660) (0.0666) (0.0874) 
       
CAP -0.2991
***
 -0.2903
***
 -0.2843
***
 -0.1585
**
 -0.1387
*
 -0.1588 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0075) 
       
ADV -0.0722 -0.0672 -0.0968 -0.0988 -0.0734 -0.0920 
 (0.6059) (0.6245) (0.7363) (1.2610) (1.2704) (1.4825) 
154 
 
Dep. Variable: ROA Dep. Variable: ROE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled OLS Industry 
Effect 
Firm Effect Pooled OLS Industry 
Effect 
Firm Effect 
 
LEV -0.1320
*
 -0.1371
*
 -0.2875
***
 -0.0928 -0.0947 -0.2088
**
 
 (0.0241) (0.0262) (0.0319) (0.0502) (0.0534) (0.0643) 
       
SIZE 0.2456
***
 0.2442
**
 0.3510
***
 0.1735
*
 0.1744
*
 0.2212
**
 
 (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0114) 
       
POW -0.0172 0.0026 -0.0654 0.0985 0.1039 0.0487 
 (0.0253) (0.0277) (0.0386) (0.0526) (0.0563) (0.0778) 
       
INV -0.0262 -0.0244 -0.0568 -0.0573 -0.0638 -0.0905 
 (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0240) 
       
year dm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry eff. No Yes No No Yes No 
Firm eff. No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 
R
2
 0.287 0.292 0.563 0.238 0.277 0.563 
adj. R
2
 0.224 0.213 0.41 0.17 0.20 0.41 
F 4.549*** 3.700*** 3.606*** 3.524*** 3.434*** 3.602*** 
 Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. CGIETH is an overall corporate governance index 
constructed by taking the average score of board, ownership and disclosure sub indices. Growth is year-to-year sales growth over a five-year period.  RISK is standard 
deviation of return on asset (ROA). CAP is the logarithm of the ratio of fixed asset to sales.  Advert is the ratio of advertizing expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of 
total debt to total asset.  Size is firm size measured by the logarithm of total asset. POW is market power measured by the ratio a firm's sales relative to total sales of its 
industry. INV is a dummy indicator whether a firm invests in fixed assets as reported in its financial statement.  FAM, COMP, GOV and BANK are dummy indicators 
for owner identity. 
Continued 
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Moderating effects      
This part presents results for the moderating effects of firm level contingencies on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. We have hypothesized 
that firm growth, firm risk and owner identity moderate the corporate governance-firm 
performance relationship. As discussed in previous parts, moderation analyses are vulnerable 
to multicollinearity; transforming the variables in multiplicative interactions can avoid the 
problem (Venkatraman, 1989). Subtracting the means of variables from their values brings 
its own problems. The standardized coefficient (Beta) coefficient of the multiplicative term 
is affected by the transformation (Allison, 1977).  Thus for meaningful interpretation of 
results and hypothesis testing, all moderating effect analysis are based on unstandardized 
coefficients. Equally applicable is that the transformed data is the new data source for testing 
various specifications of relationships. It should be noted that transforming variables does 
not alter the essence of the model except rearranging the meanings of coefficients of 
transformed variables (Allison, 1977). As discussed before, analysis of all moderating 
regression results follow three phases: phase one- significance testing of interaction terms, 
phase two- evaluating overall effect of corporate governance at different values of the 
moderating variable and phase three- graphical depiction of the marginal effects of 
corporate governance across observed values of the moderating variable. 
6.5 The moderating effect of firm growth on the corporate governance-
firm performance relationship.       
Table 9 reports the results for firm growth as a moderator. ROA and ROE are the dependent 
variables.  Equation 1 and equation 3 include only main effects of CGIETH and firm growth 
among other variables.  The last columns of ROA and ROE (equation 2 and 4 respectively) 
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are specifications relevant for testing the contingency hypothesis. The inclusion of the 
multiplicative interactive term between CGIETH and GROW increases the adjusted R
2
. 
Adjusted R
2
 changes from 0.41 to 0.47 in the ROA equations and from 0.41 to 0.46 in the 
ROE equations. The addition of interaction terms explain about 6% more of the variation of 
ROA and about 5% more of the variation of ROE relative to that excluding interaction. This 
is one apparent advantage of using multiplicative interaction (Allison, 1977).  However, 
explanative power alone should not be a success as contingency hypotheses requires more 
formal testing procedures.  
The first phase of analysis is evaluating the coefficient of the interaction term. Equation 2 
and 4 shows that firm growth moderates the positive effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance.  Our   contingency hypothesis states that the greater the firm growth the greater 
is the influence of corporate governance on firm performance. In both ROA and ROE 
equations, the interaction of firm growth and corporate governance (CGIETH*GROW) 
indicates that the effect of corporate governance on financial performance is enhanced with 
increase in firm growth by one unit. The additional effect of corporate governance on ROA 
associated with a unit increase in firm growth is 0.01. The corresponding effect of corporate 
governance on ROE associated with a unit increase in firm growth is 0.018. For both ROA 
and ROE the hypothesis on the moderating effect of firm growth is supported and is 
significant at a 1%   level (p<0.01).   
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 Table 9: Fixed Effect regression analysis for the moderating effect of firm growth in the corporate 
governance-firm performance relationship. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE 
CGIETH 0.253
***
 
(0.067) 
0.263
***
 
(0.063) 
0.537
***
 
(0.135) 
0.556
***
 
(0.129) 
     
GROW -0.000137 
(0.000) 
-0.00287
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.000187 
(0.000) 
-0.00520
***
 
(0.001) 
     
CGIETH*GROW  
 
0.01
***
 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.018
***
 
(0.004) 
     
RISK -0.518
***
 
(0.153) 
-0.474
***
 
(0.145) 
-0.500 
(0.308) 
-0.419 
(0.294) 
     
FAM -0.0113 
(0.039) 
-0.00662 
(0.037) 
0.0461 
(0.078) 
0.0546 
(0.074) 
 
     
COMP 0.0815 
(0.053) 
0.0751 
(0.050) 
0.138 
(0.108) 
0.126 
(0.103) 
     
GOV -0.0721 
(0.046) 
-0.0746
*
 
(0.043) 
-0.122 
(0.092) 
-0.127 
(0.088) 
     
BANK -0.0651 
(0.043) 
-0.0489 
(0.041) 
-0.150
*
 
(0.087) 
-0.121 
(0.084) 
     
CAP -0.0101
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.00961
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.0114 
(0.007) 
-0.0104 
(0.007) 
     
ADV -0.795 
(0.736) 
-1.018 
(0.697) 
-1.519 
(1.482) 
-1.929 
(1.418) 
     
LEV -0.101
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.0622
**
 
(0.031) 
-0.147
**
 
(0.064) 
-0.0766 
(0.064) 
     
SIZE 0.0180
***
 
(0.006) 
0.0167
***
 
(0.005) 
0.0228
**
 
(0.011) 
0.0205
*
 
(0.011) 
     
POW -0.0205 
(0.039) 
0.0166 
(0.037) 
0.0306 
(0.078) 
0.0987 
(0.076) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE 
     
INV -0.00955 
(0.012) 
-0.00583 
(0.011) 
-0.0307 
(0.024) 
-0.0238 
(0.023) 
     
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.190
*
 
(0.101) 
-0.194
**
 
(0.095) 
-0.200 
(0.204) 
-0.207 
(0.194) 
N 210 210 210 210 
R
2
 0.563 0.613 0.563 0.604 
adj. R
2
 0.407 0.471 0.406 0.459 
F 3.606*** 4.329*** 3.602*** 4.171*** 
 Standard errors in parentheses; significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
CGIETH is an overall corporate governance index constructed by taking the average score of board, ownership 
and disclosure sub indices. Growth is year-to-year sales growth over a five-year period.  RISK is standard 
deviation of return on asset (ROA). CAP is the logarithm of the ratio of fixed asset to sales.  Advert is the ratio 
of advertizing expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total asset.  Size is firm size measured by 
the logarithm of total asset. POW is market power measured by the ratio a firm's sales relative to total sales of 
its industry. INV is a dummy indicator whether a firm invests in fixed assets as reported in its financial 
statement.  FAM, COMP, GOV and BANK are dummy indicators for the identity of the largest shareholder. 
NPRV is also a dummy indicator if the largest shareholder is company, government or bank. 
 
The second phase of the analysis is to test the overall effect of corporate governance on 
financial performance over observed range of firm growth, often at Mean, Mean + SD and  
Mean - SD. The overall effect of corporate governance can be specified by taking the 
derivative of firm performance relative to corporate governance  
𝑑(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)
𝑑(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)
 . 
Based on table 9 the reduced specification for the overall effect of corporate governance is 
given by; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 0.263 + 0.01 ∗ 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊                                                           [7] 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 0.556 + 0.018 ∗ 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊                                                         [8] 
Continued 
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Both equations include main effects of corporate governance and its enhanced effect due to a 
one unit change in firm growth. Although regression results in table 9 support the 
contingency hypothesis for firm growth, additional analysis can strengthen the robustness of 
the findings. At this second phase of the analysis, the marginal effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance is evaluated at different values of firm growth.  
Table 10 reports marginal effects of corporate governance on ROA evaluated at mean – SD, 
mean and mean + SD of firm growth (lower value, average value and higher value 
respectively).  When firm growth is at average, there is statistically positive association 
between corporate governance and ROA. At average value of firm growth, a one unit 
increase in corporate governance increases ROA by 0.263 at a 1% significance level. At 
lower values of firm growth (Mean – SD), increase in corporate governance is associated 
with decrease in ROA.  For low growth companies, one unit increase in corporate 
governance is associated with a decrease in ROA by 0.224 at a 10% significance level. This 
is consistent with the hidden implications of contingency hypotheses.  At this point, the 
greater firm growth the greater is the effect of corporate governance on firm performance 
implies that at lower values of firm growth increase in corporate governance is associated 
with decrease in firm performance (Schoonhoven, 1981). The coefficient of -0.224 suggests 
the hidden implication of the contingency hypothesis developed in this study.  The last row 
of table 10 shows the impact of corporate governance at higher values of firm growth (mean 
+ SD). The greater impact of corporate governance on ROA is statistically significant at 1% 
level. Compared with the average company, the effect of one unit increase in corporate 
governance increases ROA by three-fold.  
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Table 10:  Marginal effect of corporate governance on ROA evaluated at different values of firm growth. 
Growth at 𝜕𝑅𝑂𝐴
𝜕𝐶𝐺𝐼𝐸𝑇𝐻
 Std. err p-value 
Mean – Standard Deviation -.224* .124  0.072 
Mean .263***  .063  0.000 
Mean + Standard Deviation .750***  .1283  0.000 
 Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Figure 3 shows the third phase of the moderation analysis. The marginal effect of corporate 
governance on ROA (vertical axis) is evaluated at three values of firm growth as discussed 
above. The point at which the line crosses the „0‟ value of the vertical axis is the level of 
firm growth where corporate governance has no effect on ROA. Below the point, corporate 
governance has negative effect on ROA while the effect is positive above the point.   
Figure 3: Moderating effect of firm growth in the corporate governance-ROA relationship 
(Firm growth is computed at Mean - sd, mean and mean + sd) 
 
The two-phase approach applied for the ROA equation is repeated here for the ROE 
equation. Table 11 presents marginal effects of corporate governance on ROE at three 
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different values of firm growth. The result is similar with that of ROA except the 
insignificant result for lower values of firm growth. There is statistically significant positive 
association between corporate governance and ROE for both average growth and high 
growth companies. For the average growth companies, a one unit increase in corporate 
governance increases ROE by 0.556 at a statistical significance level of 1%. The magnitude 
of the effect is more than twice as large for the high growth companies relative to the 
average growth companies. For the high growth companies, a one unit increase in corporate 
governance is associated with a 1.45 increase in ROE at a significance level of 1%. In 
addition, the result in table 11 supports the hidden implication of the contingency hypothesis 
but is not statistically significant. For low growth companies, increase in corporate 
governance decreases ROE. Apart from its insignificance, the result supports the non-
monotonous contingency relationship that strategic management researchers have suggested. 
The third phase of the analysis depicts the marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE 
as shown below in figure 4. 
Table 11: Marginal effects of corporate governance on ROE evaluated at different values of firm growth. 
Growth at 𝜕𝑅𝑂𝐸
𝜕𝐶𝐺𝐼𝐸𝑇𝐻
 
Std. Err. P-value 
Mean – Standard Deviation -.337 .253 0.183 
Mean .556*** .129 0.000 
Mean + Standard Deviation 1.449*** .261 0.000 
 Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
      
According to figure 4, the effect of corporate governance on ROE is non-monotonous across 
the values of firm growth. At a point between the lowest and the average firm growth, the 
effect of corporate governance on ROE is zero (the line crosses the grid where 
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∆(ROE)/∆(CGIETH)=0). Above the point the marginal effect of corporate governance is 
positive. On the other hand, below the point the marginal effect is negative. The result in 
table 10 however indicates that the negative marginal effects of corporate governance at 
lower values of firm growth is insignificant.    
Figure 4 : Moderating effect of firm growth in the corporate governance-ROA relationship 
(Firm growth is computed at Mean - sd, mean and mean + sd) 
 
We now turn to the discussion of control variables in table 9. The moderating specifications 
(Equation 2 and 4) are the focus of discussion. Firm risk, owner identity, capital intensity 
and leverage are significant only in the ROA specification. Firm risk is statically and 
negatively associated with ROA at a 1% significance level. Only one of the owner identity 
variables is marginally significant in the ROA specification. If the largest owner in a 
company is government compared with management, the effect of owner identity on ROA is 
negative at significance level of 10%.  Capital intensity has also negative effect on ROA at a 
1% significance level. Leverage has a statistically significant effect on ROA at 5%.   The 
positive effect of firm size on financial performance is statistically significant at 1% in the 
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ROA and 10% in the ROE specifications. Advertising intensity, market power and the 
investment dummy are insignificant in all specifications.  
6.6 The moderating effect of firm risk on the corporate governance-firm 
performance relationship.       
Table 12 reports the results for firm risk as a moderator. The contingency hypothesis states 
that the positive effect of corporate governance on firm performance is greater at higher firm 
risk. The hypothesis is supported if the coefficient of the multiplicative term is statistically 
positively significant. ROA and ROE are the dependent variables.  Equation 1 and equation 
3 include only main effects of corporate governance and firm growth among other variables. 
The last columns of ROA and ROE (equation 2 and 4 respectively) include interaction of 
CGIETH and RISK. The equations are relevant for testing the contingency hypothesis of the 
moderating effect of firm risk. In the ROA equation, the inclusion of the multiplicative term 
does not change adjusted R
2
. It can be attributed to the non-significant coefficient of the 
interaction term in equation 2.  On the other hand, inclusion of the interaction term increases 
adjusted R
2
 from 0.41 to 0.42 in the ROE equation. The interaction of CGIETH and RISK is 
statistically significant at a 5% level. Thus, firm risk moderates the positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance although limited in the ROE equation. 
The coefficient of CGIETH*RISK term   indicates the additional effect of corporate 
governance on ROE associated with as firm risk increases by one unit. The additional 
positive effect of corporate governance (CGIETH) on ROE as firm risk (RISK) increases by 
one unit is 5.1 at a statistically significance level of 5%.  
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Table 12: fixed effect regression analysis for the moderating effect of firm risk in the corporate governance-
performance relationship. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE 
CGIETH 0.253
***
 
(0.067) 
0.254
***
 
(0.067) 
0.537
***
 
(0.135) 
0.543
***
 
(0.133) 
     
RISK -0.518
***
 
(0.153) 
-0.356 
(0.238) 
-0.500 
(0.308) 
0.306 
(0.472) 
     
CGIETH*RISK  
 
1.018 
(1.143) 
 
 
5.072
**
 
(2.271) 
     
GROW -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
     
FAM -0.011 
(0.039) 
-0.015 
(0.039) 
0.046 
(0.078) 
0.028 
(0.077) 
     
COMP 0.082 
(0.053) 
0.079 
(0.054) 
0.138 
(0.108) 
0.127 
(0.106) 
     
GOV -0.072 
(0.046) 
-0.056 
(0.049) 
-0.122 
(0.092) 
-0.041 
(0.098) 
     
BANK -0.065 
(0.043) 
-0.058 
(0.044) 
-0.150
*
 
(0.087) 
-0.113 
(0.088) 
 
CAP -0.010
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.010
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
     
ADV -0.795 
(0.736) 
-0.722 
(0.741) 
-1.519 
(1.482) 
-1.158 
(1.473) 
     
LEV -0.101
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.093
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.147
**
 
(0.064) 
-0.109
*
 
(0.066) 
     
SIZE 0.018
***
 
(0.006) 
0.018
***
 
(0.006) 
0.023
**
 
(0.011) 
0.021
*
 
(0.011) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE 
 
     
POW -0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.029 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.078) 
-0.013 
(0.079) 
 
INV -0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.024) 
     
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant  -0.218
**
 
(0.097) 
-0.216
**
 
(0.097) 
-0.227 
(0.196) 
-0.219 
(0.193) 
N 210 210 210 210 
R
2
 0.563 0.565 0.563 0.576 
adj. R
2
 0.407 0.406 0.406 0.421 
F 3.606*** 3.551*** 3.602*** 3.718*** 
  Standard errors in parentheses; significance level: 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
CGIETH is an overall corporate governance index constructed by taking the average score of board, ownership 
and disclosure sub indices. Growth is year-to-year sales growth over a five-year period.  RISK is standard 
deviation of return on asset (ROA). CAP is the logarithm of the ratio of fixed asset to sales.  Advert is the ratio 
of advertizing expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total asset.  Size is firm size measured by 
the logarithm of total asset. POW is market power measured by the ratio a firm's sales relative to total sales of 
its industry. INV is a dummy indicator whether a firm invests in fixed assets as reported in its financial 
statement.  FAM, COMP, GOV and BANK are dummy indicators for the identity of the largest shareholder. 
NPRV is also a dummy indicator if the largest shareholder is government or bank. 
 
 
For the significant CGIETH*RISK term analysis of the overall effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance requires evaluating the relationship along different values 
of firm risk. Table 13 reports the marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE at Mean – 
SD, Mean and Mean + SD values of firm risk. 
As reported in table 13, the marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE is statistically 
significant only at average and higher values of firm risk. For companies with average firm 
risk, the marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE is 0.543 at a 1% significance level. 
Continued 
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On the other hand, the marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE is greater for high-
risk companies. For high-risk companies the marginal effect of corporate governance on 
ROE is 0.812 at a statistical significance level of 1%. Compared with the average risk 
company, the effect is greater. At lower values of firm risk however, the marginal effect of 
corporate governance is insignificant. The non-monotonous effect would have been implied 
if increase in corporate governance decreased performance at lower values of firm risk. By 
graphically depicting the marginal effect of corporate governance, one can see whether there 
is non-monotonous relationship.  
Table 13: Marginal effects of corporate governance on ROE evaluated at different values of firm growth. 
   Firm Risk at 𝜕𝑅𝑂𝐸
𝜕𝐶𝐺𝐼𝐸𝑇𝐻
 
Std. Err. P-value 
Mean – Standard Deviation .274    .178      0.126   
Mean .543***    .133      0.000 
Mean + Standard Deviation .812***      .181        0.000 
 
According to figure 6 the marginal effect of corporate governance is always positive across 
all values of firm risk. Unlike values of firm risk, the marginal performance effects of 
corporate governance are all above zero. Although the result is insignificant, even for low 
risk companies increase in corporate governance is associated with higher ROE. Hidden in 
the contingency hypothesis is that at low firm risk increase in corporate governance should 
result in lower performance. The graph should have extended to both positive and negative 
values of the vertical axis.  This does not imply however rejection of the hypothesis. The 
moderation hypothesis is supported but is limited to higher values of firm risk. 
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Figure 5: Moderating effect of firm risk in the corporate governance-ROE relationship 
 
 
Looking at the moderation equations (equation 2 and 4) reveals that few of the control 
variables have statistically significant results.  Leverage is negatively and statistically 
associated with both ROA (p<0.01) and ROE (p<0.10). Firm size influences ROA at 1% and 
ROE at a 10% significance level.  Capital intensity is only significant in the ROA equation 
and has a statistically negative effect at a 1% level. The owner identity dummies, market 
power, investment, advertising intensity and growth are all insignificant both in ROA and 
ROE equations.  
6.7 The moderating effect of owner identity in the corporate 
governance-firm performance relationship 
To test the moderating effect of owner identity in the corporate governance-firm 
performance relationship, four owner identity variables were created relative to 
management: family/individual, company, government and bank. Interaction terms are 
formed by cross multiplying the governance variable with each of the four owner identity 
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variables. Thus, interpretations of coefficients of these variables is based on the reference of 
management ownership. Table 14 reports the results. Still ROA and ROE are the dependent 
variables. The same set of control variables are use in all specifications. Equations 1 and 4 
are for the main effects of corporate governance and owner identity variables. The 
interaction terms are included in equation 2 and 3 and the focus of analysis is on these 
equations. Including all forms of interaction between corporate governance and owner 
identity reduces adjusted R
2
 in the ROA equation. The result is not surprising as all 
interaction terms are insignificant. On the other hand adjusted R
2
 increases in the ROE 
equation when interaction terms are included. This is consistent with the significance of at 
least one variable in the equation.  
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Table 14: the moderating effect of owner identity in the corporate governance-firm performance 
relationship. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE 
CGIETH 0.253
***
 
(0.067) 
0.236
***
 
(0.085) 
0.537
***
 
(0.135) 
0.726
***
 
(0.168) 
     
BANK -0.065 
(0.043) 
-0.046 
(0.057) 
-0.150
*
 
(0.087) 
-0.141 
(0.112) 
     
COMP 0.082 
(0.053) 
0.089 
(0.054) 
0.138 
(0.108) 
0.150 
(0.107) 
     
FAM -0.011 
(0.039) 
-0.001 
(0.040) 
0.046 
(0.078) 
0.047 
(0.079) 
     
GOV -0.072 
(0.046) 
-0.073 
(0.050) 
-0.122 
(0.092) 
-0.092 
(0.098) 
     
 
CGIETH*BANK 
 
 
-0.117 
(0.305) 
 
 
-0.608 
(0.601) 
     
 
CGIETH*COMP 
 
 
-0.075 
(0.154) 
 
 
-0.331 
(0.303) 
     
 CGIETH*FAM  
 
0.095 
(0.115) 
 
 
-0.083 
(0.227) 
     
CGIETH*GOV  
 
0.030 
(0.166) 
 
 
-0.872
***
 
(0.327) 
     
RISK -0.518
***
 
(0.153) 
-0.510
***
 
(0.155) 
-0.500 
(0.308) 
-0.547
*
 
(0.306) 
 
GROW -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
     
CAP -0.010
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
     
ADV -0.795 
(0.736) 
-0.828 
(0.754) 
-1.519 
(1.482) 
-2.225 
(1.486) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE 
     
LEV -0.101
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.107
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.147
**
 
(0.064) 
-0.162
**
 
(0.064) 
     
SIZE 0.018
***
 
(0.006) 
0.019
***
 
(0.006) 
0.023
**
 
(0.011) 
0.031
**
 
(0.012) 
     
POW -0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.015 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.078) 
0.033 
(0.078) 
     
INV -0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.024) 
     
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant  -0.189
*
 
(0.101) 
-0.208
*
 
(0.109) 
-0.199 
(0.204) 
-0.287 
(0.214) 
N 210 210 210 210 
R
2
 0.563 0.567 0.563 0.585 
adj. R
2
 0.407 0.397 0.406 0.422 
F 3.606*** 3.332*** 3.602*** 3.585*** 
 Standard errors in parentheses; significance level: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
CGIETH is an overall corporate governance index constructed by taking the average score of board, ownership 
and disclosure sub indices. Growth is year-to-year sales growth over a five-year period.  RISK is standard 
deviation of return on asset (ROA). CAP is the logarithm of the ratio of fixed asset to sales.  Advert is the ratio 
of advertizing expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total asset.  Size is firm size measured by 
the logarithm of total asset. POW is market power measured by the ratio a firm's sales relative to total sales of 
its industry. INV is a dummy indicator whether a firm invests in fixed assets as reported in its financial 
statement.  FAM, COMP, GOV and BANK are dummy indicators for the identity of the largest shareholder. 
NPRV is also a dummy indicator if the largest shareholder is government or bank. 
 
The results in table 14 shows that most of the interaction terms are insignificant. The only 
significant term is the CGIETH*GOV interaction in the ROE equation.  If the largest owner 
is government, increase in corporate governance reduces ROE by 0.872 relative to 
management (p<0.01). For other owner identity variables, there is no additional effect of 
corporate governance on financial performance relative to management.  
Continued 
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Figure 6 shows additional evidence. The downward moving graph (left) indicates that the 
effect of corporate governance on ROE is lower if the largest owner is government relative 
to management (right).   
Figure 6: the moderating effect of owner identity in the corporate governance-firm performance relationship. 
 
We now turn the discussion to the control variables in table 14. ROA is influenced 
negatively by uncertainty, capital intensity and leverage and positively by firm size. ROE is 
influenced negatively by uncertainty and leverage and positively by firm size.  Firm growth, 
advertising intensity, market power and investment have no significant effect on both ROA 
and ROE. The effect of capital intensity on ROE is also insignificant.  
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented results of the study. Ethiopian companies have executive dominated 
boards. It is also shown that management is the largest owner in more than half of the 
companies. Bank ownership appeared to be less common in Ethiopia. The status of 
disclosure is somehow good. Almost all companies disclose the identity, address and share 
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ownership of their shareholders and board members. Moreover, average number of 
companies discloses managerial remuneration in their financial statements.  
Regression results indicate that corporate governance is influenced by observed firm 
characteristics. Capital intensity reduces corporate governance. Firm risk, advertising 
intensity, firm size and investment predict corporate governance positively.  The identity of 
the largest owner has association with the level of corporate governance. If the largest owner 
is government or bank corporate governance is enhanced. Relative to management 
ownership, the effect of government ownership on corporate governance is more than twice 
of the effect of bank ownership.  
Firm performance is influenced by corporate governance, observed firm level contingencies 
as well as by fixed firm heterogeneity. A worst-to-best CGIETH is associated with a 
significant positive jump in both ROA and ROE.  For both ROA and ROE leverage has a 
negative influence while firm size has positive effect.  Moreover, ROA is influenced 
negatively by firm risk and capital intensity. Advertising intensity, market power, and 
investment do not significantly influence both ROA and ROE. The identity of the largest 
owner has some effect on financial performance. Relative to management, ROE is 
influenced positively if the largest owner is family and negatively if the largest owner is 
bank. 
Firm level contingencies are found to moderate the positive association between corporate 
governance and firm performance.  Firm growth moderates the positive association between 
corporate governance and firm financial performance for both ROA and ROE. Although the 
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significance of an interaction term can indicate the presence of moderation, graphical 
analysis is required to evaluate effect pattern. Marginal analysis shows that increase in 
corporate governance enhances the positive effect of corporate governance on financial 
performance. Similarly, increase in corporate governance reduces the effect of corporate 
governance on firm financial performance. Firm risk moderates the positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance although it is limited to ROE. 
However, the non-monotony effect is not supported. For firms with high risk, increase in 
corporate governance enhances the positive association between corporate governance and 
financial performance. For firms with low firm risk increase in corporate governance has no 
significant effect on financial performance.  Therefore, there is weak support for the 
moderation effect of firm risk on the governance-financial performance relationship. We 
have also weak evidence on the moderating effect of owner identity. Owner identity has a 
moderating effect for ROE. If the largest owner is government, corporate governance has a 
negative impact on financial performance relative to management.  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the discussion, conclusion and recommendations. The discussion 
section explicates results of the analysis from the point of view of the corporate governance 
literature. It provides possible explanations for the outcomes obtained in the analysis.   
While we used the corporate governance implications of both the agency and organizational 
perspectives in this thesis, we follow an integrative approach in which explicit address of the 
perspectives is irrelevant. The conclusion section summarizes the main findings of the study. 
The section also provides implications of findings obtained as expected and possible 
justifications for those that deviate from expectations. Finally, recommendations are given 
for policy makers and future researchers. 
7.2 Discussions 
 
The effect of antecedent factors on corporate governance 
Due to the „separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) in modern 
corporations mangers are more likely to be self-serving and may act contrary to the profit-
maximizing interest of principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Agency theory 
recommends corporate governance mechanisms to limit managerial discretion  (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). These are a “bundle of governance mechanisms” (Rediker and Seth, 1995) 
instituted to make managers strive for profit maximization. On the other hand, organizational 
perspectives suggest adoption of governance mechanisms depending on factors both internal 
and external to a firm (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In response to 
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this call, several researchers have recognized the significance of antecedent factors to 
explain variations in the adoption of certain corporate governance mechanisms within firm 
and between firms (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Bathala and Rao, 
1995; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). At firm level, growth potential (Klapper and Love, 
2002; Black, et al., 2010), demand volatility (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, et al., 
1999; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002), firm size (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985), capital structure (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), and investment rate (Finkelstein and 
D'Aveni, 1994; Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002) are important 
contingency factors that influence the choice of governance mechanisms. Greater agency 
problems require greater monitoring through a combination of governance mechanisms such 
as higher proportion of outside directors, large percentage of outside director ownership, a 
separate CEO/board chairperson position, block ownership by a non-board shareholder 
(Zajac and Westphal, 1994).  
 
To investigate the influence of firm contingencies on corporate governance, three 
specifications are considered. These are the pooled OLS, fixed industry effects and fixed 
firm effects specification. The pooled analysis requires the assumption that observed 
characteristics can explain the cross sectional variation of corporate governance. On the 
other hand the fixed industry and fixed firm effects assume that unobserved characteristics 
are correlated with observed firm contingencies and thus if not controlled coefficient 
estimates are biased (Green, 2002). In fact, the results reported in the analysis support this 
idea. The coefficients change either their sign or significance level when unobserved fixed 
effects are included. This suggests that unobserved effects are correlated with observed firm 
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level contingencies and biased coefficient estimates in the pooled analysis (Himmelberg, et 
al., 1999; Cavaco, et al., 2013). 
 
Firm growth- the analysis indicates that firm growth has no significant influence on 
corporate governance. However, the result becomes insignificant by the inclusion of 
unobserved firm characteristics. Thus, hypotheses H1a and H1b have weak support. The 
result suggests that unobserved firm characteristic are correlated with growth making the 
magnitude of the coefficient very large in the pooled OLS and industry effects specifications. 
It should be noticed that firm growth is associated positively and significantly with corporate 
governance in the regression with industry fixed effects. It implies that firm growth is 
correlated more with unobserved firm effects than unobserved industry effects. Studies have 
noted that firms with greater growth opportunities have high agency problems as managers 
have greater discretion (Bathala and Rao, 1995). It may be the case that a growing firm 
needs external finance badly that adopting effective control mechanism reduces the cost of 
capital than doing otherwise (Klapper and Love, 2002). At the same time, corporate 
governance constrains managers from investing inefficient projects (Bebczuk, 2005). The 
idea can extend to address specific governance mechanisms. For example, since raising 
external finance dissolves existing effective control right, shareholders may have the desire 
to increase their ownership stake that ultimately leads to higher concentration (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Moreover, by increasing the proportion of outside directors in the board, a 
growing firm signals potential financiers that the risk of expropriation by management is 
minimal (Klapper and Love, 2002). The insignificant coefficient in the firm effect 
specification is more likely due to the positive correlation between firm growth and 
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unobserved firm characteristics. Researchers have reported a positive link between firm 
growth and corporate governance (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). 
Corporate governance studies in Africa obtain insignificant association between firm growth 
and corporate governance (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
 
Firm risk- the regression analysis demonstrates that firm risk positively influences corporate 
governance. Hypothesis 2a is supported but not hypothesis 2b. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
argue that the wealth gain by shareholders from exercising tighter control depends on the 
demand for control imposed by a firm‟s internal and external situations. Volatility makes 
monitoring managerial behavior difficult and increases managerial discretion (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Moreover, decisions tend to be more subjective 
and conflicts are more likely higher in volatile situations (Cohen and Cyert, 1973). Thus, 
under this situation a firm responds with tighter control through various governance 
mechanisms. For example, more concentrated ownership  (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012)  and 
greater managerial ownership (Zahra, 1996) can align the interest of managers and 
shareholders in more volatile environment. Tighter control then reduces organizational 
conflict (Cohen and Cyert, 1973) and thus allows shareholders to gain larger wealth 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)  
indicate that market risk has positive effect on managerial ownership. In their examination of 
the ownership structure of 511 U.S. firms Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that instability of 
profit rate explain the systematic variation of ownership structure positively. Studies on the 
corporate governance of African companies find similar results. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) 
studies the corporate governance of Ghanaian companies and show that more risky 
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companies have larger boards.  This result corroborates the argument that managers of high-
risk firms have enough discretion and larger size increases the effectiveness of the board to 
monitor managerial actions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). 
 
Owner identity- Agency theory reduces the goal conflict to the manager-shareholders 
relationship (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). The theory assumes that all block holders have 
the motivation to monitor management equally (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta, et al., 
1999). One of the theory‟s major departures from the organizational perspectives is its 
assumption of homogeneity of non-management block holders (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). In the organizational perspective, modern corporations are „coalitions‟ of various 
interests in which power relationship among the coalition groups determine both corporate 
strategy and performance (Cyert and March, 1963; Cohen and Cyert, 1973). Contrary to the 
assumption of agency theory, block holders may have different objectives and prefer 
different strategies (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). For example, Abrahamson and Park 
(1994) show that all non-officer shareholders do not have similar interest on disclosure of 
negative outcomes. Thus, the issue should not be limited to the conflict of interests between 
a manager and shareholders but also between shareholders themselves that may affect firm 
decisions differently (Go'rriz and Fum'as, 1996).   
   
Family ownership- the regression result shows that large family shareholders have adverse 
effect on the strength of corporate governance. The coefficient of the family variable is 
significantly negative relative to management block holders in the OLS and industry effect 
specifications. The result supports the idea that family block holders may have the incentive 
to expropriate minority shareholders, may also favor growth and survival than profitability 
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(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). However, the result becomes insignificant when we account 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity with the inclusion of firm dummies. A possible 
explanation is some unobserved firm characteristics influenced corporate governance 
(Himmelberg, et al., 1999) and may have positive correlation with owner identity in family 
dominated firms. 
Company ownership- all equation specifications show that company block holders do not 
have significant influence on corporate governance relative to management block holders.  
Since company owners form business groups each of which are found at different stages of 
the value chain, they may have focused on business transactions and may have lacked 
mutual controlling between businesses partners (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). The 
Ethiopian company low refers a company that owns shares of another company as a holding 
company or a parent company (Gebeyaw, 2012). The company low provides provisions to 
safeguard firm level corporate governance in which other companies own shares. It states 
that where a company owns at least 10% of the shares of another company, the later cannot 
own shares of the former (Art 344(1)). However, the result fails to find any relationship 
between company ownership and corporate governance.  
 
Government ownership- the finding of the study on the link between government ownership 
and corporate governance is congruent with the literature. Government ownership has 
positive effect on corporate governance relative to management ownership and is robust 
across different equation specifications. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) comment that companies 
under the process of privatization may not have large investors. These companies require 
greater monitoring. Government plays in the democratization of these types of firms  
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(Mintzberg, 1984) that may be by placing public representatives in the board of directors. In 
fact, firms in which the Ethiopian government is involved have larger boards in average than 
others. Government involvement in the ownership of share companies is legally allowed 
(Gebeyaw, 2012). This often requires converting public enterprises into share companies 
(Art 47(2) (a) of Proclamation No. 25/1992) in which the government gradually reduces its 
ownership stakes. This form can be considered as partially privatized. The process is 
believed to be less likely to create large investors that lead to high managerial control and 
high managerial discretion (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Since leaving higher managerial 
discretion uncontrolled has a disastrous effect on firm performance, instituting tighter 
governance mechanisms should be a priority for government-controlled companies. Unlike 
full-fledged share companies, some corporate governance provisions of the company low are 
not applicable to those companies in which the government has ownership stakes (Negash, 
2008).  For example, shareholders meeting and appointment of directors are not applicable to 
government dominated companies. These exceptions may have allowed government 
dominated companies to institute strong corporate governance mechanisms. This may be the 
reason for the positive link between government ownership and corporate governance. 
  
Bank ownership- The analysis provides strong evidence that bank ownership has positive 
effect on corporate governance. This corroborates the literature. Bank owned firms might 
have easy access to finance, information and other services (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
Through joint ownership of debt and equity, banks have the incentive to monitor 
management (La Porta, et al., 1999). Although bank ownership is not common in Ethiopia, 
the literature has given attention to the implication of bank ownership to corporate 
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governance. Ananchotikul (2007) shows that institutional investors are associated with 
higher corporate governance. The positive association of government and bank ownership 
with corporate governance supports hypothesis 3a. However, the hypothesis for a greater 
impact on corporate governance of bank ownership than government ownership is not 
supported (H3b). To the contrary, government ownership has a greater impact than bank 
ownership.  
 
The analysis also assesses the effect of broader ownership category and corporate 
governance. It groups owner identity into private or non-private category. The evidence 
supports the findings we discussed for specific owner identities above. Non-private 
ownership, that represents intermediate agents of ultimate owners, affects corporate 
governance positively.  This is contrary to the assumption that institutional investors, banks, 
non-financial companies and governments may not have similar objectives (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). At least, all non-private owners believe that corporate governance assures 
better performance, as this is what their ultimate owners expect.  
 
Capital intensity- measures the proportion of tangible capital in a firm‟s asset structure. 
There is strong evidence on the association between capital intensity and corporate 
governance. Capital intensity has a negative effect on corporate governance although it is 
significant only in the firm fixed effect regression. This should not be surprising as the firm 
effect specification is the true model in which unobserved firm characteristics are 
incorporated. The result suggests that unobserved firm characteristics correlate with capital 
intensity downward biasing the coefficient estimates (in absolute terms) in the pooled OLS 
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and industry effects regressions (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). The result proves the premise 
that tangible assets are easier to monitor relative to intangible assets (Himmelberg, et al., 
1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Klapper and Love (2002)  find that firms with higher 
proportions of fixed assets have weaker corporate governance measured by a composite 
index.  In the study that accounts unobserved firm heterogeneity, Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
obtain a negative association between the level of fixed capital and managerial ownership.   
 
Advertising intensity- is another measure of a firm‟s asset composition. It is rather a measure 
of soft or intangible capital. The coefficient of advertising intensity positively and 
significantly predicts corporate governance in all specifications. Researchers have suggested 
that intangible assets are associated with high information asymmetry (Zahra, 1996), 
increased scope for managerial discretion and opportunism (Alves and Martins, 2010) and 
greater management entrenchment (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Investment on soft 
capitals may be an indication of managers‟ intention to hold funds within a firm rather than 
distribute to shareholders (Zahra, 1996). The implication is that greater proportion of soft 
capitals allows managers with higher discretion (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). Thus, the 
negative relationship between advertising intensity and corporate governance proves that 
intangible assets are difficult to monitor and thus require tighter control (Himmelberg, et al., 
1999; Klapper and Love, 2002). Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) obtain that nonproduction 
overhead as a measure of soft capitals is negatively associated with CEO duality.
24
 
  
To capture the remaining link between investment on assets and corporate governance, an 
                                                          
24
 In other words, higher proportion of intangible assets necessitates tighter control by separating the 
positions of the CEO and board chairperson. 
183 
 
investment dummy variable is used. The variable has positive sign in all equation 
specifications.
25
 The result might have been influenced by the method used to construct the 
variable. The variable was constructed by assigning a 1/0 value based on whether a company 
discloses investment on fixed assets in the financial statements. One explanation is that well 
governed firms disclose their fixed asset investment. An alternative explanation could be 
disclosing firms have large size and thus have good corporate governance. However,  
Himmelberg et al. (1999) use dummy variables to account for missing data on some 
variables.  
Leverage- the result shows that leverage has no effect on the level of corporate governance. 
If leverage serves as a substitution for internal corporate governance (Zajac and Westphal, 
1994; La Porta, et al., 1997) and reduce the agency problems (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) 
by lowering the free cash flow available for inefficient spending  (Jensen, 1986), it should 
reduce the level of corporate governance. Thus, leverage should have been related with 
corporate governance negatively (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
 
Market power- Himmelberg, et al. (1999) relate market power to agency theory‟s free cash 
flow (Jensen, 1986) which is believed to determine the level of agency problems. This 
assumption may prove valid if market power increases free cash flow and thus should have a 
positive effect on corporate governance. The positive relationship between market power and 
corporate governance supports the free cash flow hypothesis. Greater market power 
increases free cash flow available for discretional allocation by management (Jensen, 1986). 
                                                          
25
 Capital intensity and advertising intensity measure investment on tangible and intangible assets 
respectively. 
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The disciplining effect of product market competition appeared not to operate at least in this 
study. In fact, market mechanisms as disciplining devise work under perfect market 
conditions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is unlikely to be the case in the context of 
Ethiopia. Himmelberg, et al. (1999) find that market power measured by the ratio of 
operating income to sales is positively relate to managerial ownership.  
Firm size- firm size appears to be a stable predictor of corporate governance across all 
equation specifications. The result is consistent with the corporate governance literature. 
Larger firms are believed to have greater agency problems (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; 
Klapper and Love, 2002). Large size may also render monitoring difficult and thus large 
firms should adopt stronger corporate governance mechanism (Klapper and Love, 2002; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Strong corporate governance may also be required by large firms 
as investors may feel safe to provide their finances at lower cost of capital (Klapper and 
Love, 2002). Himmelberg, et al. (1999) obtain positive link between firm size and 
management stock holding.  (Alves and Martins, 2010) show that firm size positively affects 
the proportion of outside board of directors. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) obtains a positive 
association between firm size and size of the board of directors in Ghanaian companies. 
Overall, there is strong evidence that large firms have the incentive to adopt strong corporate 
governance.  
     
The effect of corporate governance on financial performance 
This study develops a conceptual framework linking among others, corporate governance 
and financial performance. Based on agency theory, this study hypothesizes that corporate 
governance influences firm financial performance positively. The major premise of agency 
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theory is the „separation of ownership and control‟ gives managers significant discretion  
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mangers may act contrary to the interest of shareholders for 
profit maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980).  Managers with greater 
discretion may use company resources inefficiently (Eisenhardt, 1989). Corporate 
governance is about the limits to managerial discretion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Both 
agency and organizational perspectives believe that corporate governance reduces the agency 
problems by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders in which managerial actions 
are directed toward higher profits (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
The examination of the link between corporate governance and firm financial performance is 
based on OLS, industry effect and firm effect specifications (table 8). For each specification 
return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are measures of financial performance 
used as dependent variables. The main variable of interest is the Ethiopian corporate 
governance index (CGIETH). Before discussing about specific results, the logic behind 
relative explanatory power of the specifications is worth addressing.  Compared to OLS 
specifications, including firm level effects increases the adjusted R
2
 dramatically. The 
change in R
2
 from 0.22 to 0.41 in the ROA specification and the corresponding R
2 
change in 
the ROE specification obviously indicate the presence of unobserved firm heterogeneity 
influencing the cross sectional variation in financial performance (Himmelberg, et al., 1999; 
Cavaco, et al., 2013). Thus the validity of results depend more on firm effect specifications. 
 
The evidence supports agency theory‟s prediction that internal corporate governance matters 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The results in table 8 show that CGIETH influences both ROA 
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and ROE positively and significantly in all specifications. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is 
supported (H4). The result is consistent with the argument that in imperfect markets, internal 
corporate governance affects firm financial performance positively (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Klapper and Love, 2002). It is found that a worst-to-best corporate governance is 
associated with a change in ROA from negative to positive (-0.06 to 0.10). Relative to the 
average ROA the impact of CGIETH is 5.33 times. Other researchers obtain positive 
association between corporate governance index and return on asset (ROA).  In a cross-
country study, Klapper and Love (2002) show that a corporate governance index influences 
ROA positively and significantly. Bebczuk (2005) examines the link between corporate 
governance and firm performance in 65 non-financial Argentinean companies. Based on a 
transparency and disclosure index different OLS specifications show that there is a robust 
positive effect of the governance index on ROA. Similarly, Bhagat, et al. (2008) obtain a 
positive association between corporate governance and ROA, even robust to alternative 
corporate governance measures.  They report that better governance measured by GIM and 
BCF indices are positively associated with contemporaneous and subsequent ROA.  
 
The effect of the Ethiopian Corporate Governance Index (CGIETH) on return on equity 
(ROE) is also significantly positive across all equation specifications. A marginal analysis 
shows that a worst-to-best increase in CGIETH is associated with increase in ROE by 0.32 (-
0.13 to 0.19). The impact can be translated to a jump by 8 times of average ROE. Thus, a 
change in CGIETH impacts ROE more than ROA. Bebczuk (2005) finds a significant 
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positive association between a corporate governance index and ROE in 65 non-financial 
Argentinean companies although limited only to one specification. 
 
Overall, results reported in table 8 demonstrates that monitoring mechanism do have positive 
impact on firms‟ financial performance. It should be noted that the Ethiopian Corporate 
Governance Index (CGIETH) is an overall measure of the monitoring capacity a firm to 
constrain managerial behavior. Researchers suggest that individual governance mechanisms 
do not have the required monitoring strength (Black, et al., 2010). An adequate examination 
of corporate governance should account for the impact of governance mechanisms in 
concert. These monitoring mechanisms include managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012), the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012), large share holders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Holderness, 2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and  appropriate disclosure 
and transparency requirements (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012). Thus, with appropriate 
adoption of these governance mechanisms influences company financial performance.  
 
Other firm level contingencies and financial performance 
 
 Firm growth  
As reported in table 8 of the previous chapter, there is weak evidence on the link between 
firm growth and financial performance. Firm growth influences both ROA and ROE 
negatively. However, the result is limited to OLS specification for both ROA and ROE and 
industry effect specification for ROA.  A possible explanation can be firm growth correlates 
188 
 
with unobserved firm heterogeneity that upward biases its effect in OLS and industry effect 
estimations. Alternatively, firm growth may have an effect on financial performance through 
corporate governance. 
Firm risk 
The results in the previous chapter indicate a negative link between firm risk and ROA.  It 
may because firms are unable to understand their environment to develop appropriate value 
increasing strategy (Cohen and Cyert, 1973). The absence of relationship between firm risk 
and ROE has no clear explanation but could be attributed to the large variability of ROE 
relative to ROA.  
Owner identity 
All owner identity variables are insignificant in ROA. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence for ROE. Relative to management, ROE is influenced positively if the largest 
owner is family and negatively if the largest owner is bank.  This is consistent with the 
argument that family block holders may expropriate minority shareholders, may favour 
growth and survival than profitability (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).  
Capital intensity  
There is strong evidence on the negative effect of capital intensity on financial performance. 
except in the firm effect of ROE, the negative effect of capital intensity on financial 
performance is robust in all specifications.  Other studies obtain that capital intensity is 
negatively related to ROA (Klapper and Love, 2002). 
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Leverage  
As expected and consistent with theoretical support and empirical support there is a strong 
evidence that leverage influences financial performance negatively (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). For both ROA and ROE, the negative effect of leverage is statistically significant in 
the firm effect. Since the firm effect equation is a complete specification, it is safe to accept 
the result as a valid evidence for the link between leverage and financial performance. The 
literature documents consistent negative association between leverage and financial 
performance despite using alternative performance measures. Firms with high debt in their 
capital structure have more interest expense that reduces the amount of shareholder return. 
leverage has costs as firms are unable to undertake profitable projects because previous debt 
contracts may require them not to raise additional funds  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) or 
leverage creates asset substitutions and underinvestment (Bebczuk, 2005). (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001), Bebczuk (2005) and Li and Simerly (1998) obtain that leverage is 
associated negatively with ROA and ROE. 
 
 Firm Size 
The result reported in table 8 of the previous chapter shows a non-controversial evidence for 
the positive effect of firm size on financial performance. Firm size has a positive impact on 
both ROA and ROE and is robust across all equation specifications. The result may be 
because large firms are more diversified, have greater economies of scale, scope and 
professional managers (Bebczuk, 2005). Studies report positive result  (Bebczuk, 2005).  
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The moderating effects of firm level contingencies 
 
The consensus among agency scholars is that corporate governance has benefits for all firms 
in which there is a separation of ownership from control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Recently scholars from various disciplines, of course including the traditional agency theory, 
have started to respond to advises of organizational scholars who suggest explaining 
performance as a function of fit or congruence between structural forms chosen and 
environmental contingencies. Organizational scholars argue that effectiveness of structural 
forms depends on contingency factors (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Galbraith, 1973). They suggest that modelling a structural form as a function of 
contingency factors and subsequently evaluating effectiveness as a function of fit between 
the chosen structure and contingency factors (Hambrick and Cannella, 2004). In the 
literature of corporate governance, studies have identified different firm and environmental 
contingencies and have tried to explain the moderation impact of these contingencies in the 
governance-performance relationship. Although, an exhaustive list of contingency factors is 
hard to find, firm growth, firm risk and identity of the largest owner have gained more 
attention in the empirical corporate governance literature. Results of this study prove that 
complementing agency theory with other perspectives in organizational studies in fact can 
provide deep insights (Eisenhardt, 1989; Daily, et al., 2003). 
 
The moderating effect of firm growth in the corporate governance-firm financial 
performance relationship 
 
There is strong evidence that firm growth moderates the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm financial performance (H5). It is shown that increase in corporate 
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governance has different effects for firms at different levels of growth. For a firm that has 
high growth, increase in corporate governance enhances financial performance. For a firm 
that has low growth increase in corporate governance reduces financial performance. The 
effect of corporate governance on financial performance is non-monotonous for firms at 
different stages of growth (Schoonhoven, 1981). Contrary to traditional economic 
perspectives, organizational theory maintains that the benefits of structural forms chosen 
depend on their fit with environmental contingencies (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). This is consistent with the view that corporate 
governance can benefit those firms with high agency problems associated with high growth 
(Klapper and Love, 2002). Bebczuk (2005) for Argentinean and Black, et al. (2010) for 
Brazilian firms obtain that the impact of corporate governance on firm performance is 
greater for high growth firms. Black, et al. (2010) show that the moderation impact of firm 
growth is not sensitive to different measures of corporate governance.  
  
The moderating effect of firm risk in the corporate governance-firm financial 
performance relationship 
 
There is partial evidence that firm risk moderates the effect of corporate governance on 
financial performance (Hypothesis 6). The interaction of corporate governance and firm risk 
is only significant for ROE. The result indicates that a one-unit increase in firm risk 
enhances the effect of corporate governance by 5.1. A further investigation indicates that the 
marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE is statistically significant for average and 
high-risk firms. Agency theory emphasizes the importance of firm risk in explaining 
efficient contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). Although firm risk moderates the governance-
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financial performance link, the evidence does not prove the non-monotonous assumption of 
contingency framework. If low risk firms strengthen, their corporate governance there would 
be no change in the effect of corporate governance on financial performance. Nevertheless, 
the partial evidence indicates that environment volatility increases the severity of agency 
problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) and tighter monitoring of 
management enhances the benefits of corporate governance (Zajac and Westphal, 1994). 
Similarly, the ability of shareholders to monitor management depends on environmental 
dynamism (Li and Simerly, 1998). Thus, the extent that shareholders can monitor 
management determines their gain from their investments (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
Managers of firms that operate in volatile environments should make timely decisions 
(Galbraith, 1973).  Nevertheless, under volatile conditions it is difficult to identify whether 
performance is a direct result of managerial behavior. Mechanisms that allow to link rewards 
to performances can align the interests of shareholders and managers (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2012). Managers whose interests are aligned with owners‟ have the incentive to maximize 
profit. Therefore, greater monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms can have greater 
impact on firm performance in volatile environments.  Li and Simerly (1998) obtain that 
firms with higher environmental dynamism, there is a stronger positive relationship between 
CEO ownership and firm performance. 
 
The moderating effect of owner identity in the corporate governance-firm 
financial performance relationship 
 
There is partial evidence that owner identity moderates the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance. In fact hypothesis 7 (H7) is not supported. Rather 
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government ownership has a moderating effect on the governance-ROE link. Relative to 
management, if the largest owner is government corporate governance would have negative 
effect on financial performance. This is consistent with the literature. Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000) show that the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is negative for 
bank, family and government owned firms relative to institutionally owned firms. The result 
corroborates the argument for the value reducing effect of government ownership. For 
instance, a government shareholder may have political goals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and 
favors social welfare and employment creation (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). In these 
contexts, firms that have large government ownership perform poorly (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).   
7.3 Conclusions 
This study shows that firms choose their corporate governance in response to firm 
characteristics. The evidence is consistent with organizational theory that assumes the choice 
of corporate governance endogenous to contexts. Moreover, financial performance is 
affected by factors of the contracting environment in which firms operate.  
 Hypotheses 1a and 1b are not accepted. After accounting for firm heterogeneity the 
effect of firm growth on corporate governance disappears. This may be due to the 
correlation of firm growth with firm fixed effects. If firm effects were not accounted 
for the effect of firm growth on corporate governance would have been upward 
biased in the OLS and industry effects regressions. The result implies that firm 
heterogeneities account for the cross sectional variation of corporate governance and 
if not accounted for biases findings and may lead to wrong interpretation. 
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 Hypothesis 2a is accepted while hypothesis 2b is not. Firm risk has a strong effect on 
corporate governance at a 1% significance level. The inclusion of fixed firm effects 
increases the coefficient. If fixed firm effects were not controlled for, the coefficient 
would have been downward biased leading to wrong interpretation. The result is 
consistent with organizational scholars that firms with greater risk have higher 
agency problems. Since managers have enough discretion on firm resources, firms 
respond the situation by adopting strong corporate governance.  
 
 Hypothesis 3a is accepted. The evidence in this study indicates that knowing who the 
largest shareholder has important implications to corporate governance. Government 
and bank ownership are found to be positively associated with corporate governance 
compared with management ownership at a 1% significance level (p<0.01). 
Moreover, the effect of government ownership on corporate governance is more than 
twice of the effect of bank ownership. Marginal analysis proves the comparative 
effect of government and bank ownership. Relative to management ownership, if the 
largest owner is government corporate governance increases by 0.15 or 27% of 
average corporate governance. In addition, relative to management ownership if the 
largest owner is bank corporate governance increases by 0.14 or 25% of average 
corporate governance. Again, this is consistent with organizational scholars that 
governments may influence the democratization of companies through for instance, 
allowing public interest groups in the board of directors. The result is surprising 
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given that management is the largest shareholder in more than half of the companies. 
Bank ownership is very rare according to the data. The effect of family ownership 
disappears when fixed firm effects are included. The reason may be family firms 
have characteristics that are unobserved to the researcher.  Company ownership has 
no significant effect on corporate governance. A further investigation provides 
insight that broader group of owners do have similarity. Company, bank and 
government ownership denoted as „non-private shareholders‟ have positive effect on 
corporate governance relative to the private ones. However, this may be caused by 
government and bank ownership that have significant effect on corporate governance 
separately.  
 
 Other firm level contingencies have strong predictive power on corporate 
governance. Capital intensity is found to be associated negatively and significantly 
with corporate governance (p<0.01). Advertising intensity influences corporate 
governance positively and significantly (p<0.01). Both of these variables measure the 
extent that firm assets are observed and measure the scope of discretional investment 
by management. Compared with advertising expenditures, which is intangible, 
capital expenditures are observable and are difficult to steal. Therefore, advertising 
intensive firms have stronger corporate governance. The result is consistent with the 
literature that greater agency problem requires tighter monitoring of managerial 
behavior and actions. The explanatory power of unobserved firm characteristics is 
significant for both variables. If fixed firm effects were not controlled for the 
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coefficients of capital intensity and advertising intensity would have been downward 
biased in the OLS and industry effects estimations. 
Firm size at 10% and market power at 5% levels of significance predict corporate 
governance. The corporate governance literature emphasizes the link between firm 
size and market power with the level of agency problems. Firm size increases 
management complexity that renders monitoring difficult. A firm with greater market 
power is more likely to have free cash available for discretional investment by 
management. Therefore, large firms and firms with greater market power should 
institute good corporate governance to reduce the agency problems. 
 Financial performance is affected by both observed and unobserved firm 
characteristics. The inclusion of fixed firm effects increases the adjusted R
2
 from 
0.224 to 0.41 in the ROA equation and from 0.17 to 0.41 in the ROE equation. Most 
importantly, there is a strong evidence that corporate governance has a positive 
impact on firm financial performance (p<0.01). For a firm with average corporate 
governance (CGIETH=0.56), a 1% increase in CGIETH is associated with a 0.014 
increase in its return on asset (ROA), that is, 4% of average ROA (0.03). A worst-to-
best CGIETH (0.234 to 0.84) is associated with a jump in ROA by 0.16 (from -0.06 
to 0.10). Similarly, for a firm with average corporate governance, a 1% increase in 
corporate governance is associated with an increase in ROE by 0.03, which 79% of 
the average return on equity (ROE) (0.04). A worst-to-best CGIETH (0.234 to 0.84) 
is associated with a jump in ROE by 0.32 (from -0.13 to 0.19). The results on both 
ROA and ROE indicate that there is a strong support for hypothesis 4 (H4). This is 
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consistent with the predictions of agency theory and organizational theory that good 
corporate governance increases shareholder returns. Other firm level contingencies 
have also significant influence on financial performance. 
 
 The moderating effect of firm growth in the effect of corporate governance on 
financial performance is strongly supported (hypothesis 5). For both ROA and ROE 
the hypothesis on the moderating effect of firm growth is supported and is significant 
at a 1% level (p<0.01). Our contingency hypothesis states that the greater the firm 
growth the greater is the influence of corporate governance on firm performance. In 
both ROA and ROE equations, the interaction of firm growth and corporate 
governance indicates that the effect of corporate governance on financial 
performance is enhanced with increase in firm growth by one unit. The additional 
effect of corporate governance on ROA associated with a unit increase in firm 
growth is 0.01. The corresponding effect of corporate governance on ROE associated 
with a unit increase in firm growth is 0.018. This is consistent with the idea that the 
benefit of corporate governance is enhanced where there is greater agency problems. 
We have argued that high growth firms have greater agency problems. Increase in 
corporate governance for high growth firms enhances the benefits of corporate 
governance. On the other hand, the evidence shows that for low growth firms, 
increase in corporate governance decreases financial performance. Organizational 
scholars call this situation as a „non-monotonous effect‟. 
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 There is partial evidence that firm risk moderates the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance at a 5% significance level (hypothesis 6). 
Nevertheless, the result is limited in the ROE equation.  The additional positive effect 
of corporate governance on ROE as firm risk (RISK) increases by one unit is 5.1 at a 
statistically significance level of 5%. For companies with average firm risk, the 
marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE is 0.543 at a 1% significance level. 
On the other hand, the marginal effect of corporate governance on ROE is greater for 
high-risk companies. For high-risk companies the marginal effect of corporate 
governance on ROE is 0.812 at a statistical significance level of 1%. Compared with 
the average risk company, the effect is greater. At lower values of firm risk however, 
the marginal effect of corporate governance is insignificant. This shows that we have 
partial evidence for the moderation effect of firm risk. First, the effect is insignificant 
for ROA. Second, even its significant effect on ROE is monotonous across its 
observed values. For low risk firms there is no change in the effect of corporate 
governance on financial performance.  
 
 Our evidence on the moderating impact of owner identity in the effect of corporate 
governance on financial performance is not robust.  Only government ownership has 
moderating effect. If the largest owner is government, increase in corporate 
governance reduces ROE by 0.872 relative to management (p<0.01). For other owner 
identity variables, there is no additional effect of corporate governance on financial 
performance relative to management. Therefore, hypothesis 7 is not supported. 
However, the literature documents the value reducing effect of government 
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ownership. For instance, a government may favor social welfare and employment 
creation that leads government dominated companies to perform poorly. 
7.4 Recommendations 
 Implications for corporate governance institutions 
The results in this thesis provide strong evidence that corporate governance enhances firm 
financial performance. There is much evidence on the significance of corporate governance 
on firm level performance. Firms may not exploit their corporate governance quality in the 
absence of financial markets as the market generally lacks information about them. 
However, if corporate governance is positively related to financial performance, firms may 
be encouraged to strengthen their governance mechanisms (Bebczuk, 2005). From this 
perspective, the government and other stakeholders should intervene in the institution and 
monitoring of corporate governance among Ethiopian companies (Daily and Dalton, 1994; 
CIPE , 2002).  
At the macro level, there is a link between corporate governance and economic performance 
(Claessens, 2003), entrepreneurial growth (La Porta, et al., 1999) and corruption (Wu, 2005). 
La Porta, et al. (1999) suggest initiatives of good corporate governance mechanisms for the 
growth of entrepreneurship as new entrepreneurs would generally be interested to issue new 
ownership stakes if they are assured of protection. Good corporate governance assures high 
flow of external finance while bad corporate governance is associated with diversion of firm 
resources and lower firm performance  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens, 2003; OECD, 
2004a).  
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Corporate governance mechanisms encompass economic and legal institutions (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance reforms require change in legal, regulatory and market 
institutions (Claessens, 2003). One of the fundamental economic institutions of corporate 
governance is a stock market (La Porta, et al., 1997). The role of stock markets in the 
economic growth and development of nations has been the focus of scholars and 
practitioners and political leaders. A Stock market promotes long-term investment and 
economic growth through easing capital flow and allowing risk sharing between those who 
demand finance and investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Especially, a liquid stock market 
increases investors‟ confidence to move their money easily and at low cost. Therefore, 
establishing a stock market should be a priority not an exception in Ethiopia.  
Other corporate governance institutions should also be the priorities of the country. Several 
Ethiopian scholars have long been worried about the capability of the legal framework to 
institute and enforce good corporate governance in the country. According to  Bebczuk 
(2005), corporate governance is both a private and public issue. Policy recommendations to 
improve corporate governance requires cooperation from parties affected and this depends 
on the additional benefits  each party may get from such improvements  relative to the loss 
of private benefits. More over corporate governance is a public issue that minority 
shareholders need to be legally protected from the expropriation of insiders and large 
shareholders.  A personal account of the researcher uncovers the fact that there is no formal 
corporate governance institution. Most surprisingly, the term „corporate governance‟ is alien 
to those persons and institutions that should have greater stake in the development and 
enforcement of corporate governance. There are several weaknesses in the share company 
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law of Ethiopia to address corporate issues in accordance with international best practices. 
The consequence is investors lose confidence, market inefficiency, high cost of capital 
(Gebeyaw, 2012). The share company law alone is not sufficient to protect shareholders 
from expropriation and must be supported by other laws. Gebeyaw (2012) recommends 
security laws, voluntary codes and listing standards.  
Overall, the Ethiopian government should bear much of the responsibility to change the 
corporate governance landscape of the country for the growth and sustainability of economic 
development in the country. As Bebczuk (2005) explains, change in corporate governance is 
made effective through political process. 
 For  governance prescriptions 
This study provides strong evidence that corporate governance is not an exogenous factor. 
Consistent with much of the theoretical and empirical literature the level of corporate 
governance is affected by both unobserved and observed firm characteristics. Most 
importantly the factors in the contracting environment as well as firm specific factors explain 
much of the cross sectional variation of corporate governance. Policy prescriptions on the 
governance of firms should take great care that corporate governance is not a pill that all 
companies should take. Corporate governance a structural form that should take in to 
account the demands of a specific type of firms. For instance, findings of this study indicate 
that firm growth, firm risk and owner identity strongly affect the level of adopted corporate 
governance.  Recently the business community has started a movement to lobbying the 
Ethiopian government to establish corporate governance institutions. Although it is an 
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encouraging endeavor, policy prescriptions and recommendation should be based on 
empirical evidence. Despite operating in a weak corporate governance environment, 
Ethiopian companies have chosen their governance mechanisms depending on their 
environmental contingencies. This study shows that Ethiopian companies are not so unique 
than others are. 
 For future studies 
With limited sample size, this study offers much evidence on the corporate governance of 
Ethiopian companies. Future research can benefit from loopholes of the study. Other 
researchers may add to the findings of this study if they can overcome the limited 
availability of data. This could be possible with the voluntary cooperation of companies to 
participate in such investigations.  
Future researchers may benefit from this study in a way that they can employ its findings for 
undertaking a cross-country study. Most African countries have better corporate governance 
than Ethiopia has or are in the way to develop a better corporate governance culture. 
Therefore, access to corporate governance data is more likely easier in other African 
countries than it is here in Ethiopia. Studies that could discriminate how different 
institutional environment affects corporate governance and firm performance are required 
(Klapper and Love, 2002). Another potential area for further study is examining the 
corporate governance of bankrupt Ethiopian companies. Reports show that weak corporate 
governance explains subsequent bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton, 1994). 
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The performance effect of corporate governance could also be a major arena for future 
studies. This study provides strong evidence that there is no direct link from corporate 
governance to financial performance. The influence of corporate governance on financial 
performance is moderated by firm level contingencies. Specifically, the effect of corporate 
governance on financial performance depends on firm growth, firm risk and identity of the 
largest owner. Future researchers could expand our knowledge on how firm level 
contingencies moderate the effect of corporate governance on financial performance as 
sample size gets larger or/and in among firms operating in different legal and economic 
contexts.  
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Appendix 1  
Table 15: sampled companies by industry 
INDUSTRY 
No. of 
Companies Observations 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Trade 4 20 
Manufacturing 4 20 
Public Administration and Others 7 35 
Transport, Warehousing And Communication 6 30 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 21 105 
Total 42 210 
 
Table 16: Sampled companies by name 
 
no company no company 
1 Hohiyat Business  22 Lemat    
2 Horizon  Addis Tyre    23 New Millinium Institute    
3 
internatinal trading, manufacturing and 
services  24 Neway Challenge Academy   
4 
International Cardiovascular  Medical 
Center  25 Nigat Mechanical Engineering    
5 Jemo General Business    26 Oda    
6 Kolfe Genet Market Center    27 Orbis Trading and Technical Generals  
7 Alpha Education And Training   28 Selam Bus    
8 Ambo Mineral Water    29 Sheba Travel Service    
9 Biftu Adugna Business    30 Shola  
10 Boran Real Estate   31 Sky Bus Transport Systems   
11 City University College   32 Total Ethiopia    
12 Dashen Brewery   33 Unversal Investors Coshco  
13 Dera Trading   34 Yetebaberut Beherawi Petroleum  
14 Dolphin Transit And Shipping   35 Addis Ababa Bottle  Glass    
15 East African Holding   36 Addis Ababa Gebeya Merkato   
16 Efoyta Bekolfe Marketing Center   37 Addis Mender Homing   
17 Electro Commercial    38 Admastel    
18 Ethio Berwh    39 Africa Beza    
19 Ethio Horti   40 Africa Juice Tibila   
20 Ethiopia Leather Development    41 Hibret     
21 Gutter   42 Hohete Tibeb  
 
 
215 
 
Appendix 2  
Table 17:  Corporate Governance Survey Instrument. 
Survey Items   
Board Characteristics    
 The number of directors in the board   
 Whether the positions of CEO and chair of the board are held by 
two different persons   
 The proportion of non-executive directors in the board   
 The proportion of shares owned by non-executive directors   
 The proportion of shares owned by executive directors   
Ownership Structure and Concentration   
 The proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholder   
 The identity of the largest shareholders: management, 
family/individual, other company, government or bank   
 The proportion of shares owned by the five largest shareholders   
 The proportion of shares owned by management   
 The proportion of shares owned by the top five largest shareholders 
excluding management   
 Whether the CEO owns at least 10% of firm shares    
 Whether there is a director owning at least 10% of firm shares   
 Whether there is a non-management shareholder owning at least 
10% of firm shares   
Disclosure and Transparency    
 Whether a firm discloses the names, identities, address and 
ownership of shareholders and directors  
 Whether a firm discloses its financial statements to the public   
 Whether a firm discloses the remunerations for directors   
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Appendix 3 
Table 18: ranking of firm level corporate governance. 
Year 
company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 0.669 0.669 0.558 0.558 0.446 
2 0.597 0.411 0.410 0.540 0.318 
3 0.840 0.840 0.618 0.840 0.729 
4 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.379 
5 0.623 0.612 0.389 0.389 0.389 
6 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.532 
7 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742 
8 0.491 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 
9 0.754 0.754 0.532 0.532 0.532 
10 0.627 0.627 0.405 0.405 0.405 
11 0.695 0.585 0.363 0.363 0.363 
12 0.446 0.446 0.669 0.752 0.530 
13 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.749 0.749 
14 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.669 0.755 
15 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.256 
16 0.585 0.585 0.363 0.585 0.585 
17 0.668 0.668 0.668 0.668 0.446 
18 0.536 0.536 0.313 0.536 0.532 
19 0.296 0.296 0.272 0.494 0.494 
20 0.492 0.494 0.402 0.401 0.401 
21 0.674 0.674 0.821 0.821 0.738 
22 0.433 0.433 0.433 0.433 0.322 
23 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.615 
24 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.366 
25 0.341 0.563 0.563 0.328 0.337 
26 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.456 0.456 
27 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.484 
28 0.575 0.575 0.674 0.687 0.464 
29 0.518 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 
30 0.780 0.754 0.643 0.643 0.643 
31 0.586 0.586 0.364 0.364 0.364 
32 0.577 0.577 0.577 0.587 0.586 
33 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.313 
34 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.508 
35 0.594 0.594 0.372 0.372 0.372 
36 0.547 0.539 0.428 0.428 0.428 
37 0.612 0.612 0.599 0.598 0.376 
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company 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
38 0.669 0.669 0.669 0.669 0.446 
39 0.441 0.663 0.663 0.441 0.441 
40 0.390 0.612 0.529 0.307 0.307 
41 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.490 
42 0.382 0.382 0.271 0.271 0.271 
 
Note: corporate governance is a composite index (CGIETH). Value lies between 0 and 1. 
Companies are not arranged according to the list of names in appendix 1. 
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Appendix 4  
Figure 7: Quantile-Normal Plots of Variables. 
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Appendix 5 
Table 19: Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity tests for firm level contingency-corporate governance regressions. 
     
Variable         OLS 
Industry 
effect 
Firm 
effect 
GROW 1.11 1.16 1.44 
RISK 1.27 1.48 3.88 
CAP 1.5 1.62 3.49 
ADV 1.4 1.49 2.17 
LEV 1.27 1.49 2.93 
SIZE 2.21 2.3 4.24 
POW 1.76 2.07 5.17 
INV 1.31 1.33 1.56 
FAM 1.28 1.54 16.89 
COMP 1.46 3.52 23.7 
GOV 1.3 1.42 8.68 
BANK 1.13 1.19 2.13 
Industry2   4.57 
 Industry3   3.21 
 Industry4   3.25 
 Industry5   4.97 
 firm1   
 
6.3 
firm2   
 
4.3 
firm3   
 
2.58 
firm4   
 
4.1 
firm5   
 
1.78 
firm6   
 
6.19 
firm7   
 
2.87 
firm8   
 
6.84 
firm9   
 
2.35 
firm10   
 
4.29 
firm11   
 
1.91 
firm12   
 
6.39 
firm13   
 
2.18 
firm14   
 
2.24 
firm15   
 
2.06 
firm16   
 
2.08 
firm17   
 
2.04 
firm18   
 
2.34 
firm19   
 
1.75 
firm20   
 
3.84 
firm21   
 
1.99 
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Variable         OLS 
Industry 
effect 
Firm 
effect 
firm22   
 
2.3 
firm23   
 
4.57 
firm24   
 
1.87 
firm25   
 
4.14 
firm26   
 
1.93 
firm27   
 
4.06 
firm28   
 
2.31 
firm29   
 
4.28 
firm30   
 
1.95 
firm31   
 
7.86 
firm32   
 
2.11 
firm33   
 
3.71 
firm34   
 
2.59 
firm35   
 
2.09 
firm36   
 
2.12 
firm37   
 
4.16 
firm38   
 
6.37 
firm39   
 
3.2 
firm40   
 
3.6 
firm41   
 
3.1 
year2 1.86 1.86 1.91 
year3 1.7 1.7 1.77 
year4 1.8 1.8 1.92 
year5 2.01 2.02 2.15 
mean VIF 1.52 2.2 3.94 
hetro.test     
(P > chi2 0.2675 0.1292 0.1479 
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Table 20: Multicollinearity and Heteroskedasticity Tests for the corporate governance-financial performance 
Regressions. 
ROA ROE 
Variable 
OLS 
Industry 
Effect 
Firm 
Effect OLS 
Industry 
Effect 
Firm 
Effect 
CGIETH 1.67 1.71 6.99 1.67 1.71 6.99 
GROW 1.13 1.18 1.44 1.13 1.18 1.44 
RISK 1.28 1.49 4.19 1.28 1.49 4.19 
FAM 1.34 1.6 16.91 1.34 1.6 16.91 
COMP 1.47 3.52 23.99 1.47 3.52 23.99 
GOV 1.43 1.55 11.65 1.43 1.55 11.65 
BANK 1.16 1.22 2.85 1.16 1.22 2.85 
CAP 1.51 1.63 3.84 1.51 1.63 3.84 
ADV 1.47 1.54 2.83 1.47 1.54 2.83 
LEV 1.28 1.49 2.93 1.28 1.49 2.93 
SIZE 2.26 2.35 4.34 2.26 2.35 4.34 
POW 1.76 2.08 5.37 1.76 2.08 5.37 
INV 1.44 1.46 1.77 1.44 1.46 1.77 
Industry2 
 
4.6    4.6 
 Industry3 
 
3.21    3.21 
 Industry4 
 
3.26    3.26 
 Industry5 
 
4.98    4.98 
 firm1 
  
6.42   
 
6.42 
firm2 
  
4.3   
 
4.3 
firm3 
  
3.35   
 
3.35 
firm4 
  
4.25   
 
4.25 
firm5 
  
1.9   
 
1.9 
firm6 
  
6.7   
 
6.7 
firm7 
  
3.45   
 
3.45 
firm8 
  
6.93   
 
6.93 
firm9 
  
2.37   
 
2.37 
firm10 
  
4.44   
 
4.44 
firm11 
  
2   
 
2 
firm12 
  
6.39   
 
6.39 
firm13 
  
2.18   
 
2.18 
firm14 
  
3.26   
 
3.26 
firm15 
  
2.06   
 
2.06 
firm16 
  
2.44   
 
2.44 
firm17 
  
2.27   
 
2.27 
firm18 
  
2.36   
 
2.36 
firm19 
  
1.76   
 
1.76 
firm20 
  
4.06   
 
4.06 
222 
 
ROA ROE 
Variable 
OLS 
Industry 
Effect 
Firm 
Effect OLS 
Industry 
Effect 
Firm 
Effect 
firm21 
  
3.24   
 
3.24 
firm22 
  
2.36   
 
2.36 
firm23 
  
4.76   
 
4.76 
firm24 
  
1.94   
 
1.94 
firm25 
  
4.15   
 
4.15 
firm26 
  
2.22   
 
2.22 
firm27 
  
4.58   
 
4.58 
firm28 
  
3.22   
 
3.22 
firm29 
  
4.35   
 
4.35 
firm30 
  
2.19   
 
2.19 
firm31 
  
8.13   
 
8.13 
firm32 
  
2.21   
 
2.21 
firm33 
  
3.9   
 
3.9 
firm34 
  
2.83   
 
2.83 
firm35 
  
2.36   
 
2.36 
firm36 
  
2.5   
 
2.5 
firm37 
  
4.25   
 
4.25 
firm38 
  
6.86   
 
6.86 
firm39 
  
1   
 
2.1 
firm40 
  
2   
 
1.52 
firm41 
  
2.25   
 
1.65 
year2 1.9 1.9 2 1.9 1.9 2 
year3 1.7 1.7 1.77 1.7 1.7 1.77 
year4 1.8 1.8 1.92 1.8 1.8 1.92 
year5 2.01 2.02 2.2 2.01 2.02 2.2 
Mean VIF 1.56 2.2 2.29 1.56 2.2 2.29 
HET TEST 0.3286 0.3801 0.5523 0.9556 0.5714 0.836 
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Table 21: Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity tests for the regression of the moderating effect of firm growth  in 
the governance-financial performance relationship. 
Variable ROA ROE 
CGIETH 7 7 
GROW 2.8 2.8 
CGIETH*GROW 8.3 6.3 
RISK 4.21 4.21 
FAM 6.92 6.92 
COMP 4.01 4.01 
GOV 11.66 11.66 
BANK 2.88 2.88 
CAP 3.85 3.85 
ADV 2.85 2.85 
LEV 3.17 3.17 
SIZE 4.35 4.35 
POW 5.66 5.66 
INV 1.78 1.78 
firm2 6.43 6.43 
firm3 4.38 4.38 
firm4 3.38 3.38 
firm5 4.25 4.25 
firm6 1.9 1.9 
firm7 6.71 6.71 
firm8 3.46 3.46 
firm9 6.94 6.94 
firm10 2.4 2.4 
firm11 4.44 4.44 
firm12 2.01 2.01 
firm13 6.4 6.4 
firm14 2.19 2.19 
firm15 3.27 3.27 
firm16 2.09 2.09 
firm17 2.45 2.45 
firm18 2.27 2.27 
firm19 2.42 2.42 
firm20 1.76 1.76 
firm21 4.06 4.06 
firm22 3.25 3.25 
firm23 2.4 2.4 
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Variable ROA ROE 
firm24 4.77 4.77 
firm25 1.95 1.95 
firm26 4.17 4.17 
firm27 2.23 2.23 
firm28 4.58 4.58 
firm29 3.23 3.23 
firm30 4.35 4.35 
firm31 2.23 2.23 
firm32 8.21 8.21 
firm33 2.21 2.21 
firm34 3.91 3.91 
firm35 2.84 2.84 
firm36 2.36 2.36 
firm37 2.5 2.5 
firm38 4.25 4.25 
firm39 1.88 2.7 
firm40 2.26 3.35 
firm41 1.95 3.45 
firm41 1.64 3.55 
year2 2.98 2.98 
year3 1.77 1.77 
year4 1.93 1.93 
year5 2.2 2.2 
Mean VIF 3.7 3.8 
hetro. test    
(P > chi2)   0.14 0.40 
Table 22: Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity tests for the regression of the moderating effect of firm risk   in the 
governance-financial performance relationship. 
Variable ROA ROE 
CGIETH 7 7 
RISK 8.11 8.11 
CGIETH*RISK 4.41 4.41 
GROW 1.46 1.46 
FAM 7.09 7.09 
COMP 14.04 14.04 
GOV 13.52 13.52 
BANK 2.96 2.96 
CAP 3.84 3.84 
ADV 2.87 2.87 
LEV 3.14 3.14 
SIZE 4.37 4.37 
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Variable ROA ROE 
POW 5.73 5.73 
INV 1.77 1.77 
firm2 6.54 6.54 
firm3 4.42 4.42 
firm4 3.71 3.71 
firm5 4.26 4.26 
firm6 1.9 1.9 
firm7 6.75 6.75 
firm8 3.84 3.84 
firm9 7.24 7.24 
firm10 3.16 3.16 
firm11 4.53 4.53 
firm12 2.01 2.01 
firm13 6.5 6.5 
firm14 2.32 2.32 
firm15 3.49 3.49 
firm16 2.07 2.07 
firm17 2.55 2.55 
firm18 2.27 2.27 
firm19 2.46 2.46 
firm20 1.77 1.77 
firm21 4.15 4.15 
firm22 3.52 3.52 
firm23 2.4 2.4 
firm24 5.1 5.1 
firm25 1.96 1.96 
firm26 4.17 4.17 
firm27 2.74 2.74 
firm28 4.64 4.64 
firm29 3.6 3.6 
firm30 4.46 4.46 
firm31 2.22 2.22 
firm32 8.36 8.36 
firm33 2.23 2.23 
firm34 4.1 4.1 
firm35 2.84 2.84 
firm36 2.55 2.55 
firm37 2.57 2.57 
firm38 4.34 4.34 
firm39 7.15 7.15 
firm40 1.3 2 
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Variable ROA ROE 
firm41 1.01 1.5 
year 2 2.01 2.01 
year3 1.77 1.77 
year 4 1.92 1.92 
year 5 2.21 2.21 
   
 
Mean 4 4  
hetro. test    
(P > chi2)   
 
0.7316 
 
0.7791 
 
 
Table 23: Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity tests for the regression of the moderating effect of owner identity in 
the governance-financial performance relationship. 
Variable ROA ROE 
CGIETH 2.15 2.15 
FAM 8.04 8.04 
COMP 4.56 4.56 
GOV 3.57 3.57 
BANK 4.82 4.82 
CGIETH*FAM 3.74 3.74 
CGIETH*COMP 4.36 4.36 
CGIETH*GOV 4.95 4.95 
CGIETH*BANK 3.49 3.49 
GROW 1.45 1.45 
RISK 4.24 4.24 
CAP 4.03 4.03 
ADV 2.93 2.93 
LEV 3.02 3.02 
SIZE 5.29 5.29 
POW 5.53 5.53 
INV 1.77 1.77 
firm 6.93 6.93 
firm1 4.69 4.69 
firm2 4.2 4.2 
firm3 4.38 4.38 
firm4 2 2 
firm5 6.95 6.95 
firm6 4.68 4.68 
firm7 7.22 7.22 
firm8 2.51 2.51 
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Variable ROA ROE 
firm9 4.59 4.59 
firm10 2.08 2.08 
firm11 7.02 7.02 
firm12 2.22 2.22 
firm13 4.09 4.09 
firm14 2.08 2.08 
firm15 2.66 2.66 
firm16 2.72 2.72 
firm17 2.46 2.46 
firm18 1.76 1.76 
firm19 4.24 4.24 
firm20 4.07 4.07 
firm21 2.6 2.6 
firm22 5.05 5.05 
firm23 1.97 1.97 
firm24 4.63 4.63 
firm25 2.34 2.34 
firm26 4.85 4.85 
firm27 3.75 3.75 
firm28 4.5 4.5 
firm29 2.54 2.54 
firm30 1.27 1.27 
firm31 2.33 2.33 
firm32 4.12 4.12 
firm33 3.09 3.09 
firm34 2.78 2.78 
firm35 2.65 2.65 
firm36 4.46 4.46 
firm37 2.08 2.08 
firm38 2.49 2.49 
firm39 2.21 2.21 
firm40 1.92 1.92 
firm41 1.64 1.64 
year2 2.01 2.01 
year3 1.78 1.78 
year4 1.93 1.93 
year5 2.23 2.23 
Mean 3.1 3.12 
hetro. test   
(P > chi2)   0.4543 0.3993 
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Appendix 6:   
Table 24: endogenous corporate governance. 
 (1) (2) 
 CGIET CGIET 
L.ROA -0.0509  
 (0.1035)  
   
L.ROE  -0.0365 
  (0.0516) 
Control variables Yes Yes  
   
year dummy Yes Yes 
N 168 168 
r2             0.695             0.695 
F 20.10*** 20.15*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
